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ABSTRACT
Current methods of system reliability analysis cannot easily evaluate
the time dependent availability of complex dynamic systems. Improved methods
are needed to treat such issues as process variables, feedback, and rule
based interactions between components.
A dynamic Monte Carlo system availability simulation model is
developed. The basic model, called DYMCAM, is based on three fundamental
modeling objectives. First, to provide the ability to analyze time -dependent
availability of dynamic systems. Second, to provide a model which is easy
to apply and interpret. And third, to create a model which can easily be
modified to incorporate additional features as needed. The output generated
by the program includes time -dependent system unavailability information and
average system unavailability over the duration of the simulated time period.
The DYMCAM model is tested on several basic availability analysis
problems to demonstrate program capabilities. These tests include a single
component with exponential failure and repair times, a single component with
two repair states, a two -out -of- three pump failure system, and a phased
mission problem requiring the forced change of a system component state after
the start of the analysis. A modification of the DYMCAM program was also
developed to demonstrate the capability of treating continuous process
variables in a dynamic simulation model.
Results of all test were compared with analytical results where
possible, and with Markovian analysis techniques in other cases. The
simulation model provided accurate unavailability results on all example
problems tested. Further work needs to be done to expand the capabilities
of the basic DYMCAM model and to continue program testing on more complex
problems
.
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The Engineering conununity has always depended upon the methods of
system reliability evaluation and prediction to solve practical engineering
problems. The use of all engineered structures and inventions is dependent
upon their ability to perform to some predetermined specifications. Thus as
technology advances and systems become more complex it becomes necessary to
derive new and better ways to ensure the reliability of such systems.
Recent examples provide abundant evidence of the need for proper
attention to reliability analysis in engineering design. One prominent case
is the failure of a seal on the booster rocket for the space shuttle
Challenger in January of 1986, which lead to the deaths of five astronauts
and a three year delay in the NASA space shuttle program. In the nuclear
industry, the failure of a pressure operated relief valve to reseat can be
argued to be at least partially the cause for the melt down of the core of
the unit 2 reactor at Three Mile Island in March 1979. And there are many
other such events in all engineering disciplines which indicate dramatically
the results of engineering systems which have not performed adequately.
The field of reliability analysis has continued to meet the challenge
in the increasingly complex technology of today's society. Over the past two
decades many advances have been made in all areas of system analysis and
progress continues to be made. To meet the needs of future technological
advances and to provide for the highest possible levels of safety and
reliability in all aspects of engineering it is necessary for systems
reliability analysts to continue to improve the state of the art by
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identifying and developing new analysis and prediction techniques,
1.2 Background
Today many approaches and methods are employed in the process of system
reliability analysis. For single components which are mass produced and
essentially identical, fundamental probability laws are applied to estimate
the probability of any given component functioning correctly for a specified
number of hours. This estimate is made based on historical performance of
identical component and engineering judgement about any improvements which
may have been made.
For systems made of many components, fault trees or event trees may be
used to calculate static system reliability characteristics as described in
references D-1, M-1, and P-1. From these trees, minimal cut sets are
identified which can be evaluated ntimerically to provide failure rate
information for the system. For complex systems where it is necessary to
determine all combinations of conditions which may lead to a specified
deviation of a system parameter, digraph methods may be used as discussed in
reference K-1. Then fault tree synthesis methods may be used to construct
fault trees from the digraph.
For repairable systems with exponential repair and failure rates,
Markovian analysis may be used to compute time dependent system availability
and unavailability as delineated in references M-1, P-1, and G-2. Markov
systems may be solved explicitly using Laplace transforms, they may be solved
by computing eigenvalues and eigenvectors, or they may be solved by computer
numerical integration techniques. Through use of Chapman- Kolmogorov
equations it is possible to determine the probability of transition between
any two system states given that the probabilities of all intermediate
transitions are known.
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The current methods available can be characterized as belonging to one
of two major categories. These are static reliability analysis methods, and
dynamic methods. The former are useful in determining system reliability at
a specified instant of time. The later give time dependent system
information in either discrete or continuous form. Static methods can give
detailed information about a system at a specific time point, but are often
not useful in evaluating dynamic systems. Dynamic methods give solutions to
time dependent problems, but are often difficult to apply. A simulation
model for dynamic system unavailability analysis can be developed which
allows for easy construction and interpretation of complex dynamic
reliability problems. Such a model could explicitly model interactions
between components and include any desired capabilities such as various
component repair states and testing and maintenance modeling features. There
is a need for such a dynamic simulation model which can easily analyze
complex systems and has the adaptability to be easily modified to handle a
wide variety of problems (e.g., non- exponential transition times, dependent
component failures, and control system reliability problems involving
continuous process variables),
1.3 Organization of this Work
The purpose of this work is to propose a simulation model for dynamic
system availability analysis. In Chapter 2 a survey is performed of the
current techniques being employed in system reliability analysis. Their
applications and limitations are addressed.
In Chapter 3 simulation languages are discussed briefly along with the
specific characteristics of SIMSCRIPT II. 5 which is being used for this
simulation model. Program objectives are examined and all assumptions made
are explained. The chapter concludes with a complete description of the

Dynamic Simulation Model 12
dynamic simulation model.
In Chapter 4 tests are performed on the simulation program and results
are compared with selected established methods to demonstrate the program's
validity. The procedures against which the model is compared include the GO-
FLOW method and Markov chain techniques
.
Chapter 5 presents a modification to the program to demonstrate the
capability to model continuous variables. Specifically, the model is altered
to perform the storage tank problem analyzed by Aldemir in ref . A-1 and ref
.
A-2. Results are compared with a Markovian analysis and the predictions of
ref. A-1.
In Chapter 6 the results obtained with this model are summarized. The
flexibility and adaptability of the simulation model are discussed along with
limitations. The dynamic simulation model is compared with other reliability
analysis techniques and their relative strengths and weaknesses cited. The
chapter concludes with recommendations for future work.

Dynamic Simulation Model 13
Chapter 2
A Survey of Current System Reliability Analysis Techniques
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter a review is done of some of the current methods for
reliability analysis. The literature has been surveyed and papers selected
representing a cross section of the state of the art in reliability
assessment. For ease of discussion these papers have been divided into two
general areas under which all reliability analysis work can be categorized.
These are static reliability analysis tools and dynamic system evaluation
techniques.
In the following sections the current trends in both techniques are
considered by reviewing recent literature. Figure 2.1 indicates the
reliability analysis methods to be discussed and their categorization.
Examples are used to illustrate unique features of the various procedures
,
and where appropriate, weaknesses in the methods are pointed out which could
be avoided by using a dynamic simulation analysis approach. The chapter
concludes with a summary section.
2.2 Static Methods
2.2.1 Fault Trees
One of the most familiar models used in system reliability analysis is
the fault tree, described in reference W-1. The fault tree is a static
system evaluation tool since it applies only to calculating the system
reliability at a specified instant of time. To calculate dynamic information
involves stepping forward in time and re-evaluating the tree.
Fault tree analysis is a deductive approach to system analysis and is
used to compute the probability of an undesirable event, such as the non-












Figure 2.1 system ReliaOiility Analysis Methods
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operation of a system. The fault tree is a logic structure indicating how
combinations of basic failure events can lead to the undesirable event of
interest. The fault tree is then used to assess the probability that a
system of components will be in a particular discrete state at a given point
in time.
All fault tree analysis methods use a minimum of three logic operators.
These are the AND gate, the OR gate, and the basic event or component, which
has a set of failure data associated with it. Basic events in the tree refer
to faults.
The methodology of fault tree construction consists of three steps.
Step one is to identify the system to be analyzed and what boundaries are to
be imposed. Step two is to determine the terminal failure event. This is
the "top event" to be evaluated. And step three is to work backwards through
the system to the component level to determine which combinations of
component failures lead to system failure. This third step involves
generating the logic structure known as the fault tree. Once the fault tree
has been constructed, a boolean algebra expression can be written and solved
numerically for the probability of the top event given the failure data
concerning the individual components. Automated fault tree construction is
possible using the CAT computer code as discussed by Apostolakis in reference
A-4.
Consider the example shown in Figure 2.2A. The system consists of
three valves which are supplied with flow from source A. Failure of the
system is defined as occurring when flow is not present at point B. All
three valves are normally open. In step one of constructing a fault tree for
this system, the boundaries of the system are defined as the flow source A
and the flow sink B. The second step is to determine the undesired event










P(No Flow to B) - P(No Flow at A) * P(Valve 3 closed)
* (P(Valve 1 closed)*P(Valve 2 closed))
c) Boolean Expression
Figure 2.2 Fault Tree Example Problem
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which for this example is loss of flow at point B. The third step is to
identify which combinations of event can lead to the "top event." For this
simple system, there will be no flow at B if valve three fails closed, if
valves one and two fail closed, or if there is no flow from the source A.
The fault tree can be constructed by tracing backwards from point B. Figure
2 . 2B shows the fault tree for the example.
Based on the Boolean logic expressed by the fault tree, an expression
can be written which quantifies the probability of the top event occurring.
For the example, an approximate version of this expression is shown in Figure
2.2C. This expression can be evaluated numerically if the probabilities of
all basic events are known. For complicated systems, computer codes are
available which quantify the tree automatically.
Fault tree methods evaluate only the probability of a system being in
a specified state at a given time, thus they do not directly apply to dynamic
problems. But by thoughtful construction of a fault tree, and by evaluating
the tree over and over again it is possible to treat dynamic problems in a
discrete fashion. Repair and failure cycles can even be considered.
Important limitations do exist, however. For instance, consider the example
of Figure 2.3. The system is composed of two pumps providing flow to point
A. Failure of the system occurs if flow is not provided by at least one of
the two pumps, both of which are normally operating. If the failure rate of
each pump depends on how many cycles of repair and failure it has been
through, a fault tree of the system will be very clumsy (there will be a
branch for each possible cycle) . Thus a fault tree is not well suited for
such a problem.
A variation on the fault tree method is described in reference D-2 by
Dhillon and Rayapati. This method is similar to fault tree techniques but



























c.) Component Fauit Tree
Figure 2.3 Fault Tree Limitation Example
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involves systems composed of three state devices in series, parallel, series
-
parallel, and bridge configurations of any complexity. Any system which can
be modeled in this fashion can be simplified through a series of reduction
steps to a single equivalent three state component representing the entire
system. This method assumes independence of all components.
Since a three state component is simply a model of a component which
can fail open (on) or closed (off) and must be in one of these two failed
states, or operational, it is clear that a fault tree can be constructed to
model the same system and identical results would be obtained. The authors
suggest this approach as possibly being of beneficial use to practical minded
reliability engineers because of its simplicity and ease of use on
appropriate problems.
2.2.2 GO Methodology
Another approach which solves for static system reliability is the GO
methodology which was developed in the mid-1960' s by Kaman Sciences
Corporation. It gives results similar to fault tree evaluation computer
codes, but differs significantly in its approach and structure. References
G-1 and B-1 describe the GO procedures and a modified GO approach
respectively.
The GO methodology is a "success oriented" technique which uses an
inductive approach to determine the probability of a system being in a
specified state. The procedure combines component probabilities and
interactions to produce the probabilities of preselected output events. A
set of standardized operators is available which are used to model all of
the physical components in the system. Components are then linked using
signals which represent the probability that the system is operational up to
that point in the system diagram. This resulting GO chart in many cases
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closely resembles a schematic diagram of the physical system layout.
There are seventeen basic operators in the GO method designed to
incorporate the majority of logic functions found in physical system
components. These operators include the three logic operators comprising the
fault tree code methods plus fourteen additional ones which provide the
capability to model the logic of most physical components with a single
operator. Figure 2.4 shows the GO operators and is taken directly from
reference G-1. For components which are not readily modeled by a simple
operator it is possible to create a "supertjrpe" which is a compilation of
several operators to model a given component. This supertype can then be used
to model the given component at every place it appears in the system. The
object being to generate a GO chart model whose components very closely
resemble the actual system components and operation.
The method of GO analysis consists of six basic steps. First, the
system to be analyzed must be defined and all necessary information such as
schematics, system description, success criteria, logic diagrams, and
operating procedures must be gathered. Second, all inputs and outputs from
the system, and each individual component must be determined and
interrelated. A system may have many inputs and outputs unlike the fault
tree method which has one output, the terminal event. To solve an identical
problem using fault tree methods, several separate fault trees must be drawn.
Third, a functional GO chart is drawn which indicates which components are
dependent and which are independent operators. Fourth, each operator on the
functional GO chart is assigned a type from one of the seventeen basic
operators. Fifth, each operator is assigned a kind number so that if several
valves in the system are identical, the failure data may be entered once for
that "kind" of valve. Finally, the signal sequence must be identified so
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Figure 2.4 GO Operators^
^ From Reference G-1 page 2-3.
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that when the program runs the logical flow of the information in the model
will be the same as the actual system.
The GO approach forces the analyst to begin the modelling process after
defining system boundaries by inductively progressing from input to output
by modelling the functional relationships between hardware components to get
a successful input event to an output event. The basic events in the model
are thus hardware components. Each component or operator, depending on its
type, may exist in a variety of states, ie. open, closed, failed, failed
prematurely, etc. This allows the model to more closely resemble actual
system operation.
All signals existing in a GO analysis are numbers representing
probabilities of existence of physical quantities, including flows, voltages,
actuation signals, etc. Thus all signals have values between zero and one.
When the GO program is run the logic operators operate on the signals in much
the same fashion as the fault tree codes to produce the final output signal
strength. The output or outputs will have values between zero and one
indicating the probability of occurrence of the output event.
Figure 2.5A shows a schematic diagram of an example system containing
a fluid source, two pumps, two check valves, and a remote operated valve.
This system is modeled with GO operators in Figure 2.5B. The operators in
the GO chart contain numbers indicating which type of GO operator is being
used. The second number inside some of the operator symbols corresponds to
the specific "kind" of operator. For example, operator number 6 is used to
model both the two pumps and the motor operated valve. The two pumps are
identical and are therefore assigned the same "kind" number, which in this
case is 2. The valve is assigned a "kind" number of 4. When the GO program
is executed, an input file is used which provides failure data for each
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separate operator "kind"
.
It is readily seen from this example that the GO chart provides a
system representation which very much resembles the physical plant layout.
The model shows all components of the system and shows the relationships
between them. The signals between components are numbered indicating the
order in which system analysis progresses. Thus the GO method allows for
time sequencing of events but does not provide dynamic availability
information. Once a GO chart is created and an appropriate input file
generated for computer evaluation, results are calculated in a manner very
similar to fault tree analysis. The GO program will find and quantify all
cutsets of the system, and print the minimal cutsets, if desired. The final
result provided for the example of Figure 2.5 would indicate the probability
of flow existing at point C at a specified instant of time. As with fault
tree methods, to compute the system reliability at another time point will
require a separate run of the program with a modified input file to reflect
the new component failure probabilities.
The modified GO method proposed by Billinton and Patwardhan in
reference B-1 presents simple changes to the original GO model. Since the
basic GO method assumes independence of series elements, Billinton and
Patwardhan point out that the method can lead to severe underestimation of
the system reliability. The modification proposes using equivalent
components to replace the individual components in a series system thereby
incorporating the concept of dependence into series networks. The results
are important for systems in which the failure of one series element does not
prevent the subsequent failure of another element in the series while the
first is under repair. Numerical examples illustrate the difference in
results obtained from the two approaches. Both concepts are useful tools in















Figure 2.5 GO Excunple Problem





Event trees are an inductive logic method used to identify the various
possible outcomes of a given initiating event. The initiating event is
normally some type of system component failure event or it could be an event
external to the system. Event trees step through the possible consequences
of the initiating event, and thus can be thought of as a quasi -dynamic
reliability analysis tool since the passage of time is required between
successive events in the event tree.
To illustrate the use of event trees, consider the example of Figure
2.6 which is taken from reference M-1. The example wishes to determine the
probability of release or radioactivity from a nuclear reactor resulting from
a large loss of coolant accident. The first step in event tree analysis is
to identify the initiating event. For the example the initiating event is
a large pipe break. The next step is to identify all applicable systems
which may effect the outcome of the event. For the example, these are
electric power availability, ECCS availability, fission product removal
system availability, and containment integrity. The order in which these
systems should appear in the event tree will depend on the logical
relationship between them. Note that these logical relationships may
conflict with the temporal sequence of events. For example, if the ECCS
system depends partially on the availability of electricity, then electric
power should come first in the event tree. In some problems, the order may
be unimportant if systems are unrelated.
After all applicable systems are determined, then the success and
























































b.) Reduced Event Tree
Figure 2.6 Event Tree Example^
Taken from Reference M-1 page 195.
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the tree of Figure 2 . 6A can be drawn representing all basic events. Some of
the sequences shown may not be physically possible due to timing constraints
and sequential and conditional dependencies, thus the next step is to
eliminate the impossible states. The end result will be the reduced fault
tree shown in Figure 2.6B. Each branch represent a possible outcome as a
result of the initiating event. Each branch is quantified based on the
transfer probabilities indicated. Determination of these individual transfer
probabilities may involve the use of fault tree diagrams.
The example shows that event trees can be used in a limited sense to
evaluate dynamic problems. The method requires that all system states be
determined before quantification of the final state probabilities in much the
same fashion as fault tree analysis. Once the event tree is identified and
all transfer probabilities determined, calculation of terminal probabilities
is straightforward and involves only simple multiplication as indicated in
Figure 2.6. The major drawback of the event tree method is that it can not
treat systems which contain loops. For example, in Figure 2.6, if the ECCS
system fails and is then repaired it is desireable to transfer to another
branch of the event tree. This can not be done without including a separate
branch from the ECCS failed condition, which can certainly be done. However,
if the problem to be analyzed contains an infinite possibility of component
repair and failure cycles, the corresponding event tree must contain an
infinite number of branches. This is not practical and thus limits the
applicability of the event tree method to those systems which do not contain
loops leading back to an event condition through which the analysis has
already passed.
2.3.2 Digraphs
The method of digraphs is a tool used for analyzing relationships in
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complex systems in which the desired operational state of one component may
depend on the actual state of another component in the system or upon the
level of a system process variable. These types of interactions are
characteristic of all process control problems, and digraphs are a useful
tool for analyzing causes of abnormal events in these systems. For example,
a control system may monitor the level of fluid in a storage tank which
supplies water to several different sources. Assume there are three pumps
which can provide fluid input to the tank, and that the number of pumps
operating at a given instant of time depends on the fluid level of the tank.
If the tank is nearly empty, then all three pumps may be required to be on,
while if the tank is almost full, only one, or none of the pumps may be
required. A digraph analysis of this problem will treat the interaction of
the fluid level causing pumps to turn on and off in a cause and effect type
manner
.
Reference K-1 by Kohda and Henley gives a detailed description of a
digraph method. A digraph is a structure consisting of nodes and edges.
Nodes represent process variables, or certain types of failure events and
edges indicate a relation between two connected node variables. A digraph
will resemble actual system configuration and can be easily constructed from
a flowsheet of the process to be analyzed and a schematic diagram of the
equipment. Fault trees are directly synthesized from digraphs and then
analysis continues in the same manner as for fault tree methods. The
additional capability is that the digraphs are designed to treat continuously
variable processes. This procedure is ideally suited for process control
type problems where component states depend on the value of a continuously
varying signal, and where there is a need to determine the likelihood of
deviating from steady state by a given amount. Results of the analysis
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provide information on the probability that the system is in a given state
at specified discrete time points. However, Kohda and Henley state in ref.
K-1 that, in their view, none of the automated fault tree construction
methods available, including the new one they propose, are successful in
providing complete, consistent, and correct failure modes without human
intervention and judgement. Thus the method of digraphs may involve
considerable work to construct the digraph and then compose an appropriate
fault tree
.
Digraphs are a useful tool for identifying the minimal combinations of
disturbance conditions which can lead to a specified undesirable condition
at a digraph node. This is especially useful for optimizing control system
design. The method includes dynamic system considerations, as the sequencing
of component and process interactions must be considered when constructing
the digraph. The analysis results obtained are not a dynamic representation
of the system unavailability, but rather a listing of disturbances which can
lead to undesirable performance of the system being analyzed. The method of
digraphs requires complete knowledge of system behavior before analysis can
begin, so that all possible system disturbance modes are identified and
included in the digraph analysis.
2.3.3 GO-FLOW Methodology
Developed by Matsuoka and Kobayashi, the GO-FLOW method was generated
in the mid- 1980' s as a success -oriented system analysis technique to analyze
the time dependent unavailability of phased mission problems. References
M-2 and M-3 give a detailed description of the method, philosophy, and
structure as well as several illustrative examples.
The GO- FLOW methodology is derived from the GO code and is therefore
similar to it in many respects. The GO- FLOW method uses an inductive
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approach and a combination of ten basic operators to create a GO- FLOW chart
which very much resembles a schematic diagram of the system being modeled.
The GO-FlOW operators are shown in Figure 2.7, which is taken from reference
M-2. Table 2.1, also taken from reference M-2 suimnarizes the output
relationships for each of the operator types. The idea is to create a
reliability model which can be easily understood by the design engineer. The
modeling process for GO- FLOW is much the same as for the GO methodology.
The GO- FLOW chart will look similar to a GO chart except for the fact
that there are fewer basic operators available in the GO -FLOW method. All
GO -FLOW operators have corresponding operators in the GO code but the
operation of each is slightly different. Each of the seven additional
operators used by the GO code can be modeled using combinations of the other
basic operators in the GO -FLOW code.
The major difference between the two methods is the manner in which
signals between operators are treated. The signals in a GO model correspond
to the probability that a component is in a given state independent of time.
Thus, a time dependent system analysis cannot be performed. Signals can go
from "on" to "off" or vice versa but they can not go from "on" to "off" and
then back to "on." Thus it is not directly possible to incorporate repair
in a GO model. In a GO-FLOW model, on the other hand, many signals represent
probabilities, but they are functions of discrete time points. Some signals
represent only time information to cause proper activation of time dependent
operators at the proper instant during the process of the analysis. Thus a
GO- FLOW model, unlike the GO model, is time dependent. The GO model
incorporates time sequencing in its analysis but the GO-FLOW method simulates
the actual passage of time through discrete time steps. Signals in a GO
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Failure of Ligfit Bulb
Figure 2.7 GO-FLOW Operators^
Taken from Reference M-2 page 66.
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Taken from Reference M-2 page 67.
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model signals represent time dependent component state information. This is
the major point of difference between GO- FLOW and its predecessor.
With this time capability GO- FLOW has the additional potential of being
able to perform an unavailability analysis incorporating repair in the model.
To do a time dependent analysis with the GO code would require several runs
of the program and changing the input information for each separate run. The
GO method can find the time when a system changes from one state to another
but it can not analyze a system which has more than one state change.
In the GO-FLOW methodology signals correspond to the existence of physical
quantities at various points in time. Sub- input signals to certain operators
represent time information rather than probabilities and therefore can take
on values greater than one. Signals are time dependent reflecting the fact
that the GO -FLOW code is set up to perform time dependent unavailability
analysis
.
Figure 2.8 shows the GO-FLOW chart for the light bulb problem analyzed
in section five of Chapter 4. This figure is taken from reference M-2. The
actual system diagram is shown in Figure 4.10 of Chapter 4. Each operator
in the GO -FLOW chart of Figure 2.8 contains an operator type number
corresponding to one of the 10 basic operators. This is the top number in
each symbol. The lower number is simply the component number assigned. Each
operator in the system must have a separate component number. Component
number 4 is shown twice in the figure because it supplies a signal to two
separate components. All signals in the system are also number sequentially
indicating the time sequence which will be used in system analysis. Table
2.2 summarizes the operators used in Figure 2.8. Table 2.3 defines the
signals of the example system. Both of these tables are from reference M-2.
Using the equations associated with each operator, as shown in Table

Dynamic Simulation Model 34
Figure 2.8 GO-FLOW Chart Example
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2.1, it is possible to step through the analysis and determine the
probability that at least one light is lit at each of the designated time
points. Specifically, time points 1, 2 and 3 correspond to time t-0.0. Time
point 1 is prior to any system change, time point 2 corresponds to connecting
the battery, and time point 3 is when switch SI is closed. Time point 4
corresponds to time t=10.0 hours, but prior to closing of switch S2, and time
point 5 corresponds to switch S2 being closed (at t-10.0 hours). Time point
6 is at t-20.0 hours. The output signal of each operator is determined at
each time point by applying the operator equations. Signals are evaluated
sequentially as numbered since input signals to operators must be determined
before outputs can be calculated. Time points are also evaluated
sequentially after all signals for the preceding time point are calculated,
because certain operator types require knowledge of the previous input and
output signals. These calculations are all done internally by the GO-FLOW
program, but can be done manually if desired.
For the example problem shown if Figure 2.8, which is also treated in
Chapter 4, manual calculations were performed to calculate output signal
intensities at each of the designated time points. The results indicate the
probability that the indicated signal exists at the selected time point.
These results are compared with simulation estimates in Chapter 4. Table 2.4
provides a summary of the signal strengths calculated at each of the time
points. The results shown for signal 12, the output of operator 12, are used
in Chapter 4 for comparison with the results obtained using the simulation
program method.
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Operator
Table 2.2
Operators Used in GO-FLOW Sample Problem
MeaningTvT3e Number Data
25 1 R(1)=0.0,
R(t)=1.0 (t not equal 1)
25 2 R(3)=1.0,
R(t)=0.0 (t not equal 3)
25 3 R(5)=1.0,
R(t)=0.0 (t not equal 5)
25 4 R(4)=10.0,R(6)=10.0,
R(t)=0.0 (t not equal 4.6)
21 5 Pg - 0.9
26 6 Pg - 0.7
21 7 Pg - 0.8
35 8 A = 0.001/h
26 9 Pg - 0.7
21 10 Pg - 0.8
35 11 A - 0.001/h
22 12
Battery is connected
Demand signal for switch SI to
close





Switch Si closes normally with
probability 0.7
Light bulb LI works with
probability 0.8
Failure of LI while on
Switch S2 closes normally with
probability 0.7
Light bulb L2 works with
probability 0.8
Failure of L2 while on
OR gate
Table 2.3















Demand signal for SI to close
Demand signal for S2 to close
Time duration
Battery provides power for both lights
Power is available at LI
LI lights up without demand failure
LI is on
Power is available at L2
L2 lights up without demand failure
L2 is on
Either LI or L2 is on (final signal)
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Table 2.4
Calculation Steps for Sample Problem
Operator Signal Intensity of Output Signal for Time Points 1 to 6
Number Input Output 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 --- 1 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 --- 2 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 --- 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
4 --- 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
5 15 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
6 5,(2) 6,(5) 0.0 0.0 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
7 6 7,(5) 0.0 0.0 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504
8 7,(4) 8,(5) 0.0 0.0 0.504 0.4990 0.4990 0.4940
9 5,(3) 9,(5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.63 0.63
10 9 10,(5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.504 0.504
11 10,(4) 11,(5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.504 0.4990
12 8,11 12 0.0 0.0 0.504 0.4990 0.7236 0.7191
2.3 Markovian Analysis
Markov models are useful in determining steady state and time dependent
availability measures, Markov analysis techniques are predominantly applied
to systems which are normally solved in continuous time. The major drawbacks
of the method are that it can not easily be used to treat phased mission
problems and the basic Markov models require all state transition rates to
be exponentially distributed.
To solve a complex phased mission problem using the Markov method would
require using Markov chains in which the probability of being in any state
is calculated up to the point where the possible states of the system are
changed using straightforward Markov analysis. Then the new states are added
to the analysis and new Markov equations are written. The results from the
first stage are used to define the initial probabilities of being in any of
the new states. The analysis progresses in time until the next point where
the state space of the system is changed by an external event such as
maintenance, testing, or a control function. The chain method can be used
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to analyze process control system problems by discretization techniques,
however for complex problems the Markov chains may become unmanageably large.
Many fundamental system reliability and risk analysis texts such as
references B-2, D-1, M-1, and P-1 give adequate descriptions of the basic
Markov modeling techniques. The essential step is first to identify all of
the possible states the system can be in. For a system of twenty components
which can be in either an operating or a failed state there are 2^° possible
system states indicating the need for reduction techniques to simplify the
problem. These methods often involve the use of absorbing states and simple
numerical procedures allowing for truncation and approximation of values.
Reference P-3 by Papazoglou and Gyftopoulos discusses the technique of
merging which can also be used to reduce the order of a Markov system. This,
of course, can lead to results which are not exact, but can be made to have
arbitrarily small error percentages.
Once all system states are identified, a set of first order
differential equations is written describing the rate of transfer in and out
of each state. If the transfer rates are exponential and are constant with
time, then the system is described by a set of linear, constant coefficient,
first order differential equations and can easily be solved by any one of a
number of methods. These include matrix exponentiation, Laplace transforms,
eigenvalues, and discrete time integration techniques such as the Runge-Kutta
method. For cases where state transition times are not exponential, the
system of differential equations are no longer Markovian. These non-
Markovian systems, which can be represented by discrete state spaces, may be
solvable by one of the three techniques described in ref . P-1. These include
the method of supplementary variables, the dummy states method, and the
embedded chain approach. All of these techniques involve attempts to reduce
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the system to an equivalent Markovian problem. However, large systems which
can be explicitly modeled by these techniques are very rare and thus without
the use of simplifying assumptions or approximate mathematical procedures,
the use of these methods is extremely limited.
Current work in the area of Markovian analysis centers around two
areas. These include methods to reduce the order of the system and methods
to incorporate dynamic system characteristics for modeling systems with
phased mission scenarios. Several papers on recent work are considered here.
In reference J-1, Johnson discusses a general availability model and
basic modeling techniques. Rules for writing the state transition matrix
and its eigenvalues and eigenvectors are given. Then formulas are discussed
for computing approximate results for state probabilities based on the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Three fundamental cases are examined to
demonstrate the approach for determining steady state availability values.
These three cases are a system involving no repair, a system of N components
having identical repair and failure rates, and an N component system in which
only one component can be failed at a time. The paper covers basic concepts
and gives a general review of Markov modeling.
Jeong, Chang, and Kim propose applying Markovian analysis techniques
to fault tree evaluation in reference J-2. The purpose is to produce time
dependent availability results of a continuous nature directly from the fault
tree structures and to correctly incorporate component maintenance and
testing, i.e. to model dependencies on the state of the system. Their method
is to describe basic events in a modified fault tree by Markovian analysis
techniques . The new tree contains numerous Markov states and includes system
state dependencies such as whether or not components are undergoing
maintenance. This new discrete state, continuous time model is quite large.
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thus Jeong, Chang, and Kim introduce the concept of a super component to
reduce the order of the transition matrix. These super components contain
a niamber of basic events from the fault tree and provide the fundamental
means by which the tree is converted to a Markovian process with a minimal
number of states to be solved for. Results provide dynamic availability data
for the system while incorporating maintenance and testing.
Reference G-2 by Gray deals with simplifying complex systems. The
method applies only to systems containing parallel active and redundant
subgroups of identical components and should prove useful in designing and
analyzing redundant systems. Each subgroup is analyzed using Markov
techniques to determine the time dependent behavior of all components in the
subgroup within the context of the subgroup as a separate unit. The
reliability of the subgroup can then be determined. From the expression
governing this relationship it is possible to calculate a mean and a standard
deviation of the subgroup time to failure. If the time to failure can be
modeled as exponentially distributed then the subgroup can be replaced by an
"equivalent element." Then further decomposition may continue if a parallel
subgroup of "equivalent elements" can be modeled in the same fashion.
This method can greatly reduce the order of a complex system to be
solved by Markovian analysis and therefore reduce the computer time necessary
relative to matrix powering techniques used to solve the same problem.
However, application is limited, as the method requires that there be
parallel subgroups of like components, and even when such structures exist,
they can only be replaced with "equivalent elements" if analysis of the
subgroup shows it to have exponential repair and failure distributions, which
certainly may not always be the case.
An important characteristic of the Markov model is that at any time the
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system can be completely described by specifying the state the system is in
and all of the exponential transfer rates in and out of each system state.
Solving the system of equations provides time dependent information about the
probability that the system is in any one of the possible states, however if
it is necessary to know the probability of transition between any two states
at a specified time it is essential to use the Chapman- Kolmogorov equations.
The Chapman- Kolmogorov equations are given by:
N
Pjk^^'^'^ = I Pji ^^'-^ ^k ^-'^'^ ^2.1)
i=l
where t ' < u < t
These allow direct calculation of transition probabilities provided all
possible intermediate transitions are determined first. In reference L-1
Limnios describes a new method for numerical solution of the Kolmogorov
equations for continuous time Markov chains. The method provides a very
simple numerical treatment which can be applied directly in discrete time
solutions of Markov systems. The error can be made arbitrarily small through
proper choice of parameters. The procedure requires less operations than
direct development for cases where the norm of the state transition matrix
is large (greater than five). The larger the norm of the transition matrix,
the greater the computational savings. This method will prove useful in
numerical computer codes which solve Markov systems through the use of matrix
exponentiation techniques.
Another variation of the Markov approach is discussed by Aldemir in
references A-1 and A- 2. This method describes a dynamic failure model for
evaluation of process control systems. The approach is unique in that most
techniques consider simple binary components which are either failed or
operational and this method considers continuous state dynamic variables
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including such parameters as temperature, pressure, and liquid level. The
method, which is described in detail in reference A-1, is based on discrete
state space, discrete time representation of process control system djmamics
and probabilistic system behavior simulated by Markov chains. An algorithm
is developed for construction of the state transition matrix and input
preparation for the algorithm is illustrated by example. The method is
demonstrated to be effective for accurate failure analysis of process control
systems.
Markovian analysis procedures provide a means for determining system
state continuous time (or discrete time) availability information. The
method applies only to components with exponentially distributed repair and
failure rates. Once the state transition equations are derived it is always
possible to solve the system exactly although in many cases exact solution
may require a prohibitive amount of computational effort. The mathematics
involved can become extremely cumbersome as the size of the system increases
since the number of system states expands exponentially with the number of
system components. The method also does not lend itself well to phased
mission analysis although Markov chains can be used as discussed above.
Example Markov solutions are shown in conjunction with the sample simulation
problems considered in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.3.5 Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is a system reliability analysis approach which
has great potential for solving complex analysis problems. Descriptions of
the method of Monte Carlo simulation for system reliability analysis can be
found in references B-2 and P-1 and many other systems reliability analysis
texts. The basic approach involves generating a computer model which
simulates operation of the system under consideration. Random number
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generators are used to model the random events in the system such as failure
and repair of components. For each set of random numbers (experiment), the
program is run and the result is a discrete time description of all system
process variables and/or system component states. The experiment is
performed a series of times and the results are averaged over all of the
trials to provide an estimate of the system reliability. For example, if the
availability of a system, A(t) , is to be determined, the simulation can be
run for N trials, each simulating system operation over a fixed time period,
T, The value of A(t) for each trial can be stored for selected discrete time
points to provide A(t | trial i) . An estimate of A(t) can then be made at
the discrete time points using the equation:
N
A'(t) =
[^1 ^ A (t|trial i) (2.2)
i=l
where A'(t) is an estimate of A(t)
As N goes to infinity this estimate will approach the exact analytical
result. The variance of the estimate A' (t) is proportional to 1/N, thus to
reduce the standard deviation of the estimate it is necessary to increase the
number of trials performed.
There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of Monte Carlo
simulation. One major advantage is that since a simulation model is
developed to fit the problem, it is possible to quantitatively evaluate any
system regardless of the form of the transfer rate expressions and the
complexity of the system itself. In theory, results can be made as accurate
as desireable by improving the modeling assumptions and running the
experiment for an arbitrarily large number of trials. However, herein also
lies the major disadvantage. To develop extremely accurate models for
complex systems may involve a relatively large amount of time for formation
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of the program and excessive cost in computer time for execution since the
number of trials required to obtain acceptable results may be unreasonable.
And, in general, references G-3 and P-1 agree that the amount of simulation
time required to provide reasonable confidence in the results obtained will
be far larger than the time required to acquire an analytical solution to the
same problem, provided an analytic solution can be achieved. Monte Carlo
simulation methods are being used in many engineering fields and one example
is in the area of electric power generating system reliability. References
A- 3 and G-3 both deal with this subject in detail. In reference G-3, Ghajar
and Billinton use Monte Carlo simulation to produce a generating system
outage history over a period of time combined with a load model to determine
adequacy indices. In this model start-up and shut-down of individual
generating units are modeled and start-up failures are modeled distinctly
from running failures. The model is applied to the IEEE Reliability Test
System (RTS) and it demonstrates good agreement with analytical results.
Reference A- 3 by Allan, Jebril, Saboury, and Roman, similarly evaluates
power system reliability using Monte Carlo simulation, but with a slightly
different model. Results of this model for the IEEE RTS are compared with
the analytical results and again the mean values of the indices indicate
favorable outcomes. It is noted, however, that the standard deviation or
dispersion of the results is extreme even though mean values are consistent.
This can be of major importance since relevant decisions may be made based
on dispersion characteristics of certain indices. For this model it may be
necessary to run a much larger number of trials or possibly to employ
variance reduction techniques.
Reference L-2 by Lewis and Zhuguo describes how Monte Carlo sampling
procedures are used to solve inhomogeneous Markov processes. Inhomogeneous
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Markov processes refer to systems which can be modeled by a discrete state
space, but the transition rates are time dependent. These problems are
solved with Markovian analysis techniques by using Monte Carlo sampling to
determine the times between state transitions. It is explained that Monte
Carlo methods are capable of treating Markov models which would be
intractable by deterministic computational methods. In the reference, a
model is developed which can treat Markov systems with time dependent
transition rates and which allows for periodic testing and maintenance. The
paper concludes with remarks concerning the development of future Monte Carlo
simulation models for system reliability analysis which incorporate the
concept of cumulative damage.
Kumamoto, Tanaka, and Inoue describe a new Monte Carlo method for
evaluating system failure probabilities in reference K-2, They explain that
for extremely reliable systems the method of direct Monte Carlo simulation
is not applicable since the number of trials required to obtain meaningful
results would be prohibitive. This fact is well known and variance reduction
techniques are applied to yield smaller variances with the same number of
trials as direct Monte Carlo methods. Karp and Luby have previously
developed the Karp -Luby minimum variance estimator (KLM) which is used to
estimate the minimum number of trials necessary to achieve results which are
accurate within certain variance limits. The KLM method can only be applied
to a system if all the minimal cut sets are known. A variance is specified
and then the KLM estimates the number of trials necessary to achieve
satisfactory results with the Karp-Luby Monte Carlo method.
Kumamoto, Tanaka, and Inoue have developed what they call the "New
Coverage Monte Carlo" (NCM) method and an associated minimum variance
estimator. Their method is very similar in nature to the Karp-Luby method,
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however they are able to achieve results of equal accuracy with a far fewer
number of trials thus saving considerable computer time. Their method can
only be applied to systems composed of components with very small failure
probabilities and the smaller the component failure probabilities are the
more pronounced the benefit this method provides over the Karp-Luby method.
Monte Carlo simulation methods are seen to be extremely useful in
evaluating system reliability for complex systems which often can not be
solved analytically. This method also allows for straightforward analysis
of phased mission problems. It can be, however, quite time consuming to use
and the results can have large variances associated with them.
2 . 6 Chapter Summary
The many methods for system reliability analysis can be broadly grouped
into two basic categories. Those methods which provide static system
information and those which can be used to do dynamic analyses . Of the
static methods, fault tree analysis procedures and the GO methodology were
considered. For dynamic analysis methods, event trees, digraphs, Markovian
analysis, the GO-FLOW methodology, and simulation were discussed.
The two static methods provide excellent tools for evaluating average
system unavailability but have only limited applicability to solving dynamic
problems. Separate program runs or computation sets must be done to evaluate
the system at each discrete time point of interest. Also because of their
static nature, they can not be used to solve phased mission problems without
performing numerous intermediate analysis computations.
Of the dynamic methods it was seen that availability information can
be obtained for all manner of complex systems, however each method has its
limitations or drawbacks. Event trees can not be used to treat systems which
contain an indefinite number of failure and repair loops and are only quasi-
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dynamic, as they involve the passage of time in the event tree sequencing of
events. Markovian analysis provides detailed information about time
dependent unavailability, but can only be applied to systems containing
components with exponentially distributed transition times. GO-FLOW allows
for consideration of any manner of transition time distributions, however it
is only designed to treat discrete state devices. If continuously varying
process variables are to be considered a complex discretization scheme must
be developed.
With the possible exception of the GO and GO-FLOW methodologies, all
system reliability analysis techniques discussed require development of a
model where all possible system states are clearly defined. An alternative
to this type of problem analysis is the simulation approach. A Monte Carlo
simulation approach can be developed which requires only an understanding of
the components involved in the system and the relationships between them.
In the next chapter a benchmark model is developed which provides a simple
approach to determining the availability of complex systems.
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Chapter 3
DYHCAM Dynamic Simulation Model
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, one of the methods discussed for evaluating the
reliability of complex systems was the Monte Carlo simulation technique.
There are many ways that this technique can be implemented using a computer,
and the way the computer program functions, along with the usefulness of the
simulation results, can be dependent on the simulation language which is
used. In this chapter simulation languages are discussed in general and
their benefits and weaknesses with regard to Monte Carlo simulation
programming are examined. The SIMSCRIPT II. 5 simulation language is used
for the dynamic simulation model developed in this work. It is described in
the second section of this chapter along with an explanation of why this
language is believed to be useful for a Monte Carlo simulation model of the
type developed in this work. The SIMSCRIPT language is a powerful simulation
tool and has not been used to its fullest extent in this work. The program
developed here is a basic model designed to demonstrate fundamental features
of a simulation approach to availability analysis, and limitations of this
program should not be viewed as limitations of the SIMSCRIPT language or
simulation in general.
Following the discussion of simulation languages, the subsequent
sections of this chapter describe in detail the design objectives that were
used in developing the DYMCAM (DYnamic Monte Carlo Availability Model)
program proposed. Certain assumptions were made to keep the initial DYMCAM
program at a manageable size for this introductory work, and these
assumptions are detailed explicitly in Section 3.3. The fourth section gives
a detailed description of the DYMCAM program. This program has been written
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in a very general form and throughout this work it is pointed out where
simple modifications can be made to the program to make it more powerful or
to meet specific needs. Many such modification proposals are included in the
program description section of this chapter. For a detailed description of
the input file format necessary to run the program, Appendix A should be
consulted. The chapter concludes with a summary section.
3.2 Simulation Languages
3.2.1 An Overview
To fully appreciate the method of Monte Carlo simulation for systems
reliability analysis, it is necessary to understand simulation as a tool, and
what its advantages and disadvantages are. Reference B-4 by Banks and Carson
is an excellent text for studying simulation techniques. In addition, in
reference B-5, also by Banks and Carson, there is a good description of
several process -interaction simulation languages. Different simulation
languages are designed to be used for certain types of problems and it is
necessary to know which languages are best used for Monte Carlo problems.
This section takes a general look at simulation approaches.
It should be pointed out that in the area of system reliability
analysis, simulation can be an important tool since there are niomerous
examples of large complex problems which cannot be solved by analytical
techniques. Monte Carlo procedures are very useful for many such instances.
Further, even in cases where analytical solutions are available it may be
desireable to use simulation methods. The advantages and disadvantages must
be understood, however. Presently, the methods of simulation are not widely
used in reliability analysis. Reference S-1 by Schmidt and Taylor specifies
some primary advantages and disadvantages of simulation and these are listed
in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1
Advantages and Disadvantages of Simulation
Advantages
:
- Once a model is built, it can be used repeatedly to analyze
proposed designs or policies.
- Simulation models are usually easier to apply than analytic
methods. Thus there are many more potential users of
simulation models than of analytic methods.
- Whereas analytic models usually require many simplifying
assumptions to make them mathematically tractable, simulation
models have no such restrictions. With analytic models, the
analyst usually can complete only a limited number of system
performance measures. With simulation models, the data
generated can be used to estimate any conceivable performance
measure
.
- In some instances, simulation is the only means of deriving a
solution to a problem.
Disadvantages
:
- Simulation models for digital computers may be costly,
requiring large expenditures of time in their construction and
validation.
- Numerous runs of a simulation model are usually required and
this can result in high computer costs.
- Simulation is sometimes used when analytic techniques will
suffice. This situation occurs as users become familiar with
simulation methodology and forget about their mathematical
training.^
There are several basic features which are desireable for a dynamic
availability analysis model. These are:
1. The model must contain general component models.
2. Component history must be traceable to provide dynamic system
information.
3. Systems should be constructable by linking general component
models
.
4. Interactions between components must be modelled.
5. Scheduling of system changes at specified times must be possible.
Taken from reference B-4 page 4, the original information comes from
reference S-1.
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6. For systems containing continuous process variables, a continuous
simulation capability is necessary.
Of these six basic characteristics, the first one is easily obtainable
by any programming language. To create general component models it is
necessary to define input and output parameters to the component, and a rule,
or set of rules , which provide a means of determining the component output
and state based on input information. Figure 3.1 shows a general component
model. It can be thought of as a box into which signals are fed and an
output emerges. In addition to signals, information concerning failure and
repair rates must be entered. To provide djmamic system information the
signals must be able to change value as a function of time. All of these
features are easily programmable in any computer language such as FORTRAN or
PASCAL.
The second necessary feature is the ability to track component history.
Figure 3.2 shows a time line of performance for a specific component. The
component is operational for a random length of time and then experiences a
failure. There is a random repair delay modeled indicating passage of time
before the failure is detected, and then once the failure is found, repair
is begun. The component repair time is also random and once the component
is repaired it is returned to its operational state. Note that, in general,
the component need not be returned to its original state. To track the
availability of systems composed of such components it is necessary to have
features of the program language which allow for integration over time to
determine the average system unavailability, and which allow for sampling the
system or component status at selected instants in time to determine the
dynamic system unavailability at discrete time points.
To allow the treatment of process variables (which are the fundamental
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Figure 3.2 Component History
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quantities determining system "success" or "failure"), it is necessary to be
able to link all of the component models and allow them to interact with each
other through the process variables. This requirement means that the output
signal from one element will be used as the input signal to another
component. This will cause the second component to react to whatever change
may have occurred in the first component. In this manner, the failure (or
change of state) of one system component can be propagated through the
system. By linking the components in this fashion it is possible to create
an entire system model out of the general component models. By requiring the
components to change state based on their inputs the interaction between
components will be modelled. Since in some systems it may be possible to
produce loops of elements, it becomes necessary to continue propagating
changes through the system in a cyclic fashion until no further changes
occur.
To simulate a dynamic system it is necessary to simulate the passage
of time. This can be done by two different methods. The first is by
discrete event simulation. In this method a queue is created into which
events are entered along with their scheduled occurrence times. For example,
a command signal causing a valve to close can be scheduled to occur at a
specified time, or a pump could be scheduled to be placed in a standby
condition to simulate the performance of maintenance. At a separate time,
the valve may be given the command to open or the pump could be placed back
in an operational state. Numerous such events can be scheduled and entered
in the queue; events in the queue are ordered by their occurrence times. In
discrete event simulation, the simulation clock is started and time is
advanced to the time corresponding to the first event in the queue. This
event is executed and the changes propagated through the system. Once the
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system has reached a steady state indicating that all consequences of the
initial change have been realized, the clock is advanced to the time of the
next event in the queue. Operation continues in this manner until there are
no more entries in the event queue. This type of event simulation assumes
that no changes occur in the system between the scheduled discrete events.
This will not be the case for systems involving continuous variables and
another simulation approach is necessary for such systems.
In continuous event simulation certain system parameters are
continuously variable. This is true for process control problems, or any
analyses which involve temperature, pressure, flow rates, or fluid levels as
process variables. To simulate this type of system, time is advanced by a
small time step and all system parameters are updated. If a component has
changed state during the time step, this change is propagated through the
system in the same manner as for discrete event simulation. After all
changes have been made, the simulation clock is again advanced by the time
step and all changes are calculated. Simulation is continued in this fashion
until time has been advanced to the end of the desired simulation period.
From the above discussion it is seen that there are three perspectives
from which simulation languages can be constructed and these are discussed
in reference B-5. These include process- interaction, event- scheduling, and
continuous simulation. Process interaction provides modelling of system
components as processes (groups of related events such as component failure
and component repair) and then relates these processes to each other in a
manner which allows the components to interact. Event scheduling allows for
events to be scheduled in a queue for occurrence at a specified time during
a simulation as is used for a purely discrete event simulation approach.
Continuous simulation is used when variables of a continuous nature are to
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be considered, in which case discrete event simulation is not appropriate.
Any simulation language may use one or a combination of all of these
approaches. The most powerful language to use from a systems reliability
analysis standpoint would clearly be a language that employs all three
positions, since a process interaction capability is desireable to easily
model component interactions, event scheduling is desireable to cause the
occurrence of such discrete events as system maintenance and testing, and
continuous simulation is necessary to treat systems containing continuous
variables
.
Any of the three approaches discussed above can be programed in general
programming languages such as FORTRAN or Pascal. However, in recent years
many program languages have been developed specifically for simulation
applications. Some of these languages are based on languages like FORTRAN
while others have been developed specifically for simulation problems. One
example of discrete event simulation using a standard program language can
be found in SIMTOOLS. This product, described in reference S-2, is a
collection of data structures and routines which allow the writing of
discrete event simulation programs in Pascal using the event view. This
method may be simpler for individuals already familiar with the Pascal
language, however it may not be as efficient as simulation with the languages
which have been designed specifically to treat simulation problems.
Many products are currently available for discrete event simulation.
Several of these products are compared and discussed on reference B-4. Their
approaches and modeling characteristics are siinimarized in Table 3.2 which
gives a comparison of five languages including FORTRAN to illustrate which
programs could be used to perform different simulation functions. It can be
seen that as far as modeling approach is concerned, SIMSCRIPT II. 5 is
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extremely versatile and could be used to model all types of random variables
and event occurrences in a Monte Carlo simulation model. SLAM II is a
simulation language which also allows for programming of all modeling
approaches and could prove to be an equal alternative to the SIMSCRIPT 11,5
language for coding of the program developed for this work. The other
example languages shown do not have the adaptability to perform all the tasks
modeled in the DYMCAM program and the modified DYMCAM program (TANK)
described in Chapter 5.
It should be noted that although Table 3.2 includes FORTRAN for
comparative purposes, it is certainly possible for anyone so inclined to
create there own simulation language equal to, or better than, those
mentioned here based on FORTRAN or Pascal. It is possible to write a FORTRAN
program oriented to solving any type of system and using any one, or all
three, of the modeling approaches, and although random sampling is not built
in, there are several scientific subroutines available for random number
generation in FORTRAN. In the following section the basic features of the
SIMSCRIPT II. 5 simulation language will be discussed to describe the features
available for the DYMCAM dynamic simulation model.









Comparison of Languages for Discrete-Event Simulation^
Language
Criteria FORTRAN GASP IV SIMSCRIPT GPSS/H SI
II.
5
Ease of learning Good Good Good
Ease of conceptualiz- Poor Fair Good
ing a problem
Systems oriented None All All
toward
Modeling approach
Event -scheduling No^ Yes Yes
Process -interaction No^ No Yes
Continuous No^ Yes Yes
Support






Ease of getting Poor Excellent Fair
standard report




















Very Good Very Good
Excellent Good
High Medium
This table is Table 3.8 taken from Reference B-4.
Modelling structures not built-in, but can be developed.
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3.2.2 SIMSCRIPT II.
5
There are many references available for explaining the SIMSCRIPT II.
5
language and programming techniques for developing simulation models. The
text by Law and Larmey (ref . L-4) is a beginning handbook for understanding
the language. For a more detailed description on programming procedures,
reference R-1 by Russell should be consulted. This latter book explains more
of the complicated modeling methods than the introductory text. Other
references used in development of the DYMCAM model include, reference C-1,
reference C-2, and reference F-1. All three of these texts provide useful
information for understanding the use of SIMSCRIPT commands and modeling
techniques
.
SIMSCRIPT II. 5 is a general programming language which facilitates the
development of a discrete -event simulation model. It allows for both process
interaction and event- scheduling points of view, or a combination of the two,
in simulation modeling. A language extension in current versions allows for
continuous simulations. In addition, it also has powerful scientific
computing and list processing capabilities which when used to there fullest
degree can be more efficient, for a programmer, than FORTRAN. A unique
feature of the SIMSCRIPT program is that it can be written in English- like
statements. As a simulation language in comparison to FORTRAN, SIMSCRIPT
performs many complicated automatic maintenance tasks and report generation
functions. It is very well suited for all types of Monte Carlo simulation
problems
.
Before proceeding, several SIMSCRIPT terms need defining to provide a
basic understanding of simulation programming using SIMSCRIPT. For more
complete descriptions the references noted previously should consulted. The
basic terms to be described here include: SCHEDULING, ENTITY, PROCESS,

Dynamic Simulation Model 60
ATTRIBUTE, and SETS.
SCHEDULING refers to the discrete event feature of SIMSCRIPT. An event
queue is created and events are placed in the queue (scheduled) along with
their time of occurrence. The events in the queue are arranged in the order
of their occurrence time and executed in that order. Time then is advanced
to the occurrence time of the next event in the queue. The queue is dynamic;
as simulated time progresses, new events may be scheduled and other
(previously scheduled) events removed from the queue. For example, a
component failure can be scheduled to occur at a certain time . Once the
failure has occurred, an event representing repair completion can then be
scheduled. As an example of removing events from the queue, an event can be
scheduled at the beginning of a simulation which restores all components to
as -good- as -new condition at a specified time. This event can remove all
scheduled component failures from the queue. Later in the simulation, the
failures can be rescheduled to occur at later times.
An ENTITY is a program variable and has a memory location allocated to
it once it is created. Entities are of two types, permanent and temporary.
Permanent entities are created once, at the beginning of the program, and
exist throughout program execution. Temporary entities are created only when
needed and memory can be made available again for other variables by
destroying the temporary entity once it is no longer needed. This provides
a means of keeping data structures contained in computer memory to a minimum,
thus providing for more efficient program operation. Several identical
entities can be created by using a pointer or indexing variable. For
example, if a simulation is to contain 10 valves, the following lines of code
could be used to create them:
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reserve polnter(*) as 10
for i equals 1 to 10
do
create a valve called pointer (1)
loop
Then to refer to a specific valve the pointer can be used.
A PROCESS is a special SIMSCRIPT entity which has memory associated
with it in the same manner as a temporary entity. It can have several
identical instances created. For example, if a component is modeled as a
process, several identical processes can be created, one associated with each
component. The most important feature of a process is that it has a
subroutine associated with it which can schedule events and interrupt other
processes
.
A process subroutine can also contain statements which cause the
execution of the routine to be suspended, and an event notice to be placed
in the event queue to cause the process routine to continue execution at a
later scheduled time. If a component is modeled as a process, then the
failure of the component can be scheduled by the process and process
execution suspended until this time has been reached. Once the failure time
has been reached, the component process again begins execution in the line
of code following the failure scheduling. Here a repair delay can be defined
and execution suspended until the scheduled delay time has passed. Then
repair can be scheduled in the same manner. A process can also create other
processes or temporary entities.
All entities and processes can have ATTRIBUTES associated with them.
This is a way of creating a data array. For instance, a pump can be defined
as an entity. Several pumps may be created. Associated with each pump there
may be a demand failure probability, a failure rate, a repair rate, etc.
These characteristics can be defined as attributes of the pump entity and
thus when a pump is created, memory storage is also allocated for the array
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of characteristics associated with it. Processes can also have attributes
in the same manner.
SETS are an important SIMSCRIPT feature. Several items which are of
the same type can be grouped as members of a set. These members may be
entities or processes, but must be one or the other, in a given set. For
example consider a system containing 100 different input and output signals
from ten system components. Several of the signals may be input signals to
a given component. A signal set can be defined to group these signals. The
set will be "owned" by the component process, and the input signals will
"belong" to the set. Thus in SIMSCRIPT terminology, all sets must have an
owner and may have any number of members which belong to the set.
SIMSCRIPT also has useful statistics features available for evaluating
system simulation. The two basic commands are TALLY and ACCUMULATE. The
Tally command is used to compute statistics of a distribution, such as the
mean and variance, at specified instants of time. The distribution can be
an array variable. The Accxomulate command tracks the behavior of en entity
over the duration of a simulation. It performs integration with respect to
time and can be used to determine the time -averaged behavior of a system
entity. By properly defining the possible component states, this feature can
be used directly to calculate time averaged system unavailability
information.
The process -interaction approach to simulation modeling allows
SIMSCRIPT to be very useful in the analysis of complicated phased mission
problems. Components can be modeled as processes thus allowing each
component to control its own time dependent behavior. Failure and repair
procedures can be included in the component process subroutine to provide
scheduling of failure and repair times. By modeling testing and maintenance
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as separate processes it is possible to correctly model random testing and
maintenance events interrupting component operation and then restarting the
components once they are completed. If it is desireable to limit repair
resources, such as by limiting the number of components under repair at any
given time, or if random repair delays are to be incorporated based on the
number of components presently failed, it is possible to create a "repair
supervisor process." This process could be used to schedule repair processes
by interrupting and rescheduling selected component events. Event scheduling
techniques do not readily allow this flexibility, since scheduling of certain
events, such as repair completion times and testing termination intervals,
are dependent on the occurrence of other random events and are therefore best
modeled by processes rather than sequences of events.
As an example, consider the time line of Figure 3.3A. A system is
composed of two components with exponential failure distributions and
constant repair time. Using discrete event scheduling, the failure and
repair times can be scheduled for both components before the start of the
simulation based on their failure rate and repair time data as shown in
Figure 3.3A. The occurrence times are independent and do not interact with
each other. However, if repair resources are to be limited such that only
one component can be under repair at a time, then the event scheduling shown
in figure 3 . 3A is not adequate. A repair supervisor process can be used
which counts failures of components and schedules repair events. Then when
the first component fails, the repair process will immediately schedule the
repair time. When the second component fails, if the first component is
still under repair, then the process can wait until repair of the first
component is complete before repair is begun on the second component. This














b.) Component Repair Modeling. One Repairman
TIME
Figure 3.3 Limited Repair Resource Modeling
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some form of process interaction simulation approach to model adequately.
The continuous capability is important for analysis of problems which
have continuous random variables. It allows for straightforward analysis of
process controls systems and like structures which include such continuous
parameters as temperature, pressure, flow rates, or fluid levels. This
program capability is taken advantage of in Chapter 5. The report generating
functions are also extremely useful as they allow easy calculation of such
system parameters as all statistical values and all time averaged quantities
of interest. The SIMSCRIPT II. 5 simulation language provides many other
valuable programing features useful for developing Monte Carlo simulation
models and several of these shall be evident in later sections of this work.
For more complete information the references should be consulted.
3.3 Program Objectives
The DYMCAM (D3mamic Monte Carlo Availability Model) base simulation
program was developed with the three primary objectives. These objectives
are: 1) provide a model which is able to analyze the time -dependent
unavailability of dynamic systems, 2) provide a model which is easy to
construct and interpret, and 3) provide a base model which can easily be
expanded to incorporate additional features as needed.
To analyze the time -dependent unavailability of a system it is
necessary to consider two basic program abilities. The program must
incorporate component repair and there must be a program feature which allows
the scheduling of external events. Consider the time line of Figure 3.4.
During the course of a simulation, two types of events must scheduled to
cause changes in components of the system. These are internal events and
external events . Internal events are failure and repair times of individual
components. Scheduling of these events is controlled by the individual

Dynamic Simulation Model 66
Start Simulation -- t Valve Open
External Event
Internal Event







External Event -- t = 34 Valve Ordered Opened
Figure 3.4 Event Scheduling Approaches
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component processes. External events are scheduled at the start of a
simulation by the user. In the example shown these types of events t:ould
include such occurrences as changing the state of a valve from closed to
open. The time -dependent availability of a system will depend on both types
of events
.
Another time -dependent feature desired, is the incorporation of
interactions between components based on process variables . When one
component in a system changes state, it may have an impact on other
components in the system. Thus the change must be propagated through the
system to determine what effect there is on other components. For example,
an open valve may be supplying water to an operating pump. If the valve
fails closed, flow to the pump is stopped. If the pump does not stop on its
own, it will fail. Even in the absence of directly caused failures such as
this, it is necessary to propagate interactions to obtain the state of all
process variables
.
To provide a model which is easy to use and interpret, it is necessary
to provide component models in the program which correspond directly with
physical components. This is a feature provided by both GO and GO-FLOW as
was discussed in Chapter 2. It is also the approach adopted by Apostolakis,
Salem, and Wu when constructing fault trees based on decision tables (ref
.
A-4) . The problem with GO was that it is designed to be used in static
analysis cases. In the case of GO-FLOW, which is designed for time -dependent
analysis, the method does not incorporate repair directly into its operators
and can therefore not directly treat the failure and repair cycles of
components. The equations of the GO-FLOW operators in Table 2.1 demonstrates
this fact.
The model to be developed should have a one-to-one correspondence
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between physical components and model components and connections between
components in the model should reflect actual component interactions in the
physical system. Power and control signals to components must be modeled as
well as process variables. The set of rules governing the possible changes
in component state as a function of the various input signals supplied to
them should clearly reflect the physical changes actually experienced.
Since the model to be developed is to be a basic one, it should also
be easy to modify so that additional feature may be incorporated. Such
features may include non- exponential transitions, dependent repair and
failure of components, uncertainty analysis, continuous process variables,
and complex interactions. Specific features of the actual model will be
discussed in section 3.5.
3.4 Model Assumptions
To implement the general model to treat the behavior of some simple,
but realistic systems, a number of assumptions are made as detailed in this
section. Many of these assumptions can be relaxed at a future date if more
work is to be done on the DYMCAM dynamic simulation model. They do not
represent restrictions of the simulation language or the program, but merely
modeling simplifications. Where applicable comments will be made concerning
relaxing the assumptions.
The base model considers exponentially distributed failure and Weibull
distributed repair times. Dependent failure and repair are considered only
to the extent that the loss of the process variable to an active component
causes it to fail if it is in an operating state, and external events can be
used to model shocks which fail several components simultaneously.
Uncertainty analysis is not included. Continuous variables are included in
the program modification described in Chapter 5. Complex interactions are
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also considered, to a certain extent in Chapter 5, as operational states of
components are dependent on the level of the continuous process variable.
The output generated by the program is also of importance. The desired
output of the DYMCAM program is a print out of the time dependent system
unavailability and the average system unavailability over the duration of
simulated time. The time -dependent unavailability can be printed in several
fashions. If desireable, the user can specify an arbitrary set of time
points between time zero (start of simulation) and the terminal time (end of
simulation) and enter these time values directly in the input file. Or, if
it is preferred, the number of time points desired can be specified in the
input file and the program will automatically select the specified number of
points, uniformly distributed over a linear or logarithmic scale between the
starting time and the end time.
For computing the average system unavailability over the duration of
the simulation, the program uses the basic SIMSCRIPT II. 5 Accumulate
commands. Over each simulated system run the total time the system was
unavailable is determined and then divided by the total time. This value is
stored for each run and statistics are taken to determine the average and
standard deviation of the average unavailability over the number of system
runs. The average and standard deviation are then printed in the output file
along with selected percentiles of the distribution. If desireable, a simple
program modification allows for printing of the average system unavailability
for every trial. This is done in one of the example problems discussed in
Chapter 4.
To model system components, five component types were chosen. These
include valves, check valves, switches, and generic active and passive
components. Component types are defined by the number and type of input
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signals, by the possible internal states of the component, and by the rules
used to process the input/output signals as a function of the component
state.
A large number of engineering components can be modeled effectively
using these basic elements. Active components, valves, and switches have a
minimum of three inputs which include a power signal, a command signal, and
at least one process input. Passive components have a minimum of one input.
They require at least one process input and do not require power or commands.
All components can have any number of process outputs. Figures 3.5 to 3.9
provide diagrams and rule tables describing the five component tjrpes. The
rule tables are taken directly from the model program listing of Appendix B.
Generally, at the start of a run, no component is initially in a failed
state. Note that it is a simple matter to use an external event to change
a component to a failed state at time zero.
Changes can be forced on the system at any time through the use of
external events . These external events can be scheduled to occur during the
simulated system operating period and can be used to change the state of
components or to change system signals, such as changing a command signal to
tell a pump to turn on or off. The current model requires the times of such
occurrences to be known before the start of the simulation and included in
the input file. The programming language, however, will allow for the random
scheduling of these external events. If this is desireable at a later date,
it simply involves creating a process routine (similar to the repair
supervisor routine) which schedules events in a random fashion. This type
of routine may be useful for treating unscheduled testing and maintenance.







Command Power Process Initial Final Proces
Input Input Input State State Output
_ _ _ failed failed no
- no - standby standby no
stop yes - standby standby no
none yes - standby standby no








- no - operating standby no








none yes no operating failed no
none yes yes operating operating yes
start yes no operating failed no
start yes yes operating operating yes
- standby* standby* no
- no - operating* operating* no
- yes no operating* failed no
- yes yes operating* operating* yes
Figure 3.5 Active Component
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Command Power Process Initial Final Process
Input Input Input State State Output
_ - _ failed_open failed_open no
- no - open open no
open - - open open no
none - - open open no








- - no failed_closed failed_closed no
- - yes failed_closed failed_closed yes
- no no closed closed no
- no yes closed closed yes
open yes no closed failed_closed
open no




none - no closed closed no
none - yes closed closed yes
close - no closed closed no




Input Process CHECK VALVE Output Process
Decision Table
Process Initial Final Process
Input State State Output
_ failed_closed failed_closed no
no closed closed no
yes closed failed_cloEed no
open yes
no failed_open failed_open no
yes failed_open failed_open yes
no open failed_open no
closed no
yes open open yes
Figure 3.8 Check Valve







Command Power Process Initial Final Process
Input Input Input State State Output
_ _ _ failed_closed failed_closed no
- no - closed closed no
close - - closed closed no
none - - closed closed no








- - no failed_open failed_open no
- - yes failed_open failed_open yes
- no no open open no
- no yes open open yes








none - no open open no
none - yes open open yes
open - no open open no
open - yes open open yes
Figure 3.9 Switch
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Component failure times are considered to be exponentially distributed.
Component repair rates are assumed to be Weibull distributed. The SIMSCRIPT
II. 5 language allows for many types of distributions, therefore it is an easy
matter to change distribution types if others are more appropriate for
certain applications. These changes can accommodate such time -dependent
effects as component aging.
Also concerning component transfer rates, the possibility of demand
failures of active components, valves, and switches are considered. These
data are entered in the input file® and applied to cases of the indicated
component failing to transfer in either direction. For instance, a valve can
fail to open when it receives a signal to open or it can fail to close once
it receives a signal to close. This may be a problem if the two failure mode
probabilities are of different magnitude, but this can be easily rectified
by making minor changes to the program and the input file.
Currently there is no capability to consider repair delays but as is
discussed in an example of Chapter 4 these are easily including in the
REPAIR. SUPERVISOR routine. If it is necessary to always consider repair
delays for components, then it may be desireable to modify the component
routine of the program to include a repair delay and to change the input file
so that a repair delay time, or the parameters for a repair delay
distribution can be entered.
Concerning process signals in the program which will represent such
system characteristics as fluid flow, pressure, temperature, or electric
current, there is currently no provision in the model to determine signal
magnitudes. It is assumed that the existence or non-existence of the signal
The DYMCAM program input file is described in Appendix A.
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is enough to establish the state of components or of the system. In fact all
components can have any number of process inputs and process outputs and
where inputs are concerned, if the component has at least one input signal
indicating it is on, then if the state of the component is correct, all
output process signals will be "on". For the case of a two-out-of- three
system (an example is considered in Chapter 4) it is possible to modify the
program by changing the input requirements to a valve so that it does not
produce output unless it has at least two input signals. This, however, is
not a satisfactory solution, in general, if process signal strength is
important in the system analysis. Again it would require modifications to
all component routines and the input file to accommodate the notion of signal
strength, but this could be accommodated by the SIMSCRIPT language and this
is a minor point. Currently, there is no limit to the number of input or
output process signals from any given component, so clearly, if signal
strength is to be considered, an algorithm must also be included which
divides the input signal strength between the available outputs based on the
physics of the system.
There are many basic assumptions in the DYMCAM dynamic simulation
model, but most of them can be relaxed if time and effort is taken to modify
the DYMCAM program. The SIMSCRIPT language provides numerous capabilities
and can accommodate almost any feature that may be desireable in a Monte
Carlo simulation model. It is readily apparent that Monte Carlo dynamic
simulation modeling can be a powerful tool for reliability analysis. In the
next section the DYMCAM program will be discussed in detail.
3.5 Program Description
In SIMSCRIPT II . 5 there are many language features which may not be
familiar to those who are accustomed to other program languages. First of
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all, every program is composed of many subroutines. Two subroutines which
are common to all programs are the "PREAMBLE" and the "MAIN" subroutines.
The PREAMBLE is essentially where all initialization is made for the
execution of the program. The MAIN routine is where overall program
execution is controlled from. For simple programs, this may be the only
routine used other than the PREAMBLE. It is used to call the subroutines and
to start and stop the simulation program.
The DYMCAM program contains many subroutines, including the PREAMBLE
and MAIN routines. Table 3.3 gives a list of all these routines and their
basic purposes. A complete listing of the DYMCAM computer program is
contained in Appendix B. The remainder of this section gives a brief
description of the purpose for, and operation of, each DYMCAM program
subroutine in the context of the program operational flow chart as shown in
Figure 3.10.
Several subroutines are executed before the beginning of actual system
simulation. The first of these is the Input subroutine. The INPUT routine
is used to read the data from the input file and record the information in
the appropriate memory locations. In particular, it defines the
characteristics of the components to be modeled. This routine is called once
during the execution of the program from the MAIN routine. The next routine
called from MAIN is RUN. INITIALIZE. This routine uses the input information
just read in to link the system components together by filing signals in
appropriate input and output sets of various components. It also records
appropriate signals and components in files associated with each external
event for reference when the external event is executed. This routine also
initializes all entities. Variables which are not assigned values are
automatically set equal to zero by SIMSCRIPT.
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The routine TRIAL. INITIALIZE is called from the MAIN program inside the
loop which is executed once for each Monte Carlo trial which is to be run.
Its purpose is to reset the state of all components and signals to the
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Defines all Entities and Processes
Controls overall execution
Controls Active components
Process that takes time -dependent
data for unavailability
Process that causes delay then
calls Update routine
Controls Check Valves
Process to control failure and
repair of Components
Determines failure on demand
Process to execute External Events
Function to determine failed state
Reads input file
Controls Passive components
Process to allocate Repair
resources
Initializes Variables for Run
Prints output results to a file
Process to cause recording of time
dependent unavailability data
Process to schedule External Events




Initializes Variables for a Trial
Controls Valves
The next two routines called from inside the loop of the MAIN routine
are the scheduling modules. The SCHEDULE. AVAIL. SAMPLES process is used to
schedule interrupts in the execution of a simulation run to sample the system
unavailability. The sample times specified by the user are entered in the
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Schedule Events In Event Queue




Make Component or Signal
Changes as Required by
External Event or
Component State Change
Figure 3.10 DYMC2^ Program Flow Chart
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event queue for subsequent simulation interruption for system sampling. The
actual recording of the availability information is done by the AVAILABILITY
process. There is an AVAILABILITY process for each time point specified by
the input file and each one collects data for its assigned time point.
These samples are totaled for each particular sampling time and divided by
the total number of trials in the output routine to determine the system
time -dependent unavailability. The SCHEDULE. AVAIL, SAMPLES routine is only
to schedule the interruptions for sampling by placing event notices in the
event queue.
The SCHEDULE. EXTERNAL. EVENTS process is used to schedule the interrupts
in the execution of the simulation run for the processing of external events.
It schedules these interrupts to occur at the specified times indicated by
the input file. For every external event there is an EXTERNAL . EVENT process.
Each EXTERNAL . EVENT process has a component set and a signal set associated
with it which specify which components and signals are to change. These
changes are performed when the external event is executed and then control
is passed to the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine. EXTERNAL . EVENT processes are created
by the RUN. INITIALIZE routine along with their associated component and
signal files.
Also inside the loop in Main is the STOP. SCENARIO routine. It is used
to stop the execution of all processes which have not concluded at the end
of a trial and to reset the execution of each component to its original
operating condition.
The CALL. UPDATE process exists inside the loop of the main routine to
escape a complication associated with the simulation language. Any series
of commands executed sequentially without undergoing the simulated passage
of time must not contain commands which start and stop the same process or
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create and destroy the same entity. It is also not possible to activate the
same process twice. The program is designed so that on the initial trial of
a run, all component processes are activated at time zero by the
RUN, INITIALIZE routine. Thus a notice is put in the scheduled events list
which will be executed once the timing routine is begun. One of the first
statements in the COMPONENT process is a command to suspend operation, since
some components, e.g. standby components, may not be operating at the start
of the simulation. Standby components are not allowed to undergo failure in
this model and therefore should not have failure times placed in the event
queue until they are placed in an operational mode. The components that
should be operating are then restarted by the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine.
The problem is that the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine should be executed from
the loop of the MAIN routine before the passage of simulated time is begun.
This would cause an error since the sequential execution of commands would
make it appear that a COMPONENT process has been scheduled to start twice.
Therefore the CALL. UPDATE routine is included in the MAIN program loop. Its
sole purpose is to wait a short period of time so that the simulation clock
is started and all components are in the suspended state before the
SYSTEM . UPDATE routine is executed and the operation of selected components
is started again.
The SYSTEM. UPDATE routine will be called many time during the execution
of a simulation program run and it performs many functions. The first time
it is called, it is used only to activate the components which should be
operational at the beginning of a simulation. These components will advance
from their original suspended states and begin their failure and repair
cycles. Thus at the beginning of the simulation each operating component,
if it has a non-zero failure rate, it will have a failure time scheduled for
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it in the event queue.
At this point the simulation is started. Currently there are three
types of events scheduled in the event queue. These are component failures,
availability samples, and external events. The simulation clock will be
advanced to the time corresponding to the first event in the queue, the
notice scheduling the event will be removed from the overall schedule, and
the event will be processed.
If the event is an external event then an EXTERNAL . EVENT process will
be executed. Components in the external event component set and signals in
the external event signal set for this external event will be changed to
their new values. Then the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine will be called.
If the event is an AVAILABILITY sample, then the system indicator
variable, which indicates whether or not the system is in a satisfactory
state, will be tested. The result will be summed with previous and future
results for that particular time point, and stored for use in generating the
output file. No change to the system is made by this interruption, therefore
time is advanced to the next event in the event queue without any changes to
the system being performed.
If the event is a component failure, then the COMPONENT process for
that particular component will again begin operation. The function
FAILURE. TRANSLATION will be called and used to determine the state of the
failed component. The failed state will be dependent on the type of
component and the initial state, e.g. an open valve will fail closed and a
closed switch will fail open. FAILURE. TRANSLATION is an example of the use
of the SIMSCRIPT function command which simplifies programming when a series
of commands is reused often. The commands in the FAILURE. TRANSLATION
function could be placed in the COMPONENT routine without complicating
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execution of the program. Once the type of failure is determined, a
REPAIR. SUPERVISOR process will be activated and the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine
will be called.
The SYSTEM . UPDATE routine is used to connect all system components.
It is called any time a component changes state or an external event is
activated. It looks for changed signals or components and if it finds a
change, it calls the response function (SWITCH, VALVE, etc.) for that
particular component or the component which contains the altered signal in
its input signal file. If this component changes state, or its output signal
changes strength, then it will be necessary to propagate this change through
the system. The routine continues to call affected components until no
further changes occur. This routine also monitors the overall system state
and changes it as necessary to reflect whether the system is available or
unavailable as a unit according to the definition provided in the input file.
The SYSTEM. UPDATE routine handles the loops which must occur in a
process interaction system. The routine stores the value of all system
signals and then looks for changes to this set. If a signal changes value
then this is an indication that changes are still occurring in the system.
The routine looks for components which have changed state or whose input
signals have changed strength and calls the associated response function to
ensure the component is in the proper operational state. If it is not, it
may change according to its response function and new output signal strengths
may be generated. These outputs are inputs to other components, so these
components must also be updated. Since the possibility exists for loops to
occur in system component structure, once all components have been checked
once, the new signals are compared with the old signal strengths. If a
difference is indicated, then it is possible that a component is not in its
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desired state, thus the affected components are evaluated again. This
process continues until the value of all signal strengths at the end of an
iteration, equal the value of the signal strengths at the beginning of the
iteration, indicating that no component has changed state during the last
iteration. Since infinite loops may be possible, a maximiim number of
iterations is specified, which, if exceeded, causes an error message to be
printed.
Another important function of the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine is to reset
the "failure clock" for components which change state. For example, whenever
an Active component is placed in standby from an operating condition, the
COMPONENT process associated with the Active component is reset so that when
it begins operation again it will start a new failure clock. This program
feature is very important for the analysis of phased mission problems where
it is feasible that a single component may be turned on and off several times
during a simulation run.
The five routines entitled ACTIVE, PASSIVE, CHECK VALVE, VALVE, and
SWITCH are the response functions called by the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine used
to determine the state of all system components and the value of their output
signals. These routines are used to change the state of components when a
new command is received or the strength of an input signal changes. Each
routine tests the state of the component and the value of all input signals
and compares the results to a set of control "rules" to determine the new
component state and the value of all of the component output signals. If the
component is Active, a Valve, or a Switch and it has been called upon to
change state, then the DEMAND. TEST routine is called to determine if the
component has failed or not. The DEMAND. TEST routine's sole function is
determine if a demand failure occurs based on the demand failure probability
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for the component. Once the tests are performed and the component state is
modified, execution is returned to the SYSTEM . UPDATE routine.
After a component has undergone failure and the effect propagated
through the system, the REPAIR. SUPERVISOR routine is called. The
REPAIR. SUPERVISOR process is not developed at this point to meet all of its
potential. This process is currently used to start a repair process once a
component is failed. Thus it simply reactivates the component process which
controls the repair time calculation for the component. The repair process
is activated from the COMPONENT routine whenever a component fails. The
listing of the REPAIR. SUPERVISOR process in Appendix B contains a version
which immediately starts a repair once a failure has occurred. Line 31,
which causes a Weibull distributed repair delay, is not being used (it is
"commented" out). It is used in one of the examples of Chapter 4. By
changing the values of a and b in lines 23 and 24 it is possible to change
the repair delay distribution. However, if different repair delay
distributions are desired for different components, then the input file
structure and other program characteristics must be changed.
The REPAIR. SUPERVISOR process could also be used to limit the amount
of repair resources available. It is a simple matter to count the number of
components failed and the number of components under repair by checking the
status variable associated with each component. Then if too many components
are failed it is feasible to delay repair of some components until repair is
finished on other components. It is possible to prioritize repair based on
which component has been failed the longest since when a component fails its
failure time is recorded. If other prioritization schemes are desired they
can be programmed in to the REPAIR. SUPERVISOR process.
The COMPONENT process is used to control the transfer between good and
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failed states for all components of the system. There is a COMPONENT process
for each system component and these Components are created by the
Run. Initialize routine. Within the COMPONENT process there is a section
which controls the transfer from operational to failed and a separate section
which controls the transfer from failed to operational. Whenever a component
changes state the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine is automatically called to propagate
the component change through the system as discussed above. Under the
current program structure, when a component changes state from operational
to failed, the component goes to a suspended state. The repair process is
not begun until the REPAIR. SUPERVISOR process reactivates the component.
Once the STOP . SCENARIO event is reached in the event queue, the
STOP. SCENARIO process is executed. This process removes all remaining events
from the event queue and resets all component processes so that all system
processes are ready to begin operation for the next trial. With no events
now remaining in the event queue, operation of the program is returned to the
MAIN routine which causes the RUN. OUTPUT routine to be called. The
Run. Output routine is used to write the program results to an output file.
The results provided are of two types . There is a print out of the time
dependent unavailability data and there is a list of the average system
unavailability distribution. Examples of output files are included in
Appendix E and will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter the DYMCAM dynamic simulation model has been discussed.
The discussion began with a review of some currently available simulation
languages. These various approaches of event scheduling, process
interaction, and continuous simulation were discussed and it was pointed out
that all approaches are valuable to Monte Carlo simulation for complex
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systems. It is recognized that SIMSCRIPT II. 5 contains programming
characteristics allowing for use of all three modeling approaches. Table 3.1
shows a comparison of four simulation languages along with FORTRAN and it is
clearly evident that SIMSCRIPT is at least as good as, if not better, than
the other languages for Monte Carlo simulation applications to evaluate
system reliability. A discussion of SIMSCRIPT II. 5 programing features is
also included.
Sections 3.3 of the chapter dealt with the program objectives for the
DYMCAM model and section 3.4 discussed the basic assumptions made. In the
final section of the chapter the DYMCAM program is described. Its many
subroutines are listed and brief explanations given of what the purpose of
each routine and process is , to give a general understanding of what the
program does. For a complete discussion of input file preparation for the
DYMCAM program, Appendix A should be consulted. A complete program listing
is provided in Appendix B. Specific program features and limitations will
also be covered in the discussions of particular problems tested in the
examples of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The next chapter of this work deals
with tests of the basic DYMCAM dynamic simulation model.
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Chapter 4
Test Runs and Results
4.1 Introduction
The DYMCAM program was developed as a basic benchmarking model to
demonstrate the capabilities of a simulation approach to solving system
availability analysis problems. It does not give results that are
necessarily any better than other methods, but it has the advantage that it
can solve more complex problems. The capabilities of the basic DYMCAM
program are:
1) It can model external events necessary for phased mission
problems.
2) It treats exponential failure and Weibull repair distributions.
3) It provides dynamic unavailability information about the system
and also average unavailability information.
4) The base model can be easily modified to treat more complex
analysis problems.
In this chapter several basic tests of the DYMCAM program are conducted
to demonstrate these capabilities. The results obtained are compared with
analytical results were applicable, and with numerically generated results
in the more complicated examples. A fourth order Runge-Kutta method,
obtained from reference P-4, is used to solve the Markov equations for the
systems which can be modeled by this approach. The GO- FLOW example is
compared with exact results as computed using the GO -FLOW method.
The first problem considered involves a single component with
exponential repair and failure times. For this example, which can easily be
modeled as a two state Markov system, the governing equations can be solved
analytically for comparison. The second illustration also involves a single
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component with exponential repair and failure; in addition, it includes a
second repair state which also has an exponential transition time. This
three state problem can be solved analytically using a Markovian approach.
The third problem involves three pumps in parallel, in series with a
valve. Success of the system requires two of the three pumps to operate and
the valve to be open. This problem involves a slight change to the program
to consider the requirement for flow to be present from two pumps. For this
problem there are sixteen possible system states with four of the states
leading to system success. To solve the sixteen Markov equations would be
difficult to do analytically, therefore the numerical Runge-Kutta integration
method is used.
The final example pertains to a GO-FLOW model. This approach is used
to solve phased mission problems, therefore a comparison would show the
usefulness of the DYMCAM program for solving a phased mission problem.
Results are compared with the analytic results obtained from the GO- FLOW
solution to the problem. In addition, this problem is used for a sensitivity
analysis of the program to demonstrate the variation of the accuracy of the
DYMCAM program results with the number of Monte Carlo trials performed.
The chapter concludes with a summary of the performance of the basic
DYMCAM dynamic simulation model over the test cases considered. General
comments are made concerning the demonstrated capabilities and the accuracy
of results. Consideration is made of how this approach compares with other
system reliability analysis methods.
4.2 Single Component, Single Repair State
The first example problem to be tested on the DYMCAM program is a very
basic example for which an analytical result is readily available. The
analytical equation governing the unavailability of the component is:
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Q(t) = [xT"^] <1 - exp[-(A+//)t]} (4.1)




Q(t) = probability component is failed at time t
The illustration is a single component with exponential repair and failure
rates. For ease of examination, equal repair and failure rates were
considered. The asymptotic value of system unavailability is clearly 0.5
since the component will spend equal time in each of the two possible states.
The DYMCAM program computes both instantaneous unavailability of a
system to provide the dynamic output, and it computes the average
unavailability. Instantaneous availability is computed by stopping the
simulation (during each Monte Carlo trial) at a user-specified time and
checking the system to see if it is in a failed state. A success state is
indicated if the system indicator variable is equal to one, and failure is
indicated by a zero. Thus the system indicator value is summed over all of
the Monte Carlo trials for each selected time point. A different variable
is kept to sum the value for each time point. After all runs are completed,
the totals of these variables are divided by the number of trials. If the
result equals one, then the system was always available at that time point.
If the result is zero, then the system was always unavailable. Numbers
between zero and one reflect the probability that at the instant of the time
point, the system was available. Thus by subtracting all values from one,
an estimate of the instantaneous unavailability is made for each selected
time point. The simulation result is an estimator for the exact result given
by equation 4.1. The simulation estimates apply at the discrete points
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chosen for analysis in the program.
Average unavailability is calculated over the duration of a simulation.
Consider the time line of Figure 4.1. For each trial there will be a
distribution similar to the ones shown, but with failure and repair events
occurring at different times. For each Monte Carlo trial the area under the
curve is integrated and divided by the total simulation duration time. This
is an automatic function available in SIMSCRIPT. Since the height of the
line in Figure 4.1 is one, the integral of the area under the curve simply
equals the total time during the simulation duration for which the system was
unavailable. By dividing this result by the total simulation time, an
estimate of the average unavailability is obtained. For each trial this
result will be slightly different, thus the average unavailability is stored
for each trial, and after all trials are completed, a mean, a variance, and
selected percentiles of the distribution can be printed. The resulting
distribution is an estimator of the exact result given by the equation:
T
Q (for < t < T) = [^1 [ Q(t) dt (4.2)
^average - - [Tj J^
To perform the test for proper asymptotic results, the failure and
repair rates were chosen to be 0.01 per hour. Thus after approximately 2Q0
hours the system will have reached its asymptotic condition. Each simulation
run covers 10,000 hours. For the simple system only 100 Monte Carlo trials
were run to give satisfactory results. To show the fluctuations in
unavailability about the asymptotic value, the system instantaneous
unavailability was printed at every 500 hours of the simulation. To see the
average system unavailability the time averaged system unavailability for
each trial was printed.
Table 4.1 shows the fluctuation of the instantaneous system
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unavailability about the desired value of 0.5. Over the relatively small
niomber of Monte Carlo trials performed we see that there is a rather large
fluctuation. This can readily be reduced by increasing the number of trials
since the standard deviation of the result is related to the number of trials
by one over the square root of the number of trials.
Table 4.1























Using the values of time averaged unavailability for each of the 100
Monte Carlo trials, a graph was constructed showing the distribution of
unavailability values. This is shown in Figure 4.2. This figure portrays
basically the same information about the model as Table 4.1. The difference
is that Table 4.1 provides data that was computed using the instantaneous
unavailability estimation procedure discussed in conjunction with equation
4.1 and Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the time averaged unavailability
























Figure 4.2 Single Component, Single Repair State
Average Unavailability
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unavailability can be found by performing the integral in equation 4.2.
Doing this integration, where A - y - 0.01, the result is found to be 0.4975
following 10,000 hours of operation. This result agrees within less than
one percent with the mean value of the distribution shown in Figure 4.2. The
variance of the distribution indicates a standard deviation of the result of
+ 0.05. For many applications this deviation may be insignificant. The
standard deviation can be reduced by increasing the number of Monte Carlo
trials performed as shall be demonstrated in a later example.
Another area of interest is whether or not the DYMCAM program provides
adequate time dependent unavailability information. Another test was run
with the same example problem only over a simulated time period of 200 hours.
To reduce the wide variance experienced in the above example the number of
Monte Carlo trials was increased to 1000. For comparison the results are
plotted in figure 4.3 with the analytic results obtained by Markov analysis
of the two state component as shown in equation 4.1.
Figure 4.3 shows that the simulation model provides good time dependent
results for this example. At large values of time, however, it is seen that
the simulation starts to deviate from the desired results. In fact, for
times greater than 200 hours, the simulation continues to fluctuate above and
below the desired 0.5 value for unavailability. This, again, is a
demonstration of the fact that there will be statistical fluctuations in a
Monte Carlo simulation. The fluctuations are smaller the larger the number
of trials used.
A final point of concern with a simulation approach to systems
reliability analysis is the computer time required to perform the analysis.
For this simple one component system the time required to obtain the above













Figure 4.3 Single Component, Single Repair State
Time Dependent Unavailability
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at 7.16 MHz. The average unavailability test required a large amount of time
due to the long simulated time period of 10,000 hours, which allowed for an
average of fifty failure and repair cycles per Monte Carlo trial. The value
of fifty is assumed since if the mean failure and repair times are both equal
to 100 hours, then every 200 hours the component will, on average, go through
a complete cycle of failure and repair. The time dependent analysis required
30 minutes to run even though it simulated a shorter time period, because the
unavailability of the system was sampled once every simulated hour (200
points) which slowed down program execution. The program runs in about one
sixth the time on a COMPAQ 386 machine. Methods of reducing computer time
required are discussed in Chapter 6.
4.3 Single Component, Dual Repair State
The second example problem is an extension of the first, which
demonstrates a capability of the REPAIR. SUPERVISOR routine (a subroutine in
the DYMCAM program that determines when component repair is initiated) and
the ease at which the DYMCAM program can be modified to meet specific
applications. The problem involves a single three state component which has
an exponentially distributed repair delay time before the component begins
the repair process.
In Appendix B the entire program listing is shown. In the
REPAIR. SUPERVISOR process routine, line 31 contains the WAIT command used to
create the third component state. It has been modeled as a Weibull
distributed variable, but by proper choice of the parameters, the Weibull
distribution becomes an exponential distribution. The Weibull distribution
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where, a and b are the distribution parameters. By letting the parameter a
equal 1.0, the Weibull distribution becomes an exponential distribution with
lambda equal to 1/b. Lines 23 and 24 define the exponential distribution
with a mean failure rate of one failure every 100 hours. If, in the future,
it is desireable to enter different delay distributions for various
components, the parameters for the Weibull distribution can be read in the
INPUT routine in the same manner as the repair distribution parameters.
The failure and repair rates for this example were chosen the same as
for example number one. Thus with a mean repair delay time of 100 hours, the
component now has three equal transfer rates from its three states. Thus it
is evident that for the asymptotic case, the component will spend equal time
in each of the three states. The component is only available when it is in
its operational state, thus the asymptotic unavailability is two thirds.
To test the asymptotic unavailability the DYMCAM program was run for
a simulated component operation of 10,000 hours and 100 Monte Carlo trials.
As in example one, the component was modeled as a passive element, although
results would be the same for modeling the component as any of the other four
elements for this simple case. Again the unavailability was sampled at 500
hour intervals to show the fluctuation of the value around the expected value
of 0.6667 corresponding to two thirds. Table 4.2 shows the results which
indicate again that for the small number of Monte Carlo trials used, the
variance is quite large.
For this test the average system unavailability was also printed out
for each of the 100 Monte Carlo trials. The range of values was divided into
nine bins and the number of trials in each bin plotted against the central
unavailability value for that bin. The results are shown in Figure 4.4. By
using the fourth order Runge-Kutta technique to determine the time dependent
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component unavailability over the 10,000 hour period, as is done for Figure
4.5, and then numerically integrating the result from time zero to 10,000
hours and dividing by the total time (10,000 hours), the exact result is
found to be 0.6634. This indicates that the first 200 hours of operation did
contribute slightly to lowering the result obtained. The simulation result
agrees with the exact result within less than one percent difference. Again
the standard deviation of the simulation result is + 0.05 which may be
insignificant for some analyses.
Table 4.2























To compute the time dependent unavailability of this component the
simulation time was reduced to 200 hours, and the number of trials increased
to 1000 to reduce the variance of the results. Unavailability samples were
taken every simulated hour and the results are plotted in Figure 4.5. For
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this example ic is also possible to derive the analytic equations for the
probability that the system is in any one of its three states using simple






-^ = -^i2^2 * ^^1^1' where A = //^ = /^2 = ^'^^ ^^'^^
Rather than solve these equations using Laplace transforms or matrix
exponentiation techniques, a fourth order Runge-Kutta numerical integration
routine taken from reference P-4 was used. The time dependent probability
of the component being in state was calculated and the result was
subtracted from one to give the component unavailability. This result is
plotted in Figure 4.5 for comparison with the simulation results.
From Figure 4,5 it is seen that the simulation program again gives good
results for the time dependent unavailability. As the value of simulated
time increases there is a fluctuation of the simulation results about the
desired value, but as explained before this can be reduced by increasing the
number of trials. The computer time required for these two experiments was
comparable with the first example problem (approximately 30 minutes) . The
addition of the third component state did not significantly alter the time
required to complete the run. The most important contributions to running
time appear to be the length of simulation time for each trial and the number
of time samples taken during each trial (the sampling process interrupts the
simulation)
.
4.4 Two Out of Three Pumps
The third test case considers a more complicated system composed of
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three pumps connected in parallel. Figure 4.6 shows a diagram of the system.
The output of the pumps is fed to a common header where the flow then enters
a valve. Success of the system requires at least two pumps to be operating
and there to be flow output from the valve. The DYMCAM program, as written,
does not currently treat the strength of signals between components, thus a
slight modification was required to allow this test since the program would
not know if the output signal from the valve was the result of one, two, or
three pumps operating. The modification also allows the determination of the
system status simply by checking the output process signal from the valve.
The alteration made to the program for this test was made in line
number 129 of the VALVE routine. By changing the test to require two input
processes, the valve would not have an output unless at least two of the
pumps are providing input to the valve. There are other ways this problem
could have been modeled, but this method appeared to be the most
straightforward.
Unlike the previous two examples, this problem does not have a simple
analytic solution for the time dependent unavailability. To simplify
understanding of the test results, all pumps are chosen to be identical and
the valve was modeled with failure and repair distributions identical to the
three pumps. There are four components which can be in either a failed or
operational state which means the system can be in 2* - 16 possible states.
Since all failure and repair rates are equal, in the asymptotic case each
system state has equal probability of occurrence. Only four of the states
correspond to the system being in an available condition, thus twelve states
(or three fourths of the states) contribute to system unavailability.
Clearly the asymptotic unavailability should be 0.75.
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As in the previous two examples, the program was run for a simulated
time period of 10,000 hours and for 100 Monte Carlo trials. Table 4.3 shows
the fluctuation of unavailability about the desired value of 0.75. Again,
the failure and repair distributions were chosen to be exponential with mean
values of 100 hours. Figure 4.6 indicates that the system has reached its
asymptotic state after approximately 200 hours. Thus the actual value for
average system unavailability should be slightly less than the value of 0.75,
which would be the exact result achieved for average system unavailability
as time goes to infinity. This was also the case with the first two examples.
Table 4.3























The average value of unavailability over the 10,000 hour simulation was
printed for each of the 100 trials and the resulting distribution is plotted
in Figure 4.7. This figure indicates that the mean value of unavailability
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is 0.7428 which agrees well with the expected value of slightly less than
0.75, and it is seen that the standard deviation of the distribution is 0.03.
This value of standard deviation is approximately half of that obtained for
the first two example problems.
The time dependent performance of this system is also of importance,
thus a second run was done over a simulated time period of 200 hours using
1000 Monte Carlo trials. The unavailability was sampled every hour to
provide an accurate picture of the simulation program performance. For
comparison, the Markov equations for the system were written. There are
sixteen possible states and these are:
- All components are good
1 - Pump #1 failed
2 - Pump #2 failed
3 - Pump #3 failed
4 - Valve failed
5 - Pumps #1 and #2 failed
6 - Pximps #1 and #3 failed
7 - Pump #1 and Valve failed
8 - Pumps #2 and #3 failed
9 - Pump #2 and Valve failed
10 - Pump #3 and Valve failed
11 - Pumps #1, #2, and #3 failed
12 - Pumps #1 and #2 and Valve failed
13 - Pumps #1 and #3 and Valve failed
14 - Pximps #2 and #3 and Valve failed
15 - All Components are failed
Figure 4.8 shows the Markov state transition diagram for this system. All
transition time distributions are the same and given by Xi =" Xa "" Pi "
y2 - 0.01 per hour.
Using these sixteen states the Markov equations for the system were
written. These equations lead to a sixteen by sixteen matrix which is not
a trivial problem to solve, therefore a fourth order Runge-Kutta numerical
integration routine (from ref. P-4) was used to solve for the probability
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from zero to 200 hours. States 0, 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the system being
available therefore the probabilities that the system is in any one of these
four states is summed and subtracted from one to give the system time
dependent unavailability. This exact solution is plotted in Figure 4.9 along
with the simulation results for comparison.
It is seen from Figure 4.9 that even for this more complicated system,
the DYMCAM simulation program provides good results for the system time
dependent tinavailability . Again the fluctuation of the results about the
desired result can be seen at larger time values and it is evident that the
accuracy of Monte Carlo analysis is directly related to the number of trials
performed.
For this example problem, the computer time required to run the 10,000
hour simulation run for estimation of the asymptotic unavailability value was
approximately three hours on an IBM compatible XT running at 7.16 MHz. The
second run to determine time dependent unavailability required four and one
half hours. The significant increase over the time required for the first
two tests is due to the fact that this problem is more complicated (sixteen
system states as apposed to two or three) which leads to a far greater number
of calculations to be performed during execution of the program. The
difference between the two times required for the asymptotic run and the time
dependent analysis run reflects on the fact that for more complicated
systems, the number of Monte Carlo trials performed will have the
controlling effect on the amount of time required to complete a computer run.
Considering the fact that the accuracy of the results is dependent on the
number of trials performed, it is evident that methods should be explored to
reduce the amount of time required for a computer run. The DYMCAM code could
probably be programed more efficiently. It was written to be as transparent
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as possible and therefore may not be as efficient as possible.
4.5 GO-FLOW Example Problem
The fourth example problem considered will demonstrate the phased
mission capability of the DYMCAM program. For comparison, this problem is
derived from the GO- FLOW example problem discussed in reference M-2. The
solution derived from the methods of reference M-2 will be used for
comparison with the results of the simulation method.
The problem to be solved involves a simple electrical circuit. Figure
4.10 gives a diagram of the system. It is composed of a battery, having a
demand failure probability of 0,1, which will supply power to two parallel
circuits. Each circuit has a switch and a light bulb. The switches are
identical and have a demand failure probability of 0.3. Neither the battery
nor the switches are presumed to experience run time failures. The light
bulbs in the system are considered identical and they have a 0.2 probability
of failing on demand and an exponentially distributed run time failure rate
with a mean value of one failure every 1,000 hours.
The actual problem solved in reference M-2 considered that the switches
had a probability of premature closure, however in the DYMCAM model this type
of failure would be modeled as a run time failure and would mean that there
is an equal probability that the switch could open once it is closed. Since
the latter condition was not considered in reference M-2, the premature
failure probability was excluded from the simulation analysis. A numerical
solution was performed on the modified GO- FLOW problem to provide the
comparison results.
The phased mission problem to be solved considers that at time zero the
battery is connected to the circuit and has a 0.9 probability of being good.
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later the second switch is closed. The analyst wishes to determine the
probability that at least one light is on immediately following closure of
the first switch (call this time t-0.0), immediately prior to closing of the
second switch (time t=9.99 hours), instantly following closure of the second
switch (time t=10.0), and twenty hours after closure of the first switch
(time t-20.0). Analysis using the DYMCAM program was done varying the number
of Monte Carlo trials from 1,000 to 10,000 to demonstrate a sensitivity
analysis of the simulation method.
To solve this problem using the DYMCAM program, the external event
feature was used. This capability allows the input file to contain
instructions which will cause a signal to change at an instant of time after
the start of the simulation. This function was used to give the battery a
process signal input at time t-0.0, to give the first switch a command signal
to close at time t-0.0, and to give the second switch a command to close at
time t-10.0 hours. This unique feature allows the DYMCAM program to easily
solved phased mission problems.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarize the results of the ten tests run on the
DYMCAM program. Table 4.4 shows the results using from 1,000 to 5,000 Monte
Carlo trials and Table 4.5 shows the outcome of tests using 6,000 to 10,000
trials. The tables show the actual probability of at least one light being
on at each of the four designated time points as calculated using the GO-FLOW
method and the corresponding values calculated with the simulation program.
The difference of the simulation value from the actual value is shown and the
percent error is calculated as the difference divided by the actual value.
For an indication of the variance, the number of trials which would need to
have been changed to give the actual results are indicated. For example,
for the time point t=20 hours and for 1,000 trials, Table 4.4 indicates that
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-10 trials would have to be changed. This means that 10 of the 1,000 trials
for which a light was not on at t-20 would need to have had a light test on
in order for the simulation results to agree with analytic results.
Table 4.4
Light Bulb Problem Results (1,000 to 5,000 trials)
^fUMBER OF TRIALS






























0.5040 0.4910 0.5070 0.5057 0.5033 0.5020
0.0130 0.0030 0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0020
-13 6 5-3 -10
2.6 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.4
0.4990 0.4880 0.5025 0.5010 0.4985 0.4968
0.0110 0.0035 0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0022
11 7 6-2 -11
2.2 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.4
0.7236 0.7060 0.7270 0.7320 0.7275 0.7266
0.0176 0.0034 0.0084 0.0039 0.0030
-18 7 25 16 15
2.4 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.4
0.7191 0.6980 0.7205 0.7257 0.7215 0.7212
0.0211 0.0014 0.0066 0.0024 0.0021
21 3 20 10 10




Light Bulb Problem Results. (6,000 to 10,000 trials)
NUMBER OF TRIALS





























0.5040 0.4995 0.4950 0.4971 0.4998 0.5007
0.0045 -0.0090 -0.0069 -0.0042 -0.0033
-27 -63 -55 -38 -33
0.9 -1.8 -1.4 -0.8 -0.7
0.4990 0.4935 0.4889 0.4913 0.4939 0.4948
0.0055 -0.0101 -0.0077 -0.0051 -0.0042
-33 -71 -62 -46 -42
1.1 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.8
0.7236 0.7238 0.7204 0.7205 0.7214 0.7243
0.0002 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0022 0.0007
1 -22 -25 -20 7
0.03 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.1
0.7191 0.7185 0.7143 0.7145 0.7154 0.7186
0.0006 -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0037 -0.0005
-4 -34 -37 -33 -5
----
-0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1
It can be seen in these two tables that the error decreases as the
number of trials is increased and for 10,000 trials the percent difference
between the actual availability values and the estimates from the simulation
program are less than one percent for all time points. As expected, there
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is very little difference in the error percentages for two cases separated
by only 1,000 trials. For example, there is an average of only a 0.5 percent
difference between the values for the 3,000 trial case and the 4,000 trial
case. The amount of error should decrease with increasing number of trials
in proportion to one over the square root of the niomber of trials and this
is evident by comparing the 1,000 and 10,000 trial cases. If the values of
percent error at 1,000 can be taken to be characteristic of values that would
be obtained regardless of the random number generator used by the program,
then certain comments about the error can be made. For the four time points,
the average error for 1,000 Monte Carlo trials is approximately 2.5 percent.
The variance of the estimates should go as one over the square root of the
number of trials, therefore it is expected that the percent error for 1,000
Monte Carlo trials should be no greater than the square root of 1,000 divided
by the square root of 10,000 times the error for the 1,000 trial case.
Checking this assumption it is seen that the expected error should be no
greater than 0.8 percent. From table 4.5 it is evident that this assumption
is indeed correct and it seems probable that for any number of trials used
greater than 10,000 the percent error of the result should be no greater than
0.8 percent. However, to significantly reduce the error below this 0,8
percent value using the current program would take a prohibitively large
number of trials. In fact, using the above methods it is estimated that to
reduce the error margin to 0.5 percent or less would require in excess of
25,000 trials.
The computer time required for these tests was approximately fifty
minutes for every 1,000 trials, thus the 10,000 trial case took about eight
and one half hours to run. This time requirement refers to an IBM compatible
XT running at 7.16 MHz. The approximate time for the 10,000 trial on a 386
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personal computer is estimated to be about 1.5 hours. Even at this rate,
though, it would take computer runs of close to five hours to reduce the
error to less than 0,5 percent for this particular problem with the current
structure of the DYMCAM program. If more accurate solutions were necessary,
it is clear that modifications to the program will be essential on order to
reduce the computer time requirement, however, this kind of accuracy is
almost never needed since there is always a inevitable amount of uncertainty
in the original data.
Demonstrated by this example was the important DYMCAM feature of using
external events in phased mission analysis problems. GO-FLOW was designed
with this capability, but most other methods do not provide an easy method
for treating this type of problem. This capability can be exploited to
analyze all types of systems involving testing and maintenance functions.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter four example problems have been analyzed using the
DYMCAM dynamic simulation model. A single component with exponential repair
and failure distributions was considered to demonstrate program operation.
Next, a third state was added to the component in the form of an
exponentially distributed delay time between the failure and repair states.
This example demonstrated use of the REPAIR. SUPERVISOR routine and the ease
with which the program can be modified to meet specific needs. The third
example considered a more complex problem and demonstrated that the program
can model m-out-of-n components, although to do this properly the program
should be modified to consider the strength of process variables. The final
example treated a simple phased mission problem and illustrated the use of
the external event concept to turn a component on after the start of a
simulation time period. The results of all four examples were compared with
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analytic answers and the comparison was favorable. In each case the
simulation values agreed with expected results quite well.
It was seen that the simulation method can be used to evaluate the
asymptotic unavailability of a system, but more importantly, that it also
provides good results for a time dependent unavailability analysis. Analytic
asymptotic values agreed almost exactly with mean values of unavailability
distributions produced. Time dependent simulation results agreed well with
Markov solutions; however, differences between simulation and exact results
do not vanish as the simulation proceeds.
The DYMCAM program can be used for any type of phased mission problem
where it is necessary to turn components on and off during a simulated time
period. This capability was demonstrated with a very basic problem. This
potential should prove very powerful in systems reliability analysis. Most
current techniques are not designed for phased mission analysis.
An important result observed was the importance of the program result
accuracy on the number of Monte Carlo trials used and the time requirement
necessary to achieve satisfactory results. A simulation technique such as
this provides an estimate of the unavailability of a system. This estimate
will have a distribution associated with it. The mean of the distribution
should equal the exact analytical result, if one is obtainable, and the
variance of the distribution is related to the number of trials performed.
Thus, though the mean of the distribution may be equal to the exact solution
after a small number of trials, there is no way of knowing this for certain
unless the analytical solution is available. The variance of the
distribution provides a measure of "confidence" in the mean value, thus to
have increased confidence in the simulation result, it is desireable to have
small variances. To accomplish this may require large amounts of computer
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time.
The DYMCAM program shows that it provides accurate results for simple
problems . Further work should be done to modify the program to handle
different levels of process signals and also to improve the speed with which
the program runs . In the next chapter a problem involving a continuous
process will be treated which involves modifying the program extensively and
demonstrates the capability of simulation programs to treat continuously
variable signals.
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Chapter 5
Continuous Simulation TANK Progreun
5.1 Introduction
Most reliability analysis methods are designed to treat only systems
which can be modeled using a discrete state space. This type of approach,
however, may not be adequate for analyzing certain systems including process
control problems which depend on continuous variables such as pressure,
temperature, flow rates, and tank water levels. This particular type of
problem has been discussed in detail by Aldemir in references A-1 and A- 2.
Aldemir has developed a dynamic method which uses discrete Markov chains to
model the probabilistic behavior of the system to analyze such problems, and
in references A-1 and A- 2 he applies his technique to several examples
including a process control system which regulates the water level in a tank.
The DYMCAM dynamic simulation model discussed in previous chapters does
not have the capability to treat failures of components whose state depends
on a continuous variable such as water level. In this chapter the basic
program is modified to include this capability. Although the TANK program
developed here is designed specifically to solve the example problem treated
in references A-1 and A-2, it demonstrates the capability of the basic
simulation approach to handle analysis of complex systems which involve
continuous variables
.
The chapter begins with a section describing the problem to be solved.
This problem is similar to the example treated by Aldemir in reference A-1.
Aldemir treats the problem by considering the failure of the control system
itself, which means that if a unit is in a failed state in one system control
region, this does not mean the component will remain in that state if the
process variable moves to another control region. The problem treated here
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considers only the failure of individual input and output units. Thus once
a component fails, it remains in that failed state regardless of any changes
that may occur in the operating state of the system. Thus results should be
different than those predicted by Aldemir. Once the problem is described,
program modifications will be indicated which were necessary to simulate the
example. As much as is possible the DYMCAM program is left exactly as it was
in previous chapters and special subroutines and processes are added to treat
the continuous variable.
After the TANK program development is explained, the procedure is used
to solve two of the cases discussed by Aldemir for the process control
problem which controls a tank water level. Results are compared
qualitatively with results in the reference. A simple Markov approximation
to the system is also developed and results of the TANK simulation program
are compared quantitatively to this solution method. For the simple case
tested, results of the simulation model agree well with the approximate
Markov modeling of the system and also with Aldemir' s solution. For the more
complicated case tested, simulation results agree with Markov approximations
but not with results proposed by reference A-1. Explanations are given for
the difference.
The TANK simulation program performs well on the specific problem
tested and demonstrates the capability of a Monte Carlo simulation approach
to be used in solving a continuous variable problem.
5.2 Problem Description
The problem to be solved consists of a fluid containing tank which has
three separate level control units. Figure 5.1 shows a diagram of the
system. Each control unit is independent of the others and has a separate





Figure 5.1 Tank Problem Diagraun
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in the tank, which is a continuous process variable, and based on the
information from the level sensors, the operational state of the control
units is determined. Each flow control unit can be thought of as containing
a controller which turns the unit on and off based on the signal from the
level sensors, as shown in Figure 5.1. Failure of the system occurs when the
tank either runs dry or overflows.
The tank has a nominal fluid level at the start of system operation of
zero meters. The maximum level of the tank is 3 meters (point b) and the
minimiim level of the tank is -3 meters (point a). If the tank level moves
out of this range, failure of the system has occurred. Within this range
there are two set points at -1 meter (set point alphal) and +1 meter (set
point alpha2) . These set points define three control regions for system
operation. Region one is defined from point a to alphal, region two is from
alphal to alpha2 , and region three is from alpha2 to point b. When the fluid
level is in any of the three control region there is a specific action
required of each of the three control units . Each control unit acts
independently and is not aware of what the state of the other control units
is except through the change occurring in the process variable. Table 5.1
shows the control unit states for each control region.
Table 5.1
Flow Control Unit States as a Function of Fluid Level
Control Liquid Control Unit State
Region Level (x) Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
1 x<alphal off on on
2 alphal<x<alpha2 on on off
3 alpha2<x on off off
Unit one is an outlet element providing a means for releasing fluid
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from the tank to lower the level. In all cases discussed in reference A-1,
unit one is assigned an exponential failure distribution with a mean failure
time of 320 hours. This is the failure rate of unit one transferring to the
wrong state. When operating the unit allows fluid to flow out of the tank
at the rate of 0.01 meters per minute. Unit one receives a command from the
level controller to be on when the fluid level is in control region two or
three and it receives a signal to shut off when the fluid level is in control
region one. If the xinit is modeled as a valve, it is clear that the valve
is normally open unless the fluid level is below the low level setting for
the tank, in which case the valve is closed. The component routine used to
model unit one as a valve is one of the routines contained in the basic
DYMCAM program code.
Unit two is a supply unit which provides fluid input to the tank. It
too has an exponentially distributed failure rate which applies to unit two
transferring to the wrong state. The mean failure time used for all cases
considered in reference A-1 is 219 hours. When operating, the unit supplies
fluid at the rate of 0.01 meters per minute. This unit receives a control
signal to be on if the fluid level is in control regions one or two, and it
receives a signal to shut off if the fluid level is in control region three.
The unit can be modeled as a pump or an inlet valve. In this work the unit
was treated as a valve. It is only necessary that the component model be
able to fail open (on) or closed (off) and that it respond to control
signals
.
The third unit is also a fluid supply element. It is identical in
nature to unit two except that it has a mean failure time of 175 hours.
Through most of the cases treated in reference A-1, the flow rate from unit
three is identical to unit two therefore providing 0.01 meters per minute of
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fluid, however in one of the cases (Case F of Ref. A-1), which is also
considered here, unit three only supplies 0.005 meters per minute of fluid.
Unit three is normally in an off (closed) state unless the fluid level drops
into control region number one, in which case the unit receives a signal to
turn on. Like unit two this unit can also be modeled as an inlet valve as
is done in the following analysis.
At the start of system operation the fluid level is in the normal
region (control region two) and units one and two are on while unit three is
off. Thus the flow rate into the tank is equal to the flow rate out of the
tank, and the fluid level is not changing. This state will continue until
one of the level control units fails. Then the fluid level will change
either up or down depending on which unit has failed, and when the fluid
level enters a new control region the controller will take action to halt the
change. The new system state may or may not be stable, as is seen later in
the chapter, however failure of the system cannot occur with the failure of
a single control unit. The level will remain in the new control region, or
oscillating between two control regions until a second unit fails. The
second failure is likely to cause the system to fail by the tank either
running dry or overflowing.
Since component repair is not considered in this problem, all scenarios
will end in system failure. The type of failure experienced is dependent on
the sequence in which the units fail and also upon the timing of failure for
certain cases in which the fluid level oscillates. The problem to be solved
in this reliability analysis is to determine the time dependent probability
of each of the two types of failure. The complication which prohibits this
type of problem from being easily solved by other analysis methods, is that
component states are dependent on a continuous process variable. Modeling
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of the process variable must be done, and a method must be available by which
control units are allowed to change state at non-deterministic times. In
other words the method of the DYMCAM program, which uses external events to
control phased mission problems, is not appropriate since the time at which
a component will be required to change its operating state will not be known
before the simulation is begun.
One characteristic of this problem does allow for a simple method of
approximating the failure results. This is the relationship between unit
failure time and the time required for the system to change from one control
region to another once a unit has failed. The three units have mean failure
times of 320, 219, and 175 hours respectively. If the tank fluid level is
at zero when a unit fails, then at a flow rate of 0.01 meters per minute it
will only take approximately 1.7 hours for the tank to change control
regions. If the level is at the edge of control region one, and must travel
to control region three, the longest amount of time that will be required is
approximately 3.5 hours. If these times can be considered small enough so
that the assumption can be made that a second failure does not occur until
the system has entered a new control region, then a straightforward approach
of initiating event analysis can be used and simple Markov chains can be
applied to solve the problem. This approach is used as an approximate method
against which the simulation results can be checked for an estimate of
simulation performance.
For the second case treated, in which the flow rate from unit three is
reduced to 0.005 meters per minute, there are failure sequences which will
lead to the fluid level changing at only 0.005 meters per minute. In this
case the maximum time required to change from one control region to another
is approximately 7 hours. Clearly the assumption that a second failure does
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not occur during this transit time period is not as good for this case, and
results using the approximate technique will not be as accurate. However,
results are still expected to be quite good.
5.3 The TANK Program - Modifications to DYMCAM
The major change which was necessary to make in the DYMCAM program in
order to solve the tank problem was to add a routine which models the
continuous process variable. SIMSCRIPT II. 5 has a continuous variable
modeling capability , which is described in reference F-1, and this was used
to treat the fluid level in the tank. This new variable required the
addition of several subroutines to the DYMCAM program and these are described
in this section. In addition, certain subroutines of the original program
required minor modification. Table 5.2 lists all the new subroutines added
and all the old subroutines to which adjustments were made. A complete
SIMSCRIPT program listing of the new subroutines is contained in Appendix C.
The modified subroutines are contained in Appendix B. In Appendix B, those
subroutines which were modified for the tank problem contain the message
"TANK" at the far right hand side of the page next to the added or altered
lines of code. These commands should be removed or altered to use the DYMCAM
program by itself. It should be emphasized that the sole purpose of the
particular modified program is to demonstrate a simulation modeling approach
to a reliability problem involving continuous process variables.
Modifications made to the DYMCAM program have been chosen with an eye on
rapid implementation rather than programming generality.
The most fundamental addition to the program was the TANK process.
This is the continuous process which provides SIMSCRIPT with the capability
to solve continuous variable systems. The continuous capability of SIMSCRIPT
II. 5 is described in detail in reference F-1 by Fayek. The difference
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between discrete and continuous event simulation is fundamental. In purely
discrete event simulation the model advances in time from event to event
using entries in an event queue. It is assumed that the system remains
unchanged between scheduled events and can change only at the designated
event times. For a continuous model, variables are assumed to vary
continuously with advancing time. Thus time is incremented by a small amount
and all variables are updated. This is done by associating a differential
equation with each continuous variable which indicates the rate of change for
that variable. Then as time is advanced by discrete time steps, integration
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SIMSCRIPT II. 5 uses a variable time step for which the user must
specify the minimum and maximum to be allowed. The integration routine can
be specified explicitly, or the Runge-Kutta integration routine which is
contained in the SIMSCRIPT language may be used. Also associated with the
integration routine are error parameters must be indicated to specify the
accuracy of integration calculations desired. All of these initializations
were entered in the TANK. INITIALIZE. RUN routine.
Figure 5.2 shows a flow chart of the operation of the TANK program.
Following through this chart will provide an explanation of the TANK program
operation and methodology. The function of routines of the DYMCAM program
will not be repeated here since they are described in Chapter 3.
The tank begins with the TANK. INITIALIZE. RUN routine which creates and
initializes the variables and signals associated with the tank. This is done
only once at the beginning of each computer run. Next, for every trial the
tank output signals, the tank level, and the initial flow rate are reset by
the TANK. INITIALIZE. TRIAL routine. After all other initialization is
completed by the DYMCAM program, the simulation clock is started. Failure
of all three units will be scheduled to occur at discrete times in the
simulation based on their failure rates, and these times are assigned by the
DYMCAM program.
Unlike the DYMCAM program, which uses only discrete event simulation,
the TANK program also contains the continuous tank level variable. Thus
after the start of the simulation, control of the time aspect of the program
is performed by the Tank process. This subroutine contains the statement
(line 15):
work continuously evaltiating 'water . level' testing 'tank. condition'
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Initialize for Run
(Tank.lnitialize.Run)


































Figure 5.2 Flow Chart of TANK Program
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This statement updates the tank water level using the WATER-LEVEL routine
which applies the differential equation:
d. level (tank) - net .flow. rate (tank)
The time step is variable between the minimum and maximum specified by the
user and in this case, is not variable since both values were set equal to
one hour. If a variable time step were allowed, then SIMSCRIPT would adjust
the step based on how fast the variable is changing. The integration
routine, Runge-Kutta in this case, calculates the water level at the new
time.
Once the new level is determined, the TANK. CONDITION routine is called
to verify that the tank condition is good. If it is, then the simulation
clock is advanced another time step, and the new water level is calculated.
If the TANK. CONDITION routine determines that: 1) the net. flow. rate (tank)
does not equal the flow. rate, in minus the flow. rate. out, 2) the tank has
failed by overflow or dryout, or 3) The control state is not correct based
on the current fluid level; then continuous time steps are stopped and
control continues in the TANK process. The net flow rate for the tank is
updated here next. The reason for this is to provide proper synchronization
for changing of the flow rate. After updating the net flow rate, the TANK
process calls the TANK. UPDATE routine.
The TANK. UPDATE routine serves two functions. First it checks the
water level to see if overflow or dryout has occurred. If either condition
has occurred, then the output signal from the tank, indicating tank status,
is set equal to zero (representing tank failure) , and control is returned to
the Tank process. The TANK process then suspends itself. The rest of the
simulation time of the trial passes in discrete event fashion. When the
scheduled STOP. TANK and STOP. SIMULATION times are reached, the TANK process
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is reset and the next trial begun. It should be noted that the system
indicator variable can have only one of two values indicating either system
success or failure. Since both tank overflow and tank dryout are failure
events, it is necessary to simulate failure in each mode separately. This
is done by altering the computer code to count only failures of one type or
the other during a particular run of the program. To test for the
probability of tank overflow, lines 13 through 17 of the TANK. UPDATE routine
were rendered un- executable, and when testing for tank dryout, lines 13 to
17 were restored and lines 24 through 28 of the Tank. Update routine were
removed. In either case, once the tank has run dry or overflowed, continuous
operation of the system is suspended. Of course, an alternate modification
is to revise the SYSTEM . UPDATE and RUN. OUTPUT routines such that multiple
output states are recognized. This was felt to be more complex than the
method adapted.
If the tank has not failed, then the TANK. UPDATE routine checks to see
if the unit control states are correct based on the fluid level of the tank.
If not, the TANK. UPDATE routine creates the proper control signals to send
to the three units to change their operating state to the proper condition.
To cause the units to change state, the SYSTEM . UPDATE routine is called.
This is a DYMCAM routine which changes the states of components based on
changes in signals and on changes in other system component states. A new
line added to the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine for the TANK problem, appears at line
141. This command causes the FLOW. UPDATE routine to be called. This routine
calculates the flow rate going into the tank and the flow rate coming out of
the tank based on the state of the three control units. It does not directly
calculate the net flow rate into the tank which is used by the WATER. LEVEL
routine. This is done in the TANK process to prevent the flow rate from
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changing during an integration time step.
Once the flow rates are updated, control is returned to the
SYSTEM. UPDATE routine. The SYSTEM . UPDATE routine, in turn, returns control
to the Tank. Update routine. Now the tank is in the proper operating
condition and thus control is returned to the TANK process. Since the tank
has not yet overflowed or run dry, the TANK process begins execution of the
continuous function again. Time is advanced by the given time step (one
hour) , the level of the tank is updated, and the condition of the tank is
again checked. As long as the tank condition is good, operation continues
in this fashion. If the tank condition tests bad, then the continuous
operation is again suspended.
The failure rates used for the three control units in the tank problem
make it highly likely that the system will fail during the simulated 1,000
hour time period, therefore at some point the continuous process should stop
and the simulation will continue in the discrete event fashion. In the rare
case of no system failure during the 1,000 hour period, the continuous
process will be suspended by the Stop. Tank routine at the 1,000 hour time
point, and the system will be reset for the next trial. Of course, no
failure event would be recorded for such a trial.
Individual control unit failures are controlled by the DYMCAM program.
When a failure occurs, the SYSTEM. UPDATE routine is called which in turn will
cause the flow rate into and out of the tank to be adjusted. This change
will effect the TANK program when the TANK. CONDITION routine detects that the
net flow rate to the tank does not equal the flow rate in minus the net flow
rate out, and as described above, the continuous operation will be
interrupted while the net flow rate is changed by the TANK process.





















Figure 5.3 TANK Progrzun Signals
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used to initialize all the parameters associated with the test. Most
importantly the TANK. INITIALIZE. RUN routine creates all of the output signals
associated with the tank. Since the DYMCAM program does not recognize the
tank as being a component, it is not assigned any output signals. Thus one
line is added to the DYMCAM RUN. INITIALIZE routine (line 51) to add five
signals to the total system signal count. Figure 5.3 shows all of the signal
associated with the TANK program. The five new signals are indicated by
stars. These signals are then initialized by the TANK. INITIALIZE. RUN
routine. Once created, the signals are treated in the same manner as all
other component signals. The five signals concerned are the three control
signals from the tank to each of the three units, the output process flow
from the tank to unit one, and a system status signal to indicate system
success or failure.
The TANK. INITIALIZE. RUN routine also creates the signal and component
files necessary for clean operation of the program code. The
TANK. INITIALIZE. TRIAL routine, which is executed prior to each trial, resets
the net flow rate to zero, sets the tank fluid level back to zero, turns the
flow out of the tank on, resets the system success indicator to "good," and
turns off the command signals to all three control units.
The STOP. TANK process operates in much the same fashion as the
STOP. SCENARIO process. It is used to suspend operation of the tank, if the
tank has not failed during the simulated time period (which has a very low
probability of occurrence) , and then to reset the tank so it is ready to be
started at the beginning of the next Monte Carlo trial.
Minor modifications were also made to the MAIN routine and the
CALL. UPDATE process of the DYMCAM program. The MAIN routine was modified to
include calling the tank initialization routines and to call the STOP. TANK
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process. In addition the availability data structure was modified to print
out the desired results in the output file. The CALL. UPDATE process was
revised to include lines 14 and 15 which simply take the tank out of its
suspended state and cause it to start operation at the beginning of every
trial.
In addition, many lines were added to the PREAMBLE to reflect all of
the new routines, processes, and variables associated with the TANK program.
These lines are indicated in the Preamble listing for the DYMCAM program in
Appendix B by the marker "TANK" which is placed at the far right hand side
of each line of code which was modified or added. The entire TANK program,
as a unit, was compiled and kept separate from the DYMCAM program, since
subroutines cannot be compiled separately, and the two codes are not used
together. They do, however, contain the same basic structure and the TANK
program should be viewed as an extension of the DYMCAM program, which remains
almost entirely intact in the TANK code.
The input file necessary to run the program is exactly the same format
as the input file for the DYMCAM program described in Appendix A. The only
point to note is that the three units were modeled as valves in the
simulation program. It is also important that the names of the level control
units be entered as unitl, unit2, and unit3 so that they are recognized by
the TANK program as the flow control units. An example input file for this
program is contained in Appendix D. The same input file is used for all
tests, and changes are made in the program to reflect testing for the failure
condition of overflow or dryout and to alter the flow rate provided by unit
three. The output file generated by the TANK program is identical in format
to the output generated by the DYMCAM program, and an example print out is
shown in Appendix E.
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5.4 TANK Results
Two example cases were considered in the testing process. In the
notation of reference A-1, Case A involves unit three having a flow rate of
0.01 meters per minute and in Case F the flow rate from unit three is changed
to 0.005 meters per minute. Otherwise the test cases are exactly the same.
The change made to reflect the different flow rate is made in the FLOW. UPDATE
routine. To test for the probability of tank overflow, lines 13 through 17
of the TANK. UPDATE routine were rendered un- executable, and when testing for
tank dryout, lines 13 to 17 were restored and lines 24 through 28 of the
Tank. Update routine were removed. This method was used to test for the
selected type of failure event, since both tank overflow and dryout are
failures and should not be counted together as failures during the same test
run.
As explained earlier, if failures can be assumed to be separated by at
least 3.5 hours in Case A and 7 hours in Case F, then it is possible to use
a Markov chain to approximate a solution to the problem. This approach
involves understanding the feasible failure sequences which can occur in each
case. An understanding of the failure sequences also provides insight into
the problem solution by simulation methods, so they will be described in
detail.
5.4.1 Analysis of Case A
For Case A the tank starts at time zero with all units operational, and
units one and two turned on, and unit three turned off. The tank will
continue in this state with no change in the tank level until a failure of
a control unit occurs. The sequencing of failure is very important so each
unit failing first will be considered separately. Figure 5.4 shows the state
transition diagram for this system. All states are defined in Table 5.3.
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Figure 5.4 Tank Case A State Transition Diagram

Dynamic Simulation Model 140
Thus the three possible initiating events are unit one or unit two failing
closed, or unit three failing open as shown in Figure 5.4. Since the unit
which fails first is only dependent on the failure rates of the three units,
it seems intuitively clear that the probability of each individual unit being
the first to fail is given simply by the ratio of the failure rate for that
unit divided by the sura of the failure rates for all three units.
To show this more formally, consider the system composed of only the
first four states of Figure 5,2, states 0, 1, 2, and 3. The four Markov







Noting that at time t-0.0 the system is initially in state giving
Po(0)-'l,0, equation 5.1 can be solved to give:
PQ(t) = expT-fA^ "^ ^2 "" ^3]^] ^^'^^
Substituting this result into equation 5.2 gives:
^ = A^ exp[-[A^ . A^ . Ajjt] (5.6)
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The equation for state 1 can therefore be written:
1 - exp r-fA^ + A2 +
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(5.13)
Using these results it is found that unit three will fail first 43% of the
time, unit two 34%, and unit one 23% of the time.
The initial failure of unit one is the easiest case to consider since
it will always lead eventually to a tank overflow condition, regardless of
the relative flow rates provided by the three units. Unit one failing closed
causes the fluid level to rise until it passes into control region number
three, at which time unit two is shut off. The tank remains in this
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condition until either unit two or unit three fails open, either of which
will lead directly to a tank overflow condition.
The initial failure of unit two poses a more interesting problem. With
unit two failing closed, the fluid level will drop until it reaches control
region number one. Then unit one is closed and unit three is opened. This
causes the fluid level to rise until the fluid level is in control region two
again, at which time unit one is opened and unit three is closed. Thus the
fluid level will continue to oscillate about the low level set point of -1
meters with units one and three being alternately turned on and off. The
continuous routine in SIMSCRIPT uses a finite but variable time step, the
minimiim and maximum of which must be specified by the programer. For both
cases considered, the minimum and maximum time steps were both set equal to
approximately one hour, therefore for this case the level of the tank will
fluctuate between -0.4 meters and -1.6 meters, spending equal time in each
of the two control regions (one and two) . This is true since while the level
is rising, the rate of increase is 0.01 meters per minute, and while the
level is falling the rate of level change is also 0.01 meters per minute.
Fluctuation occurs between the same two points since time steps were forced
to be constant at one hour intervals.
From this state there are four possible events which can occur. While
the fluid level is rising, unit one can fail open or unit three can fail
closed, or while the fluid level is decreasing unit one can fail closed or
unit three can fail open. It is clear that if either unit fails while the
level is rising the flow rates in and out of the tank will then be equal and
the fluid level will stop changing until the failure of the third level
control unit. This third failure will lead directly to the tank running dry.
If one of the two control units fails while the tank level is dropping
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then, again, the tank fluid level will cease to change until the failure of
the third unit. This time, the third unit failing will lead directly to
overflow of the tank. Since the tank spends an equal time in the rising and
falling level states, it is equally likely that the tank will fail in an
overflow or dryout state. Thus for the case of unit two being the initial
failure event, there is a 50% probability that the tank will fail in each of
its two failure conditions.
For the case of unit three failing first, the solution is as easy as
for unit one failing first. When unit three fails open the fluid level will
begin to rise until the level has reached control region number three at
which time unit two will be closed. Now with both units one and three open
the fluid level will hold constant at 1 meter. The next failure event,
either unit one failing closed or unit two failing open, will lead directly
to a tank overflow condition. Thus for all scenarios where unit three fails
first, the tank will fail by overflow.
From the above discussion it is evident that all unit one initial
failures, all unit three initial failures, and half of the unit two initial
failures will eventually lead to an overflow condition. Thus using the
values quoted above for the probability that each of the three units will
fail first, it is found that the probability that the tank will fail by
overflow is:
0.23 + 0.43 + (0.5 * 0.34) - 0.83
The tank will fail by overflowing approximately 83% of the time and fail by
running dry the other 17% of the time.
It is important to note that although the above method simplifies the
problem so that it may be solved with Markov chains without even considering
the continuously variable tank fluid level, this method is only an

Dynamic Simulation Model 144
approximation and is as good as the assumption that two failures do not occur
within a 3.5 hour time period. This, of course, will not be the case for all
continuous variable process control problems. In this example problem the
results obtained using the approximation agree well with the simulation
results, but several possible failure sequences which will occur with low
probability are ignored. For example, consider the case of failure of both
units two and three within 1.5 hours of each other. This will leave the
fluid level essentially unchanged or, at least, still in control region
number two. The net flow rate from the tank is still zero so the tank will
remain in this condition until unit one fails, at which time the tank will
overflow. If it is considered that unit three fails just prior to unit two,
then the result is consistent with the approximate analysis. However if unit
two failed first, then the approximate method predicts that half the cases
will experience system failure by overflow and half will be by dryout. This
is obviously not the case for the dual failure example and the approximate
solution will be slightly in error. Other "simultaneous" failures lead to
similar conclusions.
5.4.2 Analysis of Case F
For Case F the problem becomes much more complicated. The initial
failure probabilities remain unchanged from Case A, but some of the sequences
of events after initial failure change. One part that remains the same,
however, is the scenario following initial failure of unit number one. Since
unit one is the only way fluid can be removed from the tank, once it has
failed closed the tank is guaranteed to fail by overflow. Thus as in Case
A, if unit one fails first, all scenarios lead to overflow. The time to
overflow, however, could be different due to the different flow rate from
unit three.
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If unit two fails first, the tank level drops to the low set point and
begins to oscillate above and below this mark as units one and three are
opened and closed (as in Case A). However, the amount of time spent in each
control region will be different. When the fluid level is rising, unit one
is closed and unit three is open, thus the level is changing at the rate of
0.005 meters per minute. When the level is falling, unit one is open and
unit three is closed, thus the level is changing at 0.01 meters per minute.
Define the flow rates from each of the three units as x^, X2, and X3
respectively. For Case F the normal values are, x^-COl, X2-O.OI, and
X3- 0.005 meters per minute. Since unit two has failed closed, then X2=0.0.
Define the net flow rate as x^^f then while the water level is in control
region one (and unit one os closed) , x^^^ is given by:
^et - X3 - 0.005
While the water level is in control region two (and unit three is closed)
,
Xnet is given by:
^et - -xi - -0.01
Therefore, if the tank level is considered to vary between the same two
levels, the tank must spend twice as much time in the control region one
(with unit three open and one closed) , than in the control region two (with
one open and three closed). This will reflect in the failure scenarios.
If while the tank level is increasing, either unit fails, then the tank
will immediately run dry. This is the same result as for Case A except that
Case A would not experience dryout until all three units have failed. If
while the tank level is decreasing, unit one fails, then the tank level will
hold constant until unit three fails open. Then the tank will overflow.
This sequence is the same as for Case A, however overflow will occur a few
hours later due to the slower flow rate from unit three.
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The fourth possible failure sequence resulting from the initial failure
of unit two is entirely different. If unit three fails while the tank level
is decreasing, then the level will continue to decrease until the level
reaches control region one, since the flow through unit three is half the
value of the flow through unit one. Once in control region one, unit one is
closed and the level will rise because of the flow from failed unit three.
Once the level is again in control region two, unit one will be opened.
Thus the level oscillates about the -1 meter level with equal time spent
while the tank level is rising and falling due to the fact that the flow rate
from unit one is exactly twice that from unit three. Since unit two has
failed closed and unit three has failed open, X2 - 0.0 and Xg =- 0.005. While
the water level is in control region one, unit one is closed; Xj,at is given
by:
i„,t - X3 - 0.005
While the water level is in control region two, unit one is open thus x^^^
is given by:
x^^t - X3 - Xi - 0.005 - 0.01 - -0.005
The water level rises and falls at equal rates.
From this condition, unit one can either fail open or closed depending
on whether it fails while the tank level is rising or falling. These
failures occur with equal probability. Therefore, once units two and three
have failed there is an equal chance that the tank will run dry or overflow.
Summarizing the possible sequences following failure of unit two it is
seen that the probability of subsequent failure of unit one or three is equal
to the ratio of their failure rates to the sum of the failure rates. Thus
there is a 65% chance that the next failure will be of unit three and a 35%
chance that the next failure will be of unit one. Of these percentages, two
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thirds of the unit one failures will be unit one failing open, which leads
directly to dryout, and the other one third of the unit one failures lead to
eventual tank overflow. For the unit three failure cases, two thirds will
be unit three failing closed, while the fluid level is rising, and this leads
to the tank failing by dryout. The other one third lead to oscillation in
the fluid level with unit one opening and closing, thus 50% will lead to
eventual system overflow and 50% will lead to system dryout. Evaluating the
probabilities of the scenarios initiated by the failure of unit two, it is
found that 77% lead to tank dryout while 23% lead to tank overflow. Figure
5.5 shows the state transition diagram for the Case F tank problem.
In Case F it is also no longer true that the initial failure of unit
three will eventually lead to tank overflow. To see this, the scenarios
associated with the initial failure of unit three are analyzed. Following
failure of unit three the tank level rises into control region three and then
unit two is closed. Since the flow rate from unit one is greater than the
flow rate of unit three, the level drops into control region two, at which
point unit two is turned back on. Thus the fluid level oscillates about the
+1 meter level with unit two being opened and closed. While unit two is on,
the net flow rate into the tank is 0.005 meters per minute, and while unit
two is off the flow rate out of the tank is 0.005 meters per minute, thus if
the tank level is assumed to oscillate between the same two levels, the
system spends equal time with unit two open or closed.
The next failure of either unit one or two will again be in proportion
to the failure rates associated with each unit. Using these values it is
found that subsequent to failure of unit three, there is a 41% chance that
the next failure will be of unit one and a 59% chance that the next failure
will be of unit two. If unit one fails, it closes, thus the tank will go
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immediately to the overflow condition. Since unit two spends fifty percent
of its time open and fifty percent of its time closed, it has an equal
probability of failing either closed or open.
If while the tank level is decreasing, unit two fails on, the tank will
go directly to an overflow state. If, however, unit two fails closed while
the tank level is increasing, then the tank level will fall until it is in
control region one, at which time unit one will be closed. Then the level
will rise due to flow from unit three until the level is in control region
two, when unit one will be opened again. Thus the level oscillates about the
-1 meter level with unit one opening and closing.
The flow rate when fluid is leaving the tank is the same as the flow
rate when the fluid level is rising, therefore unit one spends an equal
amount of time open and closed. If unit one fails closed while it is open,
then the tank will overflow. If unit one fails open while it is closed, then
the tank will run dry. The latter case was not possible in Case A.
Table 5.3
Case A Failure Sequence Summary
Failure Sequence Probability Result
#1 closed, #2 open
#1 closed, #3 open
#2 closed, #1 closed, #3 open
#2 closed, #1 open, #3 closed
#2 closed, #3 open, #1 closed
#2 closed, #3 closed, #1 open
#3 open, #1 closed
#3 open, #2 open
Summarizing the scenarios following the initial failure of unit three
it is seen that all but one of the situations leads to a tank overflow
condition. If unit one fails second, then overflow is certain to occur while






















Evaluating numerically, following the initial failure of unit number three,
there is a 35% chance that the tank will fail by overflow and only a 15%
chance that the tank will run dry.
Table 5.4
Case F Failure Sequence Summary
Failure Sequence Probability Result
#1 closed, #2 open
#1 closed, #3 open
#2 closed, #1 open
#2 closed, #1 closed, #3 open
#2 closed, #3 open, #1 closed
#2 closed, #3 open, #1 open
#2 closed, #3 closed, #1 open
#3 open, #1 closed
#3 open, #2 open
#3 open, #2 closed, #1 open
#3 open, #2 closed, #1 closed
Compiling the results of all initial failure events and evaluating the
numerical results it is found that for Case F, the probability that the tank
will fail by running dry is 0.30 and the probability that the tank will fail
by overflowing is 0.70. Thus in Case F the tank is more likely to fail by
running dry than in Case A due to the decreased flow rate from unit three.
Table 5.3 summarizes the possible failure sequences for Case A, their
probability of occurrence, and the end result. Table 5,4 summarizes the same
results for Case F.
5.4.3 Simulation Analysis
The results obtained for the asymptotic failure probabilities agree
well with the simulation results, as shall be seen, and Case A coincides with
the results presented by Aldemir in reference A-1. For Case F, however,
results from the simulation method agree with results from the simplified
Markov model, but not as closely with Aldemir 's predictions. This is due to
the fact that the problem treated in this work considers the failure of
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components and Aldemir considers failure of the control system for the
components. Thus there will be different failure possibilities between the
two approaches
.
From the above initiating event analysis, and making the assumption
that the time required for the fluid level to transit between control regions
is negligible, it is possible to construct Markov chains to approximate the
time dependent behavior of the system. Figure 5.4 shows the Markov state
transition diagram for Case A and indicates that sixteen states are required.
Figure 5.5 shows the state transition diagram for Case F, which requires
nineteen states. Table 5.5 shows the states used for Case A and their
corresponding definition. States 11 and 13 correspond to tank dryout while
states 4, 5, 10, 12, 14, and 15 correspond to tank overflow. From the states
in this table the Markov equations are written using the failure rates for
each control unit. The Markov equations are shown in Table 5.6.
Table 5.5
Markov States for Tank Case A
STATE FAILURE DESCRIPTION
All units good
1 Unit 1 failed closed
2 Unit 2 failed closed
3 Unit 3 failed open
4 Unit 1 failed closed then Unit 2 failed open (Overflow)
5 Unit 1 failed closed then Unit 3 failed open (Overflow)
6 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 1 failed closed
7 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 1 failed open
8 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 3 failed open
9 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 3 failed closed
10 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 1 failed closed then
Unit 3 failed open (Overflow)
11 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 1 failed open then
Unit 3 failed closed (Dryout)
12 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 3 failed open then
Unit 1 failed closed (Overflow)
13 Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 3 failed closed then
Unit 1 failed open (Dryout)
14 Unit 3 failed open then Unit 1 failed closed (Overflow)
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Figure 5.5 Tank Case F State Transition Diagreun
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Table 5.6
Markov Equations for Tank Case A
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Figure 5.7 Case A - Cxmulative Overflow Probability
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The failure rates are defined in reference A-1 as:
Unit 1: Aj^ = 5.2 * 10 per minute
Unit 2: A^ = 7.6 10~^ per minute
Unit 3: A^ = 9.5 * 10~^ per minute
To solve these equations, a fourth order Runge-Kutta numerical
integration routine (obtained from ref. P-4) was used as in Chapter 4. The
time period of concern is from time zero up until approximately 1,000 hours.
The time dependent results for appropriate states were summed to obtain the
time dependent probability of system failure by overflow or by dryout.
The TANK program was run for a simulated time duration of 1,000 hours
and 1,000 Monte Carlo trials were performed. The results were then plotted
along with the Markov approximation for comparison. Figure 5.6 shows the
time dependent results for the tank running dry and Figure 5.7 shows the
results for the tank failing by overflow. Both of these figures indicate
good agreement between the simulation results and the Markov approximation.
The time dependent behavior is virtually identical and values differ by only
a few percent. Good agreement between the simulation results and the
simplified Markov model is expected since the time required for the tank
level to change is small in comparison with the failure times associated with
the individual flow control units. A quantitative comparison of the
simulation and simplified Markov results with the numerical results provided
by Aldemir's dynamic Markov approach for Case A is shown in Figure 5.10.
The data for Aldemir's approach was provided in reference A- 5, and is the
same as the results presented in reference A-1. The figure indicates that
the simplified Markov results agree almost exactly with Aldemir's predictions
and the simulation method provides results which are very similar to both.
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For this case, the difference between the three methods is very small and
indicates that although the approach to the problem was different for each
method, the results were quite comparable.
For approximate analysis of Case F using the Markov technique, there
are nineteen states of interest. These states are listed in Table 5.7 below.
States 6, 12, 13, and 17 contribute to tank dryout while states 4, 5, 10,
14, 15, and 18 contribute to tank failure by overflow.
Table 5.7






failed closed then Unit 2 failed open (Overflow)
failed closed then Unit 3 failed open (Overflow)
failed closed then Unit 1 failed open (Dryout)
failed closed then Unit 1 failed closed
failed closed then Unit 3 failed open
failed closed then Unit 3 failed closed
failed closed then Unit 1 failed closed then
Unit 3 failed open (Overflow)
Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 3 failed open then
Unit 1 failed closed (Overflow)
Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 3 failed open then
Unit 1 failed open (Dryout)
Unit 2 failed closed then Unit 3 failed closed then
Unit 1 failed open (Dryout)
3 failed open then Unit 1 failed closed (Overflow)
3 failed open then Unit 2 failed open (Overflow)
3 failed open then Unit 2 failed closed
3 failed open then Unit 2 failed closed then
Unit 1 failed open (Dryout)
18 Unit 3 failed open then Unit 2 failed closed then
Unit 1 failed closed (Overflow)
With the above definitions of states and the same definition of failure rates
as given for Case A, the Markov equations are obtained and shown in Table
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Again the fourth order Runge-Kutta numerical integration program (from
ref . P-4) was used to solve the equations and the time dependent results for
the appropriate states were added together to produce the time dependent
probability of tank failure due to overflow and due to dryout. The
FLOW. UPDATE routine of the TANK program was modified to reflect the change
in flow rate from unit three and then the program was run again using the
same input file as for Case A to generate the simulation results. The input
file is contained in Appendix D and an example output file is in Appendix E.
The program was run for a simulated period of 1,000 hours and as in Case A,
1,000 trials were used. Results of the simulation program are plotted in
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 along with the Markov predictions for comparison. The
results indicate reasonable agreement between the two methods.
Also of note concerning the TANK simulation program is that from the
test run to determine failures sequences, it was found that 13 of the 1,000
trials involved failure of two units during the same continuous process
integration time step. In other words, in the 1,000 trials, 13 times, the
time separating successive failures was one hour or less. Thus approximately
1.3 percent of the time the assumption made for the initiating event Markov
analysis is not valid.
Also of note for the simulation method is the computer time required
to complete the problem. Using an integration time step of one hour,
running the problem for a simulated time period of 1,000 hours, and
performing 1,000 trials caused, the program to take two hours and fifty
minutes for the Case A problem. Using the same parameter with the Case F
problem, the test took four hours and forty- three minutes. The time for Case
F was much longer because of the fact that in this case there were many more
instances where the level of the tank oscillated about either the low or the
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Figure 5.11 Comparison With Aldemir's Results for Case P
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high tank level set points. The time stated above is for runs on a COMPAQ
386 personnel computer and times on an IBM XT are estimated to be about six
times as long. Thus the time requirement for using this simulation method
may be prohibitive.
Although the problem solved in the simulation approach was slightly
different than the one solved by Aldemir, results are compared in Figure
5.11. It is seen that the simplified Markov model now has an observable
error due to the assumptions made in its development. The simulation
results, however still show reasonable agreement with Aldemir 's predictions
using the dynamic Markov model. Note that the data plotted for Aldemir'
s
model are obtained from reference A- 5 and are corrected versions of the data
presented in reference A-1.
Certain improvements may be possible to improve the computer time
required. One of these, is increasing the time of the integration time step
used by the continuous process routine. Another is to more efficiently code
the portions of the model which lead to oscillation of a component. Based
on the difference in time required for Case A and Case F, this improvement
alone may reduce solution time by 75% or more. Other techniques of
optimizing the computer code may also certainly be possible as the code was
written to be transparent, not necessarily efficient. It is evident that the
continuous simulation routine is a valuable tool, however improvements can
be made to increase the accuracy of results and to reduce the amount of
computer time required.
5 . 6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter the use of continuous simulation methods was explored
for use in analyzing the reliability of complex process control systems. The
specific problem investigated was the tank level control problem addressed
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by Aldemir in reference A-1. The simulation solution proposed was a modified
version of the DYMCAM program discussed in previous chapters. This new
program, called TANK, made use of the continuous capability available in the
SIMSCRIPT II. 5 simulation language.
The tank level control problem addressed by Aldemir was discussed in
detail to provide insight into the exact nature of a simulation problem. The
Case A and Case F scenarios were explored and all possible failure sequences
were identified. An assumption was made concerning the time between failure
events which allowed for an approximate solution to be developed against
which the results of the simulation approach could be compared.
In the third section of the chapter, the modifications made to create
the TANK program were described. For the most part, the DYMCAM program was
left intact with only minor changes being made to a few lines of the
SIMSCRIPT code. Several routines were added to define the continuous
variable to be used in the simulation. These new routines include a Tank
process which models the fluid level as a continuous variable, and monitors
the level to determine the control region the system is in, and based on this
information, causes the opening and closing of control valves. This type of
dynamic problem is not treated by most reliability analysis techniques.
Once the program has been explained, the approximate Markov method is
described in detail. The Markov states used for both Case A and Case F are
listed in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 respectively and the Markov equations used are
listed. These equations were solved using a fourth order Runge-Kutta
numerical integration technique and the resulting time dependent system state
information manipulated to provide a time dependent estimate of the
probability of the tank failing by overflow or by dryout.
The TANK simulation program was run for a simulated time period of
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1,000 hours and for 1,000 Monte Carlo trials to provide the simulation
estimate to the tank level control problem. These results were plotted with
the results from the approximate Markov chain approach for comparison. It
was seen that both methods give similar results for the probability of tank
failure by overflow and dryout for both Case A and Case F. The results for
Cases A and F also compare well with the results given by Aldemir in
reference A- 5.
The computer time requirements for running the simulation program on
a personnel computer were quite large. This is due in large part to the
presence of the oscillation of the fluid level about the upper or lower tank
level set points. To reduce computer time requirements, it is possible to
revise the code to reflect a more efficient program, and the integration time
step can be increased. To increase the accuracy of the results, a larger
number of trials must be performed. Since the time required is directly
related to the number of trials performed, variance reduction techniques will
certainly be necessary. The TANK program demonstrated the capability of
using a continuous Monte Carlo simulation technique to solve complex process
control system reliability analysis problems with satisfactory approximate
results.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
6.1 Discussion of Methods
To evaluate the availability of a system there are two basic types of
approaches. These are static and dynamic methods. Under the heading of
static methods, the most well known technique is the fault tree. This method
has seen extensive use in reliability analysis and is a valuable tool for
calculating average system reliability. Another static method is the GO
methodology. This is a computer method which uses inductive logic to achieve
reliability analysis results. It's major advantage over the more widely used
fault tree method is that it models individual system components and
therefore provides a model which is easily reviewable and which can be
modified easily to analyze slight variations on the original analysis
problem. Both of these methods are good for determining average reliability
information, but neither can be easily used to solve dynamic analysis
problems.
Many methods exist for solving dynamic system availability problems.
One of the most commonly used is Markovian analysis. This method can provide
exact analytical continuous -time descriptions of systems which can be modeled
by a discrete state space. The major drawback of the technique , are the size
of the state space when complex systems are to be considered, and that only
exponentially distributed failure and repair time distributions can be used.
A second dynamic analysis method is the event tree. This method
provides modelling of the sequence of events which can lead to a designated
outcome. The method provides an inductive means of calculating the
reliability of a system where initiating faults can lead to unfavorable
outcomes. The method does not explicitly model repair and failure cycles of
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components and it can not be used to evaluate systems which have loops in
system operation which may the analysis to return back to a previous node in
the event tree a random number of times.
Digraph techniques provide a means of handling systems with continuous
process variables. The method is ideally suited to evaluating process
control systems in which the state of components may depend on the value of
a continuously varying signal. The results of a digraph analysis provide a
listing of disturbances which can lead to undesirable performance of the
system being analyzed.
The GO -FLOW methodology is similar to GO, but it provides a dynamic
capability. Thus this technique model provides an easily cons truetable
reliability analysis model which can de used to evaluate dynamic systems.
However, it can only be used to solve for discrete state systems, and is not
directly useful in evaluating process control systems or any structure with
continuously variable signals and component states.
The most flexible method of availability analysis, is probably also the
least used. This is the method of simulation. Monte Carlo simulation
techniques provide a powerful alternative to solving complex system
reliability analysis problems. In many cases, simulation can be used to
solve problems to which there is no analytical solution. The method can be
used to evaluate any type of phased mission problem. Since the model is
frequently developed to fit only a particular problem or specific type of
problem, often fewer assumptions or approximations are necessary and the
model can be made to accurately reflect actual system behavior.
Drawbacks of the Monte Carlo simulation method are that it only
provides an estimate of the actual system reliability. The level of
uncertainty in the prediction will be a result of the number of Monte Carlo
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trials performed and the behavior of the random number generator employed.
For better accuracy the number of trials can be increased, but this can lead
to a large computer time requirement. Typically, an analytical solution
method can produce results in a fraction of the time required for solution
by simulation techniques, provided an analytic solution to the problem
exists. However, significant time might also be involved in determining the
form of the analytical solution for the system.
In this work, a new Monte Carlo simulation model was developed for
evaluating the dynamic availability of complex systems. The DYMCAM program
is designed to be a general analysis tool with applicability to many types
of engineering systems. The SIMSCRIPT II. 5 language provides the capability
for all three major types of simulation approaches including event
scheduling, process interaction, and continuous simulation, thus providing
flexibility in program development. All three methods are used in the TANK
program.
The basic DYMCAM program is designed to provide a model which can
analyze the time -dependent availability of dynamic systems, is easy to
construct, and can be easily modified to incorporate additional features as
needed. The program structure allows for prediction of time -dependent system
unavailability information at any number of user specified time points
throughout the course of the simulated time period, and it also provides time
averaged unavailability information for the entire simulation time. It has
the capability to schedule any niomber of external events thus providing a
limitless phased mission capability. Five basic component types are
presently modeled, however further components could easily be added if
specific problem requirements call for increased modeling capabilities. Much
like the GO and GO-FLOW codes in this respect, DYMCAM should be easy to
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employ in system evaluation since it is expected that an input file can be
written to evaluate a system using the DYMCAM code directly from a schematic
of the system.
The TANK code is a modified version of DYMCAM designed to demonstrate
the capability for evaluating systems containing continuous variables. These
systems, such as process control systems, can be quite difficult to evaluate
using the analytical analysis tools available. The TANK code provides the
ability to model a continuously variable tank fluid level and it also
demonstrates how a simulation program can be used to model the occurrence of
events not scheduled before the start of the simulation. The DYMCAM and TANK
codes demonstrate that Monte Carlo computer simulation techniques can be
employed to solve a wide variety of system availability analysis problems.
6.2 Discussion of Results
The DYMCAM program was first tested on two very basic component
availability examples to demonstrate that the program does indeed provide
meaningful results. The results obtained are accurate and the variance
acceptable for the number of trials performed. The two examples consisted
of a single component with exponentially distributed repair and failure
distributions and a three state component possessing, in addition to these
two states, an exponentially distributed repair delay state. In both cases
the results agreed well with analytic predictions.
The second case, involving the three state device, demonstrated a minor
capability of the rather powerful DYMCAM subroutine called the
Repair .Supervisor . This subroutine can be used to cause various types of
repair delays and even to control which components are repaired and when.
Repair resources can even be limited if this is necessary for analysis of
certain systems.
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The third example demonstrated solution of a simple two-out-of- three
system. Success occurs if two of three parallel aligned pumps are operating
and flow is being produced at the outlet valve which all three pumps supply
pressure too. Results for this example again agreed well with Markov
predictions for the system and further demonstrated the capability of the
DYMCAM program to compute the availability of simple systems. The example
also identified the desireable capability of having signal process strength
incorporated into the model. Although not currently present, such
capabilities could easily be added.
The fourth test of the DYMCAM program demonstrated a simple phased
mission problem. The example used was one taken from reference M-2 and has
also been solved using the GO-FLOW methodology. Results obtained with the
DYMCAM program indicated the simulation approach gives availability
information equivalent to the values estimated by GO-FLOW. A sensitivity
analysis was also performed on this problem to verify the hypothesis that the
variance of results decreases with the increasing number of trials performed.
The TANK program was designed to demonstrate the continuous capability
of the SIMSCRIPT II. 5 simulation approach. Continuous variable modeling is
an important aspect of simulation a simulation approach, since few analytical
methods can treat such systems adequately. Aldemir proposes a discrete
state-space continuous time solution method with probabilistic system
behavior simulated by Markov chains in reference A-1. Also in this reference
is the specific tank example process control problem addressed in this work.
Using the TANK code, simulation solutions for the unavailability of the
tank due to overflow and dryout were calculated for the Case A and Case F
scenarios of reference A-1. Results compared favorably with Aldemir 's
solutions, despite the fact that the component states treated in the TANK
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model are somewhat different than the states assumed by Aldemir, A
simplified Markov chain solution was also proposed in this work for
comparison and the Markov results agreed within reasonable accuracy with the
simulation results obtained for both Case A and F. For Case A, the
simplified Markov solution provided results that agreed almost exactly with
Aldemir 's solution, while for Case F the simulation results were in closer
agreement with Aldemir' s solution than was the simplified Markov approach.
The TANK program demonstrated that simulation of complex process
control systems may provide a simple method of solution to a problem which
is not readily solved by analytic methods. Results appear to be accurate,
and the standard deviation of the results are related directly to the number
of trials performed.
Another important function demonstrated was the ease with which a
simulation approach can change the state of components based on the state of
a process variable or other components in the system, at any time point
during a simulated run. This is an important function not easily handled by
other reliability analysis techniques. By improving the DYMCAM program and
properly exploiting this capability it will be possible to analyze many
stochastic systems which were previously not easily quantifiable.
6.3 Strengths and Weaknesses
The DYMCAM dynamic simulation model demonstrated the capability of
simulation progrsims to solve dynamic reliability analysis problems. Values
of unavailability can be calculated for a system at any time point during the
simulation which the user chooses. In this respect, the program is equal in
capability to continuous Markov analysis procedures. Although failure times
are treated as exponentially distributed and repair times are Weibull
distributed in the DYMCAM program, it is a simple matter to change the
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program to use any type of transition distributions.
DYMCAM can also be used to solve any manner of deterministic phased
mission problem. Through use of external events, components and signals may
be changed at will during the execution of the simulation. Although not
incorporated into the basic DYMCAM code, the TANK code example demonstrated
that it is even possible to simulate stochastic systems in which components
are required to change operating state at time points determined by system
operating characteristics. The TANK code also shows that Monte Carlo
simulation can be successfully used to solve continuous variable reliability
analysis problems such as process control systems.
The major drawback of these simulation techniques are that they are
only estimation tools and do not provide exact results as do analytical
methods. The accuracy of the estimate improves with the number of Monte
Carlo trials performed, however the number of trials necessary to
significantly reduce the variance of the estimate may be prohibitively large,
requiring unacceptable amounts of computer time. As computers become faster,
this may prove to be less of a problem, in which case, in theory, exact
results can be obtained by using infinitely many trials, provided the
simulation model of the system is an accurate one.
It should be noted that the computer run times discussed in conjunction
with the tests of this work should not be interpreted as meaning that
simulation methods must always require excessive amounts of time. First,
neither DYMCAM nor TANK were programmed for maximum efficiency, but rather
to be as transparent as possible to the user. In addition, conversations
with individuals from CACI indicate that the IBM/PC version of SIMSCRIPT II.
5
does run very slowly. This is because the language was originally developed
for mainframe computers, and the PC adaptation uses an interpreter, rather
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than a compiler. SIMSCRIPT II. 5 will run much faster on a mini -computer
.
6.4 Conclusion and Recommendations
It has been shown that Monte Carlo simulation methods provide a
powerful tool for solving many types of complex system availability analysis
problems. This work introduces a program which can be used to solve a wide
variety of problems simply by entering an input file which accurately
describes the relationships between components in the system. Many large
complex systems have no adequate solution techniques, therefore advances in
simulation technology is essential for solving many reliability analysis
problems
.
As is evident from the variance of the results and computer time
required to obtain them, many improvements in the method can be made.
Cleaner coding of the program may improve run time requirements to some
extent; however a more important area of concern should be in exploring
methods of variance reduction. Incorporating such techniques may
significantly reduce the need to use many Monte Carlo trials and can,
therefore, reduce computer time requirements. Once run time has been
significantly reduced, more extensive testing of the program should be done
to better determine the limits of the simulation technique.
The program should also be modified to consider the strength of process
signals. Currently, signals are either on or off indicating only the
presence of a process, not the actual strength. If signal strength
capabilities were present then it would be an easy matter to determine, for
instance, how many pumps were feeding water to a valve simply by the strength
of the process signal from the valve.
Another area for future work is on the Repair .Supervisor routine. This
process could be expanded to provide limitless capabilities in managing
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repair resources available to a system. This routine could be used to
control the order and scheduled times of repair for individual components
based on any desireable scheduling scheme.
The DYMCAM dynamic simulation model demonstrates the basic capability
of Monte Carlo techniques to solve any manner of complex system reliability
analysis problems. In the future, as analysis of advanced engineering
systems is required, development and application of approaches such as this
will become desireable and even necessary since analytic techniques may not
be practical or possible. Future improvements of the DYMCAM program should
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Appendix A
DYMCAN Input File Description
Figure A.l shows an example listing of an input file for the DYMCAM
program. Line numbers are indicated to aid in describing the setup of an
input file for a specific program, since different problems will require
different numbers of input data file lines. This discussion should provide
all information necessary to create a file to solve any specific problem for
the desired system unavailability information. Any text editor can be used
to create the input file, and the file can be given any name acceptable by
DOS requirements
.
Line 1 is the title line and can be up to 80 characters long. If the
title is less than 80 characters long, it will be necessary to enter spaces
to extend the line to the full length. The read statements in the Input
routine are formatted reads, and therefore, if 80 characters are not found
on the first line, the program will look on the next line for the remaining
characters of the title, thus misreading the desired input data contained in
later lines. Some text editors, such as K-EDIT, do not save the trailing
blank spaces and thus could cause a problem if attempts are made to use them
to create input files. One trick that can be used if the title is short, is
simply to enter spaces out to column 80 of line 1, and then enter a character
in column 81. K-EDIT will save the entire line, but DYMCAM will only read
the first characters of the line, thus printing only the title which was
desired.
Line 2 contains the number of simulated hours for which the program is
to be run. The format is d(10,2) which means the program is looking for a
decimal number with two digits after the decimal point, and that the number
will be found in the first ten columns of line 2. For this particular
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LINE NUMBER INFORMATION


















19 BATTERY passive operating 1
20 0.1
21 1.0 1 0.0
22 system process
23 SWITCH process 1
24 SWITCH switch open 3
25 0.3
26 1.0 1 0.0
27 system command



















EXcunple DYMCAH Input File
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format specification it is not necessary to have the value right justified
in the ten column field of interest. The value can be entered left
justified, if desired, and the program will read all digits to the left of
the decimal point as an integer value and then read the next two digits
following the decimal and ignore any other characters which may be in the
first ten columns. It is critical only that the decimal appear somewhere in
the first 10 columns so that format specifications are satisfied. If the
decimal appears in columns 9 or 10, then the one or two digits following the
decimal for which values have not been assigned, will be recorded as being
zero. This is true for any number read with a d(x,y) format. Regardless of
the value of y, as long as a decimal is somewhere in the x columns specified,
then y characters will be assigned following the decimal. If y characters
are present in the input field, then they will be entered, if not, then
zeroes will be entered for the remaining digits. For the example shown, the
input value of simulation time is 1000 hours.
Line 3 is an integer value as must be entered in column 10. The value
which may be entered is either a or a 1. The entry signifies that the
run is to be a normal run. The 1 entry indicates that the run will be a test
run to see if proper program operation is occurring. Entering a 1 will cause
all components to fail at their mean failure time (one over the failure rate)
and all repairs to occur at their mean repair time. Thus by entering a 1,
it is possible to check and make sure that all components are failing and
being repaired as expected. The example shown in Figure A.l has a entered
indicating the run will be a normal run.
Line 4 indicates the number of Monte Carlo trials to be performed. The
number is entered as an integer value and must be right justified so that the
right most character of the number is entered in column 10 of line 4. THe
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example shows a value of 1000 indicating that 1000 Monte Carlo trials are to
be performed.
Line 5 specifies the number of time points for which dynamic system
unavailability data is required. This number is also an integer value and
must also be right justified with the one's digit falling in column 10.
There is no requirement as to the number of time points to be entered. If
desired, a zero can be entered and no dynamic information will be calculated
for the system. For the example problem, 11 time points will be used for the
dynamic unavailability analysis.
Line 6 is an integer value referring to the type of time distribution
desired for the dynamic unavailability analysis. The integer number 0, 1,
or 2 must be entered in column 10 of line 6. Entering a indicates that the
next lines of the input file will contain the desired time points. For the
example of Figure A.l, a value of is specified, indicating that the next
11 (number of time points specified in line 5) lines of the input line will
contain the time points of interest. If a 1 had been entered, then the 11
time points would have been chosen as uniformly distributed between time zero
and the value specified in line 2. The program automatically chooses zero
and the value of line 2 as two of its time points, thus the remaining 9
points for this example would be chosen uniformly distributed between the
beginning and end times. For this case, the points chosen would be the same
ones entered in lines 7 through 17, therefore this program feature allows for
simplification of the input file.
If a value of 2 is entered in column 10 of line 6, then the program
will choose values for the time points which are log distributed between the
zero time and the end of simulation time specified in line 2. As was the
case with entering a 1, the time zero point and the end of simulation time
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are automatically chosen. The remaining N - 2 points are calculated by
taking the log of the line 2 value, dividing it by one less than the value
of line 5, and then taking the inverse log of integer multiples of this
result, for time points between the two end times of the distribution. This
feature may be useful for evaluating the unavailability of a system which is
suspected of having an exponentially distributed result. Since the time
required to run the simulation program is directly related to the number of
time the program is interrupted to take another time dependent unavailability
sample, it is desireable to keep the number of time points specified in the
input file to a minimum, while still providing sufficient data to properly
evaluate the dynamic behavior of the system.
Line 18 of the input file specifies the number of components contained
in the system. For the example the number of components is 2. This value
will always be an integer value and must be entered right justified with the
right most digit falling in column 10. For every component indicated by this
niamber, there will be a minimum of five line of data in the input file. For
the example of Figure A.l, the first component is described in lines 19
through 23 and the second component is described in lines 24 through 30.
Each component must have a first line entered in the format of lines
19 and 24. The first 10 columns are reserved for the components name. The
name can contain any characters desired, but must not contain spaces. It
need not be left or right justified. It need only be less than or equal to
10 characters in length. The SIMSCRIPT language distinguishes between small
and capital letters, therefor it is important that if capital letters are
used for component names, that this is done consistently every where a
specific component name is mentioned. All other text, other than component
names, must be entered in lower case letters, since this is what the DYMCAM
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program has been programed to recognize.
Columns 11 through 20 for the first line of each component must contain
the component type designation. This, as all text, need not be justified,
but must be in lower case letters. Columns 21 through 30 should contain the
components initial state upon execution of the simulation. This information
must also be in lower case letters. Also on this line, the number of input
and output signals used by the component should be specified. Any number of
input and output signals can be assigned to a given component, however, for
all components, at least one input and one output signal must exist. The
number of inputs is an integer value and must be right justified in the
column 31 to 35 field, while the number of output signals must be entered as
an integer value right justified in the 36 to 40 column field. Line 19 of
the example refers to a passive element named BATTERY which is initially in
standby at time zero and has one input and one output signal. Line 24
indicates a switch named SWITCH which is initially open and has three inputs
and one output signal.
The second line of each component data field (lines 20 and 25 of the
example) contains the failure data for the component. The first 10 columns
contain the demand failure probability. The format for reading this value
is d(10,5). As discussed earlier, this means that the data will be contained
in a field 10 columns wide, and may include five digits following the
decimal. If more than five digits are entered after the decimal, they will
be ignored. The second data field of this line is from column 11 to column
20. This will contain the failure rate, lambda, for the component. The
format for this value is also d(10,5). As stated above, neither of these
values need be justified in their data fields. It is only critical that a
decimal point be entered somewhere in the field. Line 20 of Figure A.l, for
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example, indicates a value of 0.1 for the BATTERY demand failure probability.
This value was entered with only one decimal place, since only one decimal
was needed, regardless of the fact that the format specified five decimal
places can be entered. Likewise for the SWITCH in line 25, and the failure
rates for both components.
The third line for each component (lines 21 and 26) must contain the
repair information. Three data values are entered and each is read in the
d(10,5) format. The first value is the alpha parameter for the Weibull
distribution and it must be found in columns 1 through 10. The second value
is the beta parameter for the Weibull repair distribution and must be entered
in columns 11 through. The third value is the probability the component is
repairable once it has failed. This number is entered in columns 21 through
30. If exponentially distributed repair is to be considered, this can be
accomplished by entering a for the value of alpha, and treating beta as
being equal to the mean repair time for the component (one over mu, the
exponential repair rate) . For cases when a 1 is entered in line 3 of the
input file, the mean time to repair is treated as being equal to the Weibull
parameter, beta, regardless of the value of he alpha parameter. For the
example shown, repair is not considered, thus the values entered in lines 21
and 26 do not have physical significance, except for the zeros, which simply
indicate that once the component fails, it stays failed since it is not
repairable.
For every signal in the system, a line like lines 22, 23, and 27
through 30 must be specified. Since signals must be associated with the
components they link, they will always be listed following the component.
The nxjmber of signals described following any component will equal the sum
of the number of input and output signals specified for the given component.

Dynamic Simulation Model 185
For the example shown, the BATTERY has one input and one output, thus two
signals are specified. For the SWITCH, there are three inputs and one
output, thus four signals are specified. The input signals for a component
must always be specified first and the output components last. The order of
specifying several input or output files for a given component, however, is
not important as long as the above rule is obeyed. Every signal which does
not originate from, or terminate at the system level, must be contained in
two component listings. This is clearly evident because each signal must
have an origin and a destination. Thus if it does not come from or go to the
system, it must travel between two components of the system.
Information concerning signals must always begin in the column 11 to
20 field. The first 10 columns to provide ease in viewing the file. The
first field of the description (columns 11 to 20) attaches the signal to
another component. For input signals, this field contains the name of where
the signal came from (either the system or an other component) , and for
output signals the data field contains the destination of the signal (either
the system or an other component) . Thus each signal is tied between two
components
.
The second data field for each component is contained in columns 21
through 30 and indicates the type of signal (either command, power, or
process). As with all text data fields, the data need not be justified. The
third piece of data concerning each signal, is it's strength at the start of
the simulation. For power and process signals the strength is if power is
not available or the process variable is not present, and the strength is 1
if power is available or the process variable exists. For command signals,
a value of indicates no command, while a value of 1 indicates to open the
switch or valve (or start the active component). A value of -1 indicates to
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close the valve or switch (or to stop the active component) . These values
are entered as integers and are right justified in column 35. For the
example of Figure A.l, the BATTERY has one input and one output signal. The
input is a process signal coming from the system and is initially off, while
the output signal is a process signal going to the SWITCH and is also
initially off. The SWITCH has three inputs and one output. Two of the
inputs are from the system and reflect the power and command signals to the
SWITCH. Initially the switch has power but no command signal. The other
input to the switch is the process signal which comes from the BATTERY. The
output signal is aa process signal which goes to the system.
Line 31 provides information about the initial state of the system.
The program does not calculate the system state until a time 0+ which is
slightly greater than time zero, thus to artificially set the system to its
desired initial operating state it is necessary to set it at the beginning
of the run. For the system to be available at time zero, the system status
is set to operating or standby. Thus the value entered for initial system
state is either operating, standby, or failed. This data is entered in the
first 10 columns of the input file line. Line 31 of the example indicates
the system initially starts in the standby condition.
The next required line in the input file is the system success
criteria. This is the number of output signals directed to the system which
must be on in order for the system to be considered available. It is entered
as an integer value and must be right justified in column 10 of the data
line. For the example, the value entered in line 32 is one, specifying that
at least one output signal to the system must be on in order for the system
to be available. For this example, there is only one output signal to the
system, the output process signal from the switch, thus the system is only
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available if the switch is closed and an output process signal is being
generated, i.e. the BATTERY must also be operating.
Next, the number of external events to be included in the problem
scenario must be entered. This value will be an integer and is read right
justified from column 10 of the data file line. This value may be zero if
the problem to be analyzed is not a phased mission one, and if this is the
case, this will be the last line of the input file. For the example of
Figure A.l, line 33 indicates that there are 3 external events for this
problem.
For each external event, at least four lines of data must be entered.
The first line contains the time at which the event is scheduled to occur.
This information is contained in columns 1 to 10 and is read in the d(10,2)
format. Following this, in columns 11 to 20, the number of components
effected by the external event are given. This is an integer value and must
be entered right justified in column 20. Every external event must affect
at least one component or signal, but not necessarily both, therefor this
value may often be as it is in lines 34 and 38 of the example. If the
value is 1 or greater, then the next lines will list the components effected
by the external event. Each line, like line 43 of the example, simply lists
the name of the affected component. The name must be found in the first 10
columns of the data file line. For the example, the external event changes
the state of the SWITCH. The program is written such that all components
changed by a given external event, are affected in the same manner. Thus the
next data file line following the component names, gives the new state of
these components . For the example , the external event opens the SWITCH at
900.00 hours into the simulation. Thus line 44 contains the instruction to
open. This component change of state must be entered in the first 10 columns
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of the data line.
The next line of an external event specifies the number of signals
affected by the event. This will be an integer value and must be entered
right justified in column 10 of the data line. For the example of Figure
A.l, the third external event does not change any signals as is indicated by
the in line 45. The first to external events change one signal each. This
is indicated in lines 35 and 39 of the example input file. If a signal is
changed, then two lines must be entered for each signal changed by the
external event. The first line contains the origin of the signal, the
destination of the signal, and the type of signal. These three data entries
are text information and are entered in columns 1 to 10, 11 to 20, and 21 to
30 respectively. The next input data line contains the new strength of the
signal. This will be an integer value and is entered right justified in
column 10 of the data file line. For the example of Figure A.l, the first
external event changes the process signal from the system to the BATTERY
(line 36) . The new strength (line 37) specifies that the signal is to be
turned on so that the BATTERY may now supply current. The second external
event of the example effects the command signal from the system to the
SWITCH. It causes the command signal to change to -1 at the 500.00 hour time
point which will cause the switch to close, provided it does not experience
a demand failure. Line 40 of the example specifies the signal, while line
41 gives the new value
.
With the current program structure, it is possible to change many
signals with a single external event, and to change each to a different
signal strength. These same signals may be changed again at a later time in
the simulation by another external event. Components, on the other hand, can
only be changed once by an external event. This means that if an external
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event is used at the 500.00 hour time point to open a switch, the same switch
can not be closed with an external event at a later time in the simulation
(although it may have its input command signal changed) . This is because of
the way external events were treated in development of this basic
demonstration program. It would be possible to modify the program to allow
multiple state changes of a given component, if such a capability were
desireable.
Also with the current structure, all components changed by a given
external event must be changed to the same new state. This is not such a
problem since any number of external events can be scheduled to occur at
exactly the same time. In fact, the motivating idea for the external event
was that each event would effect only a single component or type of
component. If it is desireable, the External Event routine could certainly
be modified to allow multiple component changes during a single external
event
.
This appendix should supply all the information necessary for writing
input files for the DYMCAM program. Care must be taken to ensure that all
information is properly formatted. For further examples of input files,
Appendix D can be consulted which contains several input files used for the
various test runs perfomned in chapters four and five. Also note in Appendix
D that all data file lines (with the exception of the title line) contain
data only up through column 40. Since SIMSCRIPT will not look beyond this
point for any data, it is possible to use this "blank space" to include
comments concerning the input file data for future reference and ease of
understanding. This has been done for all test cases run.











9 eveiry component . record











19 a repair_function_shape, and
20 a repair_function_scale
21
22 every external. event. record
23 has an occurrence_time,
24 a number_components,
25 a new_state,
26 a number_signals, and
27 a new_strength
28
29 define response_function as a subprogram variable
30 define component_name, component_type , initial_state,
31 and new_state as text variables
32 define demand_failure_frequency, run_failure_frequency,
33 repair_probability, repair_function_shape,
34 and repair_function_scale as real variables
35 define number_inputs, number_outputs, number_components
,
36 number_signals, and new_strength as integer variables
37 //
38 '' 2-d arrays associated with permanent entities.
39 "
40 define input. name, output. name, input. signal. type,
41 output. signal. type, extevnt. component, extevnt. origin,
42 extevnt. destination, and extevnt. stype
43 as 2-dimensional text arrays
44 define input. signal. strength and output. signal. strength
45 as 2-dimensional integer arrays
46 define test as a 1-dimensional text array
47 define signal. status as a 1-dimensional integer array
48
49 processes include call. update, schedule. avail. samples,
50 schedule. external. events, repair. supervisor,
51 stop. tank, and stop. scenario
52
53 every component
54 has a name,






a demand. failure. frequency,
a run. failure. frequency,
a repair. probability,
a repair. function. shape,
a repair. function. scale,
a failure. time,
a status,
and owns an input. sset and
an output. sset
and may belong to a system. cset,
a tank. input. cset,



















a flow. rate. in,
a flow. rate. out,
a net. flow. rate,
and owns a tank. input. cset,
a tank. output. cset,
a tank. input. sset, and
a tank. output. sset
and belongs to a system. tset
every external. event





a signal .typee, and
a new. strength
and owns an extevnt.cset
and belongs to a system. eset
every availability
has a time. avail, and
a time. avail. data
define time_avail as a 1-dimensional real array
define time. avail and time. avail. data as real variables
define tank. condition as an integer function
define response. function as a subprogram variable
define name, component. type, old. state, state, new. state,
signal. origin, signal. destination, and signal. typee
as text variables

















111 repair. probability, repair. function. shape,
112 repair. function. scale, failure. time, occurrence. time,
113 high. level, low. level, high. set, low. set, '"
114 flow. rate. in, flow. rate. out, net. flow. rate, '"
115 and number. signals as real variables
116 define status and new. strength as integer variables
117 define level as a continuous double variable '"
118 "
119 " Later versions may define signals as processes (so time delays





125 has a signal. type,
126 an origin,
127 a destination,
128 an old. strength, and
129 a strength
130 and may belong to an output. sset,
131 an input. sset,
132 a tank. input. sset, '"
133 a tank. output. sset, ''
134 a system. boundary. sset,
135 a system. success. sset, and
136 a system. sset
137
138 define cptr, sptr, eptr, aptr, and tptr "
139 as 1-dimensional pointer arrays
140
141 define signal. type, origin, and destination as text variables
142 define old. strength and strength as integer variables
143 "
144 " System characteristics.
145 "
146 the system owns a system. boundary. sset,
147 a system. success. sset,
148 a system. cset,
149 a system. sset,
150 a system. eset, and
151 a system. tset "
152
153 define failure. translation as a text function
154 define job. title, initial. system. state, and system. state
155 as text variables
156 define system. ind.var and simulation. time as real variables
157 define ntrial, system. success. criterion, ntimes,
158 distribution. type, run. type, and total .signal. count
159 as integer variables
160 define unavailability .dist as a 1-dimensional real array
161 define trial. unavail as a real variable
162
163 accumulate trial .availability as the mean of system. ind.var
164 tally average. unavailability as the mean,
165 variance. unavailability as the variance.
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166 maximum. unavailability as the maximum,
167 and minimum. unavailability as the minimum of
168 trial. unavail
169
170 define .off to mean
171 define .on to mean 1
172 define .no to mean
173 define .yes to mean 1
174 define .working to mean 1
175 define .resetting to mean 2
176 define . awaiting. repair to mean 3
177 define .under. repair to mean 4
178 define . not. repairable to mean 5








call tank. initialize. run
add .003 to simulation. time
for trial = 1 to ntrial
do
call trial. initialize
call tank. initialize. trial
activate a call. update now
activate a schedule. avail. samples now
activate a schedule. external. events now
activate a stop. tank in simulation. time hours
activate a stop. scenario in simulation. time hours
start simulation
let unavailability. dist(trial) = 1 - trial. availability
let trial. unavail = trial. availability
let time.v =»
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1 routine active given component
Develops output signals for an active component
using explicit command signals. Assumes that the component







Command Power Process Initial Final Process
Input Input Input State State Output
- - failed failed no
- no - standby standby no
stop yes - standby standby no
none yes - standby standby no








- no - operating standby no








none yes no operating failed no
none yes yes operating operating yes
start yes no operating failed no
start yes yes operating operating yes
- - - standby* standby* no
- no - operating* operating* no
- yes no operating* failed no
- yes yes operating* operating* yes17
define rule as a saved 2-dimensional text array
define component as a pointer variable
define index. command, total. command, number. power, total. power,
number. process, total. process, output. strength, ruletype,
success, and j as integer variables
define later. case as a saved integer variable
Enter decision table.
if later. case eq .no
reserve rule as 17 by 4
let rule(l,l) = ""
let rule(l,3) = ""
let rule(2,l) = ""
let rule(2,3) = ""
let rule(3,l) = "stop"




let rule (2, 4) =






















































let (9,1 = "stop"
let (9 3 = "yes"
let ( 1) = "none"
let
let
let (11 3) = "yes'
let ) = "start'
let ) = "no"
let ) = "start'








let ( 3) = "yes"
let = .yes
always
Determine input signal status. Assume that "start" and "stop"
commands cancel each other out (respective values of 1 and -1)
.
for every signal in input. sset (component)
do
if signal. type (signal) eq "process"
add 1 to total. process
if strength (signal) eq .on
add 1 to number. process
always
else
if signal. type(signal) eq "power"
add 1 to total. power
if strength (signal) eq .on
add 1 to number. power
always
else
add 1 to total. command




Develop test vector for comparison with rules. Assume that
let rule(4,2) =
let rule(4,4) =







let rule (8, 4) =
let rule(9,2) =














































111 " a single process signal is sufficient, and that a single power
112 " signal is sufficient (i.e., OR gates).
113 "
114 if index. conunand eq -1
115 let test(l) = "stop"
116 else
117 if index . command eq
118 let test(l) = "none"
119 else
120 let test(l) = "start"
121 always
122 always
123 if number. power ge 1
124 let test(2) = "yes"
125 else
126 let test(2) = "no"
127 always
128 if number. process ge 1
129 let test (3) = "yes"
130 else
131 let test (3) = "no"
132 always
133 let test(4) = state (component)
134 "
135 " Determine appropriate rule.
136 "
137 for ruletype = 1 to 17
138 do
139 for j = 1 to 4
140 do
141 if rule (ruletype, j) ne "" and rule(ruletype, j ) ne test(j)
142 go to 'next'
143 always
144 loop




149 " Select rule.
150 "
151 'found'
152 select case ruletype
153
154 case 1, 16
155 let state (component) = "failed"
156 let output .strength = .no
157
158 case 2, 3, 4, 7
159 let state (component) = "standby"
160 let output. strength = .no
161
162 case 5
163 call demand. test giving component yielding success
164 if success eq .no
165 let state (component) = "standby*"
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166 let output. strength = .no
167 else
168 let state (component) = "failed"




173 call demand. test giving component yielding success
174 if success eq .no
175 let state (component) = "standby*"
176 let output. strength = .no
177 else
178 let state (component) = "operating"




183 call demand. test giving component yielding success
184 if success eq .no
185 let state (component) = "failed"
186 let output. strength = .no
187 else
188 let state (component) = "standby"




193 call demand. test giving component yielding success
194 if success eq .no
195 let state (component) = "operating*"
196 let output. strength =» .yes
197 else
198 let state (component) = "standby"
199 let output. strength = .no
200 always
201
202 case 10, 12
203 let state (component) = "failed"
204 let output. strength = .no
205
206 case 11, 13
207 let state (component) = "operating"
208 let output. strength = .yes
209
210 case 14
211 let state (component) = "standby*"
212 let output. strength = .no
213
214 case 15
215 let state (component) = "operating*"
216 let output. strength = .no
217
218 case 17
219 let state (component) = "operating*"










228 '' Update output signals.
229 "
230 for every signal in output. sset (component)








This process totals the sum of the system indicator
variable at the specified time points. At the completion
of all trials the totals are divided by the number of
trials to determine the time dependent system availability.
while time.v It (simulation. time + 10)
do
suspend







1 process call. update
2 "
3 ' ' This should be a process to keep the process component
4 ' ' from destroying itself when it tries to call a system
5 " update.
6 "
7 while time.v It .000004
8 do
9 wait .000005 hours
10 for every component in system. cset
11 do
12 resume the component
13 loop
14 for every tank in system. tset
15 resume the tank
16 wait .0005 hours
17 for i = 1 to dim.f (cptr(*))
18 do
19 if component. type (cptr ( i) ) eq "active"
20 or component. type (cptr ( i) ) eq "passive"
21 if state (cptr ( i) ) ne "operating"









31 end ' 'call. update
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1 routine check. valve given component
Develops output signals for a check valve.
input process — output process
Condensed decision table:
rocess Initial Final Process
Input State State Output
_ failed_closed failed_closed no
no closed closed no
yes closed failed_closed no
open yes
no failed_open failed_open no
yes failed_open failed_open yes
no open failed_open no
closed no
yes open open yes
define rule as a saved 2-dimensional text array
define component as a pointer variable
define number. process, total. process, output. strength,
ruletype, success and j as integer variables
define later. case as a saved integer variable
Enter decision table.
if later. case eq .no
reserve rule as 7 by
let rule(l,l) =, III!
let rule(2,l) = "no"
let rule(3,l) = "yes"
let rule(4,l) = "no"
let rule(5,l) = "yes"
let rule(6,l) = "no"
let rule(7,l) = "yes"
let later. case = .yes
always
let ru]Le(l 2) = "failed closed
let ru]Le(2 2) = "closed"
let ru]Le(3 2) = "closed"
let ru]Le(4 2) = "failed_open"
let ru]Le(5 2) = "failed_open"
let ru Le(6 2) = "open"
let ru Le(7 2) = "open"
Detennine input signal status.
for every signal in input. sset (component)
do
if signal. type(signal) eq "process"
add 1 to total. process
if strength(signal) eq .on






56 '' Develop test vector for comparison with rules. Assume that
57 ' ' a single process signal is sufficient (i.e., an OR gate).
58 "
59 if number. process ge 1
60 let test(l) = "yes"
61 else
62 let test(l) = "no"
63 always
64 let test(2) = state (component)
65 "
66 " Determine appropriate rule.
67 "
68 for ruletype = 1 to 7
69 do
70 for j = 1 to 2
71 do
72 if rule(ruletype, j) ne "" and rule(iruletype, j ) ne test(j)
73 go to 'next'
74 always
75 loop




80 " Select rule.
81 "
82 'found'
83 select case ruletype
84
85 case 1
86 let state (component) = "failed_closed"
87 let output. strength = .no
88
89 case 2
90 let state (component) = "closed"
91 let output. strength = .no
92
93 case 3
94 call demand. test giving component yielding success
95 if success eq .no
96 let state (component) = "failed_closed"
97 let output. strength = .no
98 else
99 let state (component) = "open"




104 let state (component) = "failed_open"
105 let output. strength = .no
106
107 case 5
108 let state (component) = "failed_open"
109 let output. strength = .yes
110































call demand . test giving component yielding success
if success eq .no
let state (component) = "failed_open"
let output. strength = .no
else
let state (component) = "closed"
let output. strength = .no
always
case 7
let state (component) = "open"
let output .strength = .yes
default
" Error messages can be put here if rule not matched.
endselect
'' Update output signals.
for every signal in output. sset (component)
let strength (signal) •» output, strength
return







3 '' Tracks behavior of all components after initial demand (change).
4 '' Includes repair. Uses exponential failure time model.
5 "
6 define mean. failure. time, default. time, el, and




11 while time.v It (simulation. time + 10)
12 do
13 'reset'
14 let status (component) = .working
15 if run. failure. frequency (component) gt
16 let mean. failure. time = 1. /run. failure. frequency (component)
17 if run. type eq 1
18 wait mean. failure. time hours
19 go to 'repair'
20 otherwise
21 wait exponential. f (mean. failure. time, 1) hours
22 'repair'
23 if status (component) eq .resetting
24 go to 'reset'
25 always
26 if status (component) eq .reset. run
27 go to 'term'
28 always
29 if state (component) eq "open" or
30 state (component) eq "closed" or
31 state (component) eq "operating"
32 let old, state (component) = state (component)
33 let state (component) = failure. translation (component)
34 activate a call. update now
35 always
36 else
37 let default. time = simulation. time + 10.0
38 wait default. time hours
39 if status (component) eq .resetting
40 go to 'reset'
41 always
42 if status (component) eq .reset. run
43 go to 'term'
44 always
45 always
46 let status (component) = .awaiting. repair
47 let failure. time (component) = time.v
48 activate a repair. supervisor now
49 suspend
50 if status (component) eq .reset. run






let status (component) = .under. repair
let el = repair. function. shape (component)
let e2 - repair. function. scale (component)




wait weibull. f (el,e2, 1) hours
'good'
if status (component) eq .reset. run
go to 'term'
always
let old. state (component) = state (component)
select case component. type (component)
case "active", "passive"
let state (component) = "standby"
case "switch"
let state (component) = "open"
case "valve", "check. valve"
let state (component) = "closed"
default
print 1 line thus
The component type was not matched in the repair routine.
endselect





1 routine demand. test given component yielding success
2 "
3 '' Determines if given component succeeds or fails on demand,
4 " using the demand. failure. frequency for the component.
5 "
6 define component as a pointer variable
7 define success as an integer variable
8 if random. f(l) le demand. failure. frequency (component)
9 let success « .no
10 else





16 end "demand. test
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1 process external. event
2 "
3 '' Schedules a change in the system (either to component status
4 *' or signal strength) occurrence. time hours into the simulation.
5 "
6 while time.v It (simulation. time + 10)
7 do
8 suspend
9 for every component in extevnt.cset (external. event)
10 do
11 let old.state(component) = state (component)
12 let state (component) = new. state (external. event)
13 loop
14
15 if number. signals (external. event) eq 1
16 for j = 1 to number. signals (external. event)
17 do
18 for every signal in system. sset
19 with origin(signal) eq signal. origin (external. event)
20 and destination(signal) eq
21 signal . destination (external . event)
22 and signal. type (signal) eq signal .typee (external. event)
23 find the first case
24 if found
25 let old. strength (signal) = strength (signal)




30 if number. signals (external. event) ne
31 print 1 line thus
32 An external event was entered with more than one signal change.
33 always
34 always





4 end ' 'external. event
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1 function failure. translation (component)
2 "
3 " Determines status of "failed" component.
4 "
5 define component as an integer variable
6 define mode as a text variable
7




case "check. valve", "valve", "switch"
if state (component) eq "open"
let mode = "failed_closed"
always
if state (component) eq "closed"
let mode = "failed_open"
always
if state (component) ne "open" and
state (component) ne "closed"
print 1 line thus
Failure translation didn't function properlyl
always
default
print 1 line thus
Failure translation routine rule not matched!
return with mode





3 '' Problem input routine.
4 ' '
5 define infile and outfile as text variables
6
7 write as /, "Enter DOS input file name => ",+
8 read infile
9 write as /, "Enter DOS output file name => ",+
10 read outfile
11 open 7 for input, file name = infile
12 use 7 for input
13 open 8 for output, file name = outfile
14 use 8 for output
15 "
16 '' Title, general characteristics.
17 "
18 read job. title as t 80, /
19 write job. title as t 80, /
20 read simulation. time as d(10,2), /
21 write simulation. time as d(10,2), /
22 read run. type as i 10, /
23 write run. type as i 10, /
24 read ntrial as i 10, /
25 write ntrial as i 10, /
26 read ntimes as i 10, /
27 write ntimes as i 10, /
28 read distribution. type as i 10, /
29 write distribution. type as i 10, /
30 reserve time_avail (*) as ntimes
31 if distribution. type eq
32 for i = 1 to ntimes
3 3 do
34 read time_avail (i) as d(10,2), /




39 " Component characteristics.
40 "
41 read n. component. record as i 10, /
42 write n. component. record as i 10, /
4 3 create every component. record
44 reserve input. name(*, *) , output. name (*,*) , input. signal. type
(
45 output. signal. type (*,*) , input. signal. strength(*, *) , and
4 6 output. s ignal. strength {*, *) as n. component. record by *







52 number_inputs (i) , and
53 number_outputs(i)





56 coinponent_type ( i ) ,
57 initial_state(i)
,
58 number_inputs(i) , and
59 number_outputs(i)
60 as 3 t 10, 2 i 5, /
61 read demand_failure_frequency (i) and
62 run_failure_freqviency(i)
63 as 2 d(10,5)
, /
64 write demand_failure_frequency (i) and
65 run_failure_frequency (i)




68 repair_function_scale(i) , and
69 repair_probability(i)




72 repair_function_scale(i) , and
73 repair_probability(i)
74 as 3 d(10,5)
, /
75 "
76 '' Input signals for component.
77 "
78 reserve input. name ( i, *)
,
79 input.signal.type(i,*) , and
80 input. signal. strength (i,*)
81 as number_inputs(i)
82 for j - 1 to number_inputs(i)
83 do
84 read input.name(i, j)
85 input. signal. type ( i, j) , and
86 input. signal. strength (i,j)
87 as b 11, 2 t 10, i 5, /
88 write input.name(i, j)
,
89 input. signal. type (i,j ) , and
90 input. signal. strength (i,j)
91 as b 11, 2 t 10, is,/
92 if trim. f (input. name(i,j) ,0) eq "system"




97 '' Output signals for components.
98 "
99 reserve output. name ( i, *)
100 output. signal. type ( i, *) , and
101 output. signal. strength(i, *)
102 as number_outputs(i)
103 for j = 1 to number_outputs(i)
104 do
105 read output. name ( i, j )
,
106 output.signal.type(i, j) , and
107 output. signal. strength(i, j
)
108 as b 11, 2 t 10, i 5, /
109 write output.name(i, j)
,
110 output. signal. type(i,j) , and
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111 output. signal. strength (i,j)
112 as b 11, 2 t 10, is,/
113 loop
114 add number_outputs(i) to total. signal. count
115 loop
116 "
117 '' System characteristics.
118 "
119 read initial. system. state as t 10, /
120 write initial. system. state as t 10, /
121 read system. success. criterion as i 10, /
122 write system. success. criterion as i 10, /
123 "
124 " External event records.
125 "
126 read n. external. event. record as i 10, /
127 write n. external. event. record as i 10, /
128 if n. external. event. record gt
129 create every external. event. record
130 reserve extevnt. component (*,*) , extevnt. origin (*,*) , and
131 extevnt.destination(*,*) , extevnt. stype (*, *)
132 as n. external. event. record by *
133
134 for i = 1 to n. external. event. record
135 do
136 read occurrence_time(i) as d(10,2)
137 write occurrence_time(i) as d(10,2)
138 read nuni3er_components (i) as i 10, /
139 write number_components(i) as i 10, /
140 if number_components(i) gt
141 reserve extevnt. component (i, *) as number_components (i)
142 for j = 1 to number_components(i)
143 do
144 read extevnt. component (i,j) as t 10
145 write extevnt. component (i,j ) as t 10
146 loop
147 read new_state(i) as /, t 10, /
148 write new_state(i) as /, t 10, /
149 always
150 read number_signals(i) as i 10, /
151 write number_signals(i) as i 10, /
152 if number_signals(i) gt
153 reserve extevnt. origin (i, *) , extevnt.destination(i, *)
,
154 extevnt. stype ( i, *) as number_signals(i)
155 for j = 1 to number_signals(i)
156 do
157 read extevnt. origin ( i, j)
,
158 extevnt. destination(i, j)
,
159 extevnt. stype (i,j)
160 as 3 t 10, /
161 write extevnt. origin ( i, j)
,
162 extevnt. destination(i, j )
163 extevnt. stype (i,j)




166 read new_strength(i) as i 10, /





172 end ' ' input
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1 routine passive given component
Develops output signals for a passive component (no explicit
command signals or power source)
.
input process — output process
Condensed decision table:
Process Initial Final Process
Input State State Output
- failed failed no
no standby standby no
yes standby failed no
operating yes
no operating standby no
yes operating operating yes
define rule as a saved 2-dimensional text array
define component as a pointer variable
define number. process, total. process, output. strength,
ruletype, success, and j as integer variables
define later. case as a saved integer variable
Enter decision table.
let rule(l,2) = "failed"
let rule (2, 2) = "standby"
let rule (3, 2) = "standby"
let rule (4, 2) = "operating"
let rule (5, 2) = "operating"
if later. case eq .no
reserve rule as 5 by 2
let rule (1,1) = ""
let rule(2,l) = "no"
let rule (3,1) = "yes"
let rule (4,1) = "no"
let rule (5,1) = "yes"
let later. case = .yes
always
Determine input signal status.
for every signal in input. sset (component)
do
if signal. type(signal) eq "process"
add 1 to total. process
if strength (signal) eq .on




Develop test vector for comparison with rules. Assume that
a single process signal is sufficient (i.e., an OR gate).
if number. process ge 1
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56 let test(l) = "yes"
57 else
58 let test(l) = "no"
59 always
60 let test (2) = state (component)
61 "
62 '' Determine appropriate rule.
63 ' '
64 for ruletype = 1 to 5
65 do
66 for j = 1 to 2
67 do
68 if rule (ruletype, j) ne "" and rule (ruletype, j) ne test(j)
69 go to 'next'
70 always
71 loop




76 ' ' Select rule.
77 "
78 'found'
79 select case ruletype
80
81 case 1
82 let state (component) = "failed"
83 let output . strength = .no
84
85 case 2
86 let state (component) =- "standby"
87 let output. strength = .no
88
89 case 3
90 call demand. test giving component yielding success
91 if success eq .no
92 let state (component) = "failed"
93 let output. strength = .no
94 else
95 let state (component) = "operating"




100 let state (component) = "standby"
101 let output. strength = .no
102
103 case 5
104 let state (component) = "operating"




109 '' Error messages can be put here if rule not matched.
110 "

Dynamic Simulation Model 217
111 endselect
112 "
113 " Update output signals.
114 "
115 for every signal in output. sset (component)
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1 process repair. supeirvisor
This process can be modified in the future to determine
when a failed component should begin the repair process.
Time delays can be inserted (repair delays) and if repair
resources are limited the number of components under
repair at any given time can be controlled here.
Currently this routine will be called from the system. update
routine every time a new failure is detected. This routine
uses the repair. probability for the failed component to
determine if the component is repairable or not. If the
component is repairable a repair is then begun immediately.
To determine what the current status of each component is
the status variable can be checked. The status will be
working, resetting, awaiting repair, under repair, or not
repairable.
This portion is for defining a repair delay.
define component as a pointer variable
define a, b, and x as real variables
let a = 1.0
let b = 100.0
let X = time.v
if run. type eq 1
wait b hours
let a = 0.0
go to 'good'
otherwise
wait weibull.f (a,b, 1) hours
'good'
If it is desireable to use various repair delays on a frequent
basis, the program could be modified to read in the repair
delay distribution parameters. The above delay is a weibull
distribution, but with the parameters chosen, it is actually
an exponential distribution.
for every component in system. cset
with failure. time (component) eq x
find the first case
if found
if status (component) = .awaiting. repair
if random. f(l) le repair. probability (component)
resume the component
else
let status (component) = .not. repairable
always
always
let failure. time (component) = -1.0
else
print 1 line thus




59 end ' 'repair. supervisor
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1 routine run. initialize
2 ' '
3 '' initialization of components, signals, and external events
4 ' '
5 define i, j, k, and signal. count as integer variables
6 define x, y, and z as real variables
7 "
8 '' Component initialization.
9 ' '
10 reserve cptr(*) as n. component. record
11 for i = 1 to n. component. record
12 do
13 activate a component called cptr(i) now
14 file cptr(i) in system. cset
15 let name(cptr(i) ) = trim. f (component_name(i) ,0)
16 let component. type (cptr ( i) ) = trim. f (component_type(i) , 0)
17 let n. input. sset (cptr(i) ) = number_inputs(i)
18 let n. output. sset (cptr (i) ) = number_outputs ( i
)
19 let demand. failure. frequency (cptr(i) ) =
20 demand_failure_frequency(i)
21 let run. failure. frequency (cptr (i) ) = run_failure_frequency (i)
22 let repair. probability(cptr(i) ) = repair_probability (i)
23 let repair. function. shape(cptr(i) ) = repair_function_shape(i)
24 let repair. function. scale(cptr(i) ) = repair_function_scale(i)
25




29 let response. function(cptr(i) ) = 'active'
case "valve"
let response. function (cptr ( i) ) = 'valve'
case "check_valve"
let response. function(cptr(i) ) = 'check. valve'
case "switch", "breaker"
let response. function (cptr (i) ) = 'switch'
default
let response. function(cptr(i) ) = 'active'
print 1 line with name(cptr(i) ) thus
In initialize routine response function not matched to
endselect
loop
add 5 to total. signal. count
reserve sptr(*) as total . signal. count
Initialize and file boundary condition signals.
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56 for j = 1 to n. component. record
57 do
58 for k = 1 to number_inputs(j)
59 do
60 if trim, f (input.naine( j ,k) ,0) eq "system"
61 add 1 to signal. count
62 create a signal called sptr(signal. count)
63 let signal. type (sptr (signal. count) ) =
64 trim. f( input. signal. type (j ,k) ,0)
65 let origin(sptr(signal. count) ) = "system"
66 let destination(sptr(signal. count) ) =
67 trio. f (component_name( j) ,0)
68 file sptr (signal. count) in input. sset (cptr(j)
)
69 file sptr (signal. count) in system. boundary. sset





75 '' Initialize and file component output signals.
76 "
77 for j = 1 to n. component. record
78 do
79 for k = 1 to number_outputs(j)
80 do
81 add 1 to signal. count
82 create a signal called sptr(signal. count)
83 let signal. type (sptr (signal. count) ) =
84 trim. f (output . signal .type (j ,k) ,0)
85 let origin (sptr (signal. count) ) = trim. f (component_name( j ) , 0)
86 let destination (sptr (signal. count) ) =
87 trim. f (output. name(j ,k) , 0)
88 for every component in system. cset
89 with name (component) eq destination (sptr (signal. count)
)
90 find the first case
91 if found
92 file sptr(signal. count) in input. sset (component)
93 else
94 if destination (sptr (signal. count) ) eq "system"
95 file sptr(signal. count) in system. success. sset
96 always
97 always
98 file sptr(signal. count) in output. sset(cptr( j )
)




103 '' Create and initialize external events, using
104 '' permanent entity external. event. record.
105 "
106 if n. external. event. record gt
107 reserve eptr(*) as n. external. event. record
108 for i = 1 to n. external. event. record
109 do
110 activate an external. event called eptr(i) now
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111 let occurrence. time (eptr ( i) ) = occurrence_tinie(i)
112 add .001 to occurrence. time (eptr (i)
)
113 let new. state (eptr ( i) ) = trim. f (new_state (i) , 0)
114 for j = 1 to number_components (i)
115 do
116 for every component in system. cset
117 with name (component) eq trim. f (extevnt. component (i, j ), 0)
118 find the first case
119 if found




123 let new. strength (eptr ( i) ) = new_strength(i)
124 let number. signals (eptr ( i) ) = numher_signals(i)
125 if number. signals (eptr ( i) ) eq 1
126 let signal. origin(eptr(i) ) = trim. f (extevnt. origin(i, 1) , 0)
127 let signal. destination(eptr(i) ) =
128 trim. f (extevnt. destination(i,l) ,0)
129 let signal. typee(eptr(i) ) = trim. f (extevnt. stype(i, 1) , 0)
130 always




13 5 reserve test as 4
136 reserve signal. status(*) as dim. f (sptr(*)
)
137 reserve unavailability. dist(*) as ntrial
138 reserve aptr(*) as ntimes
139 if distribution. type eq 1
140 let X = simulation. time / (ntimes - 1)
141 let time_avail(l) = 0.
142 for i = 2 to ntimes
143 do
144 let time_avail(i) = (i - 1) * x
145 loop
14 6 always
147 if distribution. type eq 2
148 let y = log. 10. f (simulation. time)
149 let X = y / (ntimes - 1)
150 let time_avail(l) = 0.
151 for i = 2 to ntimes
152 do
153 let z = (i - 1) * X
154 let time_avail(i) = 10 ** z
155 loop
156 always
157 for i = 1 to ntimes
158 do
159 activate an availability called aptr(i) now





165 end ' 'run. initialize
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1 routine run. output
This routine will print the output report at the end of the
run. It prints the time dependent unavailability data and the
average unavailability distribution data.
define x as a real variable
1 to ntimesfor i
do
let X = time. avail. data (aptr ( i)
)
let time. avail. data(aptr(i) ) = x / ntrial
let X = 1 - time. avail. data(aptr(i)
)
let time. avail. data(aptr(i) ) = x
loop
write as *,/,/
print 6 lines with ntrial thus
AFTER **** TRIALS
THE TIME DEPENDENT UNAVAILABILITY IS AS FOLLOWS
TIME UNAVAILABILITY
for i = 1 to ntimes
do
print 2 lines with time. avail (aptr (i)
)
and time. avail. data(aptr(i) ) thus
Sort the average unavailability distribution data.
define 1, m, n, j, k, and im as integer variables
define xp as a real variable
let m = ntrial
'sortl'
let 1 = m
let m = div.f(l,2)
if m gt
let k = ntrial - m
for j = 1 to k
do
let n = j
'sort2'
let im = n + m
if unavailability. dist(n) gt unavailability. dist{im)
let xp = unavailability. dist(n)
let unavailability. dist(n) = unavailability. dist(im)
let unavailability. dist(im) = xp
let 1 = n








60 if m gt




65 write as *,/,/
66 print 6 lines with ntrial and simulation. time thus
67 AFTER **** TRIALS
68 AND
69 OVER A TIME PERIOD OF ***** HOURS
7 THE AVERAGE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY IS AS FOLLOWS
71
72
73 define xl, x5, x25, x40, x50, x60, x75, x95, and x99
74 as integer variables
75 let xl = div.f (ntrial, 100)
76 let X = 5 * ntrial
77 let x5 - div.f(x,100)
78 let X - 25 * ntrial
79 let x25 = div.f(x,100)
80 let X = 40 * ntrial
81 let x40 = div.f(x,100)
82 let x50 = div.f (ntrial, 2)
83 let X = 60 * ntrial
84 let x60 = div.f(x,100)
85 let X = 75 * ntrial
86 let x75 = div.f(x,100)
87 let X = 95 * ntrial
88 let x95 = div.f(x,100)
89 let X = 99 * ntrial
90 let x99 = div.f(x,100)
91 if xl eq
92 let xl = 1
93 always
94 if x5 eq
95 let x5 = 1
96 always
97 print 27 lines with minimum. unavailability, unavailability. dist(xl)
,
98 unavailability. dist(x5) , unavailability. dist (x25)
,
99 unavailability. dist(x40) , unavailability. dist (x50)
,
100 unavailability. dist(x60) , unavailability. dist (x75)
101 unavailability. dist (x95) , unavailability. dist (x99)
102 maximum. unavailability, average. unavailability,
103 and variance. unavailability thus
104
105 The minimum is: *.****
106
107 The 1st percentile is: *.****
108
109 The 5th percentile is: *.****
110



































The 25th percentile is
The 40th percentile is
The 50th percentile is
The 60th percentile is
The 75th percentile is;
The 95th percentile is




Use this portion to print out all of the average system
unavailability values, one for every trial. These are the
values on which the above percentiles are based.
print 1 line with i and unavailability. dist(i) thus
point **** is *.****
loop
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1 process schedule. avail. samples
This process will cause samples to be taken at the designated
times during each trial to compute the time dependent
availability of the system.
7 define x as a real variable
8
9 wait .002 hours
10 resume the availability called aptr(l)
11 for i = 2 to ntimes
12 do
13 let X " time.avail(aptr(i) ) - time. avail (aptr(i - 1))
14 wait X hours





20 end "schedule. avail . samples
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1 process schedule. external. events
2 ' '
3 '' Schedules external events.
4 "
5 define 1 as an integer variable
6 define x as a real variable
7
8 if n. external. event. record gt
9 wait occurrence. time (eptr ( 1) ) hours
10 resume the external .event called eptr(l)
11 for i = 2 to dim.f (eptr(*))
12 do
13 let X = occurrence. time (eptr ( i) ) - occurrence. time (eptr (i - 1))
14 wait X hours






21 end ' 'schedule. external. events
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1 process stop. scenario
This process will interrupt any external events or components
still scheduled to occur later in time. It then resets all
components so they can begin operation again in the next trial.
call system. update
for every external. event in ev.s(i. external. event)
interrupt external. event
for every component in ev.s (i. component)
do
interrupt component
let time. a (component) = 0.0
loop
for every component in system. cset
do




end ' ' stop . scenario
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1 routine switch given component
Develops output signals for a switch or breaker
using explicit command signals. Assumes that the component







Command Power Process Initial Final Process
Input Input Input State State Output
- - - failed_open failed_open no
- no - open open no
open - - open open no
none - - open open no








- - no failed closed failed_closed no
- - yes failed_closed failed_closed yes
- no no closed closed no
- no yes closed closed yes








none - no closed closed no
none - yes closed closed yes
close - no closed closed no
close - yes closed closed yes16
define rule as a saved 2-dimensional text array
define component as a pointer variable
define index. command, -total. command, number. power, total. power,
number. process, total. process, output. strength, ruletype,
success and j as integer variables
define later. case as a saved integer variable
Enter decision table.
if later. case eq .no
reserve rule as 16 by
let ru]Le(l = "
let ru]Le(l = "
let ru]Le(2 = "
let ru e(2 = "
let ru Le(3 = ><
let ru Le(3 3 »
let ru Le(4 = "
let rule(l,2) = ' II
let rule (1,4) = ' failed_open
let rule(2,2) = no"
let rule(2,4) = •open"
let rule (3, 2) = III
let rule (3, 4) = •open"
let rule(4,2) = III
































let rule(4,3) = "" let rule(4,4) =
let rule(5,l) = "close" let rule(5,2) =
let rule(5,3) = "no" let rule(5,4) =
let rule(6,l) = "close" let rule(6,2) =
let rule(6,3) = "yes" let rule(6,4) =
let rule(7,l) = "" let rule(7,2) =
let rule(7,3) = "no" let rule(7,4) =
let rule(8,l) = "" let rule(8,2) =
let rule (8, 3) = "yes" let rule (8, 4) =
let rule(9,l) = "" let rule(9,2) =
let rule(9,3) = "no" let rule(9,4) =
let rule(10,l) - "" let rule(10,2)
let rule(10,3) = "yes" let rule(10,4)
let rule(ll,l) = "open" let rule(ll,2)
let rule(ll,3) = "no" let rule(ll,4)
let rule(12,l) = "open" let rule(12,2)
let rule(12,3) = "yes" let rule(12,4)
let rule(13,l) = "none" let rule(13,2)
let rule(13,3) = "no" let rule(13,4)
let irule(14,l) = "none" let rule(14,2)
let rule (14, 3) - "yes" let rule (14, 4)
let rule(15,l) = "close" let rule(15,2)
let rule(15,3) = "no" let rule(15,4)
let rule(16,l) = "close" let rule(16,2)
let rule(16,3) = "yes" let rule(16,4)
let later. case = .yes
always
Determine input signal status. Assume that "open" and "close"
commands cancel each other out (respective values of 1 and -1)
.
for every signal in input. sset (component)
do
if signal. type(signal) eq "process"
add 1 to total. process
if strength (signal) eq .on
add 1 to number. process
always
else
if signal. type (signal) eq "power"
add 1 to total. power
if strength(signal) eq .on
add 1 to number. power
always
else
add 1 to total. command




Develop test vector for comparison with rules. Assume that
a single process signal is sufficient, and that a single power
signal is sufficient (i.e., OR gates).
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111 if index. conunand eq -1
112 let test(l) = "close"
113 else
114 if index. command eq
115 let test(l) = "none"
116 else
117 let test(l) = "open"
118 always
119 always
120 if number. power ge 1
121 let test (2) = "yes"
122 else
123 let test{2) - "no"
124 always
125 if number. process ge 1
126 let test (3) - "yes"
127 else
128 let test(3) = "no"
129 always
13 let test (4) = state (component)
131 "
132 '' Determine appropriate rule.
133 "
134 for ruletype = 1 to 16
135 do
136 for j = 1 to 4
137 do
138 if rule (ruletype, j) ne "" and rule(ruletype, j ) ne test(j)
139 go to 'next'
140 always
141 loop




146 ' ' Select rule.
147 "
148 'found'
149 select case ruletype
150
151 case 1
152 let state (component) = "failed_open"
153 let output. strength = .no
154
155 case 2, 3, 4
156 let state (component) = "open"
157 let output. strength = .no
158
159 case 5
160 call demand. test giving component yielding success
161 if success eq .no
162 let state (component) = "failed_open"
163 let output. strength = .no
164 else


























































let output. strength = .no
always
case 6
call demand. test giving component yielding success
if success eq .no
let state (component) = "failed_open"
let output. strength = .no
else
let state (component) = "closed"
let output. strength = .yes
always
case 7
let state (component) = "failed_closed"
let output. strength = .no
case 8
let state (component) = "failed_closed"
let output. strength = .yes
case 9, 13, 15
let state (component) = "closed"
let output. strength = .no
case 10, 14, 16
let state (component) = "closed"
let output. strength = .yes
case 11
call demand. test giving component yielding success
if success eq .no
let state (component) = "failed_closed"
let output. strength = .no
else
let state (component) » "open"
let output. strength = .no
always
case 12
call demand. test giving component yielding success
if success eq .no
let state (component) = "failed_closed"
let output. strength = .yes
else
let state (component) = "open"
let output. strength = .no
always
default




221 " Update output signals.
222 "
223 for every signal in output. sset (component)







1 routine system. update
Updates status of signals in system, given status of all components
Performs iterations until signals stabilize or number of iterations
is exceeded.
Notes:
1) Currently, maximum is set by number of signals. Later
versions might make use of digraph/Petri net results.
2) Current version re-analyzes every component. Later versions
might only re-analyze components whose input changes.
define rf as a subprogram variable
define i, itr, max.itr and number. success
as integer variables
for i = 1 to dim.f (sptr(*))
let signal. status (i) = strength (sptr ( i)
)
let max.itr = dim. f {sptr(*)
)
for itr = 1 to max.itr
1) Check for changed component states and changed input
signals.
2) If found, place a demand on the component, and determine
component response. (Later versions may activate signals
here) . Note that since output signals are updated
in routine response. function, input signals for
downstream components are also updated.
for every component in system. cset
do
if state (component) ne old. state (component)
let rf = response. function (component)
call rf giving component
always
for every signal in input. sset (component)
with strength (signal) ne old. strength (signal)
find the first case
if found
let rf = response. function (component)
call rf giving component
always
loop
Quit iteration if no changes to entire set of signals.
for i = 1 to dim.f (sptr(*)
)
with strength (sptr ( i) ) ne signal. status (i)
find the first case
if found
for i = 1 to dim. f (sptr(*)
)





56 go to 'update'
57 always
58 loop
59 print 2 lines with 24*tiine.v thus
60 ! ! ! Error: Iteration maximum exceeded in routine system. update
61 time = ****.*** hours.
62 "




67 for every component in system. cset
68 do
69 if status (component) eq .working
70 if state (component) ne old. state (component)
71 select case component. type (component)
72
73 case "active", "passive"
74 if State (component) eq "failed"
75 or state (component) eq "standby*"
76 or state (component) eq "operating*"
77 if old. state (component) eq "operating"
78 interrupt the component
79 always
80 let time. a (component) = 0.0
81 resume the component
82 always
83 if state (component) eq "standby"
84 and old. state (component) eq "operating"
85 interrupt the component
86 always
87 if state (component) eq "operating"
88 and old. state (component) eq "standby"
89 let time. a (component) = 0.0
90 let status (component) = .resetting
91 resume the component
92 always
93
94 case "check. valve", "switch", "valve"
95 if state (component) eq "closed"
96 and old. state (component) eq "open"
97 let status (component) = .resetting
98 interrupt the component
99 let time. a (component) = 0.0
100 resume the component
101 always
102 if state (component) eq "open"
103 and old. state (component) eq "closed"
104 let status (component) = .resetting
105 interrupt the component
106 let time. a (component) = 0.0
107 resume the component
108 always
109 if state (component) eq "failed_open"
110 or state (component) eq "failed_closed"
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111 interrupt the component
112 let time. a (component) = 0.0




117 print 1 line thus







125 '' Update status of system, components and signals.
126 "
127 for every signal in system. success. sset
128 do
129 if strength (signal) eq .on
130 add 1 to number. success
131 always
132 loop
133 if number. success ge system. success. criterion
134 let system. state = "good"
135 let system. ind.var = 1
136 else
137 let system. state = "failed"
138 let system. ind.var =
139 always
140
141 call flow. update giving tptr(l)
142
14 3 for every component in system. cset
144 let old. state (component) =» state (component)
145
146 for every signal in system. sset




151 end ' 'system. update
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1 routine trial. initialize
This routine initializes the state of each component
and the strength of each signal at the beginning of
a trial.
define i, j, and k as integer variables
let system, state = trim. f (initial. system. state, 0)
if system. state eq "operating"
let system. ind.var = 1
else
let system. ind.var =
always
Component state initialization.
for i = 1 to n. component. record
do
let old.state(cptr(i)) = trim. f (initial_state(i) , 0)




for i = 1 to n. component. record
do
for j = 1 to number_inputs(i)
do
for every signal in system. sset
with origin(signal) eq "system"
and destination(signal) eq trim. f (component_name(i) , 0)
and signal. type (signal) eq trim. f (input. signal. type(i, j ), 0)
find the first case
if found




for k = 1 to number_outputs(i)
do
for every signal in system. sset
with origin(signal) eq trim. f (component_name(i) , 0)
and destination(signal) eq trim. f (output. name (i,k) , 0)
and signal. type (signal) eq trim. f (output. signal. type (i,k) , 0)
find the first case
if found





id ' 'trial. initialize
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1 routine valve given component
Develops output signals for an MOV or manual valve
using explicit command signals. Assumes that the component







Command Power Process Initial Final Process
Input Input Input State State Output
_ - - failed_closed failed_closed no
- no - closed closed no
close - - closed closed no
none - - closed closed no
open yes no closed failed_closed no

































none - no open open no
none - yes open open yes
open - no open open no
open - yes open open yes16
define rule as a saved 2-dimensional text array
define component as a pointer variable
define index. command, total. command, number. power, total. power,
number. process, total .process, output. strength, ruletype,
success and j as integer variables
define later. case as a saved integer variable
Enter decision table.
if later. case eq .no





let rule(3,l) = "close"
let rule(3,3)
let rule(4,l)
let rule(l 2) = ••
let rule(l 4) = "
let rule(2 2) = "
let rule (2 4) = "
let rule(3 2) = n
let rule(3 4) = ••


































































































let (13 1 = "none"
let
let (14 1 = "none"
let = "yes"
let (15 1 = "open"
let




Determine input signal status. Assume that "open" and "close"
commands cancel each other out (respective values of 1 and -1)
.
for every signal in input. sset (component)
do
if signal. type (signal) eq "process"
add 1 to total. process
if strength (signal) eq .on
add 1 to number. process
always
else
if signal. type (signal) eq "power"
add 1 to total. power
if strength (signal) eq .on
add 1 to number. power
always
else
add 1 to total. command




Develop test vector for comparison with rules. Assume that
a single process signal is sufficient, and that a single power
signal is sufficient (i.e., OR gates).
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111 if index . command eq -1
112 let test(l) = "close"
113 else
114 if index. command eq
115 let test(l) = "none"
116 else
117 let test(l) = "open"
118 always
119 always
120 if number. power ge 1
121 let test(2) - "yes"
122 else
123 let test(2) - "no"
124 always
125 "
126 " By changing the test for number of process inputs, it is
127 '' possible to simulate k-out-of-n components.
128 "
129 if number. process ge 1
130 let test(3) = "yes"
131 else
132 let test (3) = "no"
133 always
134 let test(4) =» state (component)
135 "
136 '' Determine appropriate rule.
137 "
138 for ruletype = 1 to 16
139 do
140 for j = 1 to 4
141 do
142 if rule (ruletype, j) ne "" and rule (ruletype, j) ne test(j)
143 go to 'next'
144 always
14 5 loop




150 " Select rule.
151 "
152 'found'
153 select case ruletype
154
155 case 1
156 let state (component) = "failed_closed"
157 let output. strength = .no
158
159 case 2, 3, 4
160 let state (component) = "closed"
161 let output. strength = .no
162
163 case 5
164 call demand. test giving component yielding success
165 if success eq .no
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166 let state (component) = "failed_closed"
167 let output. strength = .no
168 else
169 let state (component) = "open"




174 call demand. test giving component yielding success
175 if success eq .no
176 let state (component) = •'failed_closed"
177 let output. strength = .no
178 else
179 let state (component) = "open"




184 let state (component) = "failed_open"
185 let output. strength = .no
186
187 case 8
188 let state (component) = "failed_open"
189 let output. strength = .yes
190
191 case 9, 13, 15
192 let state (component) = "open"
193 let output. strength = .no
194
195 case 10, 14, 16
196 let state (component) = "open"
197 let output. strength = .yes
198
199 case 11
200 call demand. test giving component yielding success
201 if success eq .no
202 let state (component) = ••failed_open"
203 let output. strength =» .no
204 else
205 let state (component) = "closed"




210 call demand. test giving component yielding success
211 if success eq .no
212 let state (component) = "failed_open"
213 let output. strength = .yes
214 else
215 let state (component) = "closed"
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225 " Update output signals.
226 "
227 for every signal in output. sset (component)











1 routine flow. update given tank
2 "
3 '' Determine the new flow rate if it has changed.
4 "
5 define tank as a pointer variable
6 let flow. rate. in(tank) =
7 let flow. rate. out (tank) =
8 for every component in tank. input. cset (tank)
9 do
10 if name (component) eq "unit2"
11 if state (component) eq "open"
12 or state (component) eq "failed_open"
13 add 0.01 to flow. rate. in (tank)
14 always
15 else
16 if name (component) eq "unit3"
17 if state (component) eq "open"
18 or state (component) eq "failed_open"





24 for every component in tank. output. cset (tank)
25 do
26 if state (component) eq "open"
27 or state (component) eq "failed_open"






3 4 end '' flow. update
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1 process stop. tank
6 for every tank in ev.s(i.tank)
7 do
8 interrupt the tank
9 loop
10
11 for every tank in system. tset
12 do
13 let level (tank) = 100.0
14 let tiine.a(tank) = 0.0





20 end "stop. tank
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1 process tank
2 ' '
3 ' ' This routine will continuously monitor the water level




8 while time.v It (simulation. time + 10)
This portion of the routine determines if the tank is in the
proper control region and calls the tank update routine to
make changes if necessary.
work continuously evaluating 'water. level' testing 'tank. condition'
let net. flow. rate(tank) = flow. rate. in (tank) - flow. rate. out (tank)
if level (tank) gt 90.0
go to 'tankreset'
otherwise
call tank. update giving tank
if level (tank) gt high. level (tank)









1 function tank. condition (tank)
This function will cause calling of the tank update
routine if the tank status is not satisfactory.
define tank as a pointer variable
Use this method to adjust tank flow rate only at the
end of integration time steps.
define x as a real variable
let X = flow. rate. in(tank) - flow. rate. out (tank)
if net. flow. rate (tank) ne x
return with 1
otherwise
Is the tank too full?
if level (tank) gt high. level (tank)
return with 1
otherwise
Is the tank too empty?
if level (tank) It low. level (tank)
return with 1
otherwise
Is the tank level high and the control state wrong?
if level(tank) gt high. set (tank)
for every component in system. cset
do
if name (component) eq "unitl"
and state (component) eq "closed"
return with 1
otherwise
if name (component) eq "unit2"
and state (component) eq "open"
return with 1
otherwise
if name (component) eq "unit3"





' Is the tank level low and the control state wrong?
if level (tank) It low. set (tank)
for every component in system. cset
do
if name (component) eq "unitl"
and state (component) eq "open"
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56 return with 1
57 otherwise
58 if name (component) eq "unit2"
59 and state (component) eq "closed"
60 return with 1
61 otherwise
62 if name (component) eq "unit3"
63 and state (component) eq "closed"





69 " Is the tank level satisfactory and the control state wrong?
70 "
71 if level (tank) le high.set(tank)
72 and level (tank) ge low. set (tank)
73 for every component in system. cset
74 do
75 if name (component) eq "unitl"
76 and state (component) eq "closed"
77 return with 1
78 otherwise
79 if name (component) eq "unit2"
80 and state (component) eq "closed"
81 return with 1
82 otherwise
83 if name (component) eq "unit3"
84 and state (component) eq "open"






91 end "tank. condition
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1 routine tank. initialize. run
This routine initializes all of the variables associated
with the Aldemir Tank Problem. Initializes for the number
of trials to be performed.
define signal. count as an integer variable
let integrator. V = 'runge.kutta.r'
let max. step. V = 0.04166666666667
let min.step.v = 0.04166666666667





reserve tptr(*) as 1
activate a tank called tptr(l) now
file tptr(l) in system. tset
let high. level (tptr(l) ) =3.0
let low. level (tptr(l)) = -3.0
let high.set(tptr(l)) = 1.0
let low.set(tptr(l)) = -1.0
Must create all of the Tank output signals since the base
program does not recognize the tank as a component. These
signals include three command signals (one to each valve)
,
the tank process output to the outlet valve, and the process
output signal to the system for system status checking.
let signal. count = 9
create a signal called sptr(signal. count)
let signal. type(sptr(signal. count) ) = "command"
let origin(sptr(signal. count) ) = "tank"
let destination(sptr(signal. count) ) = "unitl"
for every component in system. cset
with name (component) eq "unitl"
find the first case
if found
file sptr (signal. count) in input. sset (component)
always
file sptr (signal. count) in tank. output. sset (tptr(l)
)
file sptr (signal. count) in system. sset
add 1 to signal. count
create a signal called sptr (signal. count)
let signal. type(sptr(signal. count) ) = "command"
let origin (sptr (signal. count) ) = "tank"
let destination(sptr(signal. count) ) = "unit2"
for every component in system. cset
with name (component) eq "unit2"
find the first case
if found
file sptr (signal .count) in input. sset (component)
always
file sptr (signal. count) in tank. output. sset (tptr(l)
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56 file sptr (signal .count) in system. sset
57 ' '
58 add 1 to signal. count
59 create a signal called sptr (signal .count)
60 let signal. type(sptr(signal. count) ) = "command"
61 let origin(sptr(signal. count) ) = "tank"
62 let destination(sptr(signal. count) ) = "unit3"
63 for every component in system. cset
64 with name (component) eq "unit3"
65 find the first case
66 if found
67 file sptr (signal. count) in input. sset (component)
68 always
69 file sptr(signal. count) in tank. output. sset (tptr(l)
)
70 file sptr (signal. count) in system. sset
71 "
72 add 1 to signal. count
73 create a signal called sptr (signal. count)
74 let signal. type (sptr (signal. count) ) = "process"
75 let origin(sptr(signal. count) ) = "tank"
76 let destination(sptr(signal. count) ) = "unitl"
77 for every component in system. cset
78 with name (component) eq "unitl"
79 find the first case
80 if found
81 file sptr (signal. count) in input. sset (component)
82 always
83 file sptr (signal. count) in tank. output. sset (tptr(l)
)
84 file sptr(signal. count) in system. sset
85 "
86 add 1 to signal. count
87 create a signal called sptr (signal. count)
88 let signal. type (sptr (signal. count) ) = "process"
89 let origin(sptr(signal. count) ) = "tank"
90 let destination (sptr (signal. count) ) = "system"
91 file sptr (signal. count) in tank. output. sset (tptr ( 1)
)
92 file sptr (signal. count) in system. sset
93 file sptr (signal. count) in system. success. sset
94 for every component in system. cset
95 do
96 for every signal in output. sset (component)
97 do
98 if destination (signal) eq "tank"
99 file signal in tank. input. sset(tptr(l)
)




103 for every signal in input. sset (component)
104 with signal. type (signal) eq "process"
105 do
106 if origin(signal) eq "tank"










114 end "tank, initialize. run
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1 routine tank. initialize. trial
2 '
'
3 ' ' This routine will reset the appropriate values to begin
4 " a new trial with the tank operating correctly.
5 "
6 let level (tptr(l)) =0.0
7 let net. flow. rate ( tptr ( 1) ) =0.0




11 ' ' Turn on the flow output and test signal from the tank.
12 "
13 if signal. type (signal) = "process"
14 let strength (signal) = .on
15 always
16 "
17 " Turn off the command signals for the valves to change position.
18 "
19 if signal. type (signal) = "command"






26 end ' 'tank. initialize. trial
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1 routine tank. update given tank
This routine determines the flow going in and out of the
tank and controls the opening and closing of the inlet and
outlet valves. If the tank should happen to dryout or over
flow this routine will suspend the tank routine.
define tank as a pointer variable
This is to track dryout.
if level (tank) It low. level (tank)
for every signal in tank. output. sset (tank)
with signal. type (signal) eq "process"
do




This is to track overflow.
if level (tank) gt high. level (tank)
for every signal in tank. output. sset (tank)
with destination (signal) eq "system"
do




if level (tank) It low. set (tank)
Close the outlet valve and open both inlet valves.
for every component in tank. output. cset (tank)
do
for every signal in input. sset (component)
with signal. type (signal) eq "command"
do
let strength (signal) = -1
loop
loop
for every component in tank. input. cset (tank)
do
for every signal in input. sset (component)
with signal. type (signal) eq "command"
do





if level (tank) gt high. set (tank)
Open the outlet valve and close both inlet valves.
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for every component in tank. output. cset( tank)
do
for every signal in input. sset (component)
with signal. type (signal) eq "command"
do
let strength (signal) = 1
loop
loop
for every component in tank. input. cset( tank)
do
for every signal in input. sset (component)
with signal. type (signal) eq "command"
do





If the level of the tank is in the operating range,
open the outlet valve (unit 1) and the inlet valve from
unit2, but close the inlet valve from unit3.
for every component in tank. output. cset (tank)
do
for every signal in input. sset (component)
with signal. type(signal) eq "command"
do
let strength (signal) = 1
loop
loop
for every component in tank. input. cset (tank)
do
if name (component) eq "unit2"
for every signal in input. sset (component)
with signal. type (signal) eq "command"
do
let strength (signal) = 1
loop
else
if name (component) eq "unit3"
for every signal in input. sset (component)









107 call system. update
108 return
109
110 end "tank. update

Dynamic Simulation Model 255
1 routine water. level (tank)
2 "
3 '' This routine supplies the integration rule for the continuous
4 " variable level of the tank.
5 "
6 define tank as a pointer variable
7 let d.level(tank) = net. flow. rate(tank) *1440.
8 "
9 ' ' We have left the time step as days and are reading flow rates
10 " as meter level change per minute thus the factor of 1440 above.
11 '
'
12 end ' 'water. level






EXP REPAIR AND FAILURE, DUAL REPAIR STATES
Time of simulation
Type of run (0 for normal)
100 Number of trials
21 Number of time points
1 Type of time distribution
1 Number of components
COMPONENT passive operating 1 1 Component one
0.0 0.01 Failure data
1.0 100.0 1.0 Repair data
system process 1 Input signal
system process 1 Output signal
standby Initial system state
1 System success criteria
Number of external events



















































Type of run (0 for normal)
Number of trials
Number of time points
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AFTER 100 TRIALS
AND
OVER A TIME PERIOD OF 10000 HOURS
THE AVERAGE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY IS AS FOLLOWS
The minimum is: .5510
The 1st percentile is; .5510
The 5th percentile is: .5804
The 25th percentile is: .6343
The 40th percentile is: .6538
The 50th percentile is: .6618
The 60th percentile is: .6740
The 75th percentile is: .7002
The 95th percentile is: .7440
The 99th percentile is: .7579
The maximum is: .7732
The mean is: .664 4




























Dynamic Simulation Model 265
point 1 is .5510
point 2 is .5622
point 3 is .5700
point 4 is .5787
point 5 is .5804
point 6 is .5836
point 7 is .5883
point 8 is .5956
point 9 is .5962
point 10 is .5967
point 11 is .5976
point 12 is .5997
point 13 is .6006
point 14 is .6056
point 15 is .6095
point 16 is .6121
point 17 is .6122
point 18 is .6167
point 19 is .6179
point 20 is .6223
point 21 is .6233
point 22 is .6264
point 23 is .6321
point 24 is .6342
point 25 is .6343
point 26 is .6371
point 27 is .6374
point 28 is .6399
point 29 is .6414
point 30 is .6430
point 31 is .6444
point 32 is .6454
point 33 is .6464
point 34 is .6465
point 35 is .6477
point 36 is .6481
point 37 is .6494
point 38 is .6500
point 39 is .6525
point 40 is .6538
point 41 is .6540
point 42 is .'6544
point 43 is .6547
point 44 is .6555
point 45 is .6568
point 46 is .6586
point 47 is .6597
point 48 is .6617
point 49 is .6617
point 50 is .6618
point 51 is .6620
point 52 is .6626
point 53 is .6633
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point 54 is .6647
point 55 is .6661
point 56 is .6671
point 57 is .6674
point 58 is .6680
point 59 is .6694
point 60 is .6740
point 61 is .6742
point 62 is .6756
point 63 is .6763
point 64 is .6821
point 65 is .6835
point 66 is .6850
point 67 is .6875
point 68 is .6876
point 69 is .6879
point 70 is .6922
point 71 is .6932
point 72 is .6967
point 73 is .6978
point 74 is .6996
point 75 is .7002
point 76 is .7023
point 77 is .7040
point 78 is .7049
point 79 is .7064
point 80 is .7064
point 81 is .7084
point 82 is .7085
point 83 is .7097
point 84 is .7136
point 85 is .7146
point 86 is .7180
point 87 is .7185
point 88 is .7218
point 89 is .7243
point 90 is .7248
point 91 is .7260
point 92 is .7273
point 93 is .7375
point 94 is .7416
point 95 is .7440
point 96 is .7502
point 97 is .7523
point 98 is .7541
point 99 is .7579
point 100 is .7732
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AFTER 1000 TRIALS
AND
OVER A TIME PERIOD OF 2 HOURS
THE AVERAGE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY IS AS FOLLOWS
The minimum is: .0000
The 1st percentile is: .0000
The 5th percentile is: .0000
The 25th percentile is: .0000
The 40th percentile is: .0000
The 50th percentile is: .004 4
The 60th percentile is: .0492
The 75th percentile is: 1.0000
The 95th percentile is: 1.0000
The 99th percentile is: 1.0000
The maximum is: 1.0000
The mean is: .3416
The variance is: .2024
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AFTERIOOOO TRIALS













OVER A TIME PERIOD OF 2 HOURS
THE AVERAGE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY IS AS FOLLOWS
The minimum is: .0000
The 1st percentile is: .0000
The 5th percentile is: .0000
The 25th percentile is: .0000
The 40th percentile is: .0000
The 50th percentile is: .0033
The 60th percentile is: .0289
The 75th percentile is: 1.0000
The 95th percentile is: 1.0000
The 99th percentile is: 1.0000
The maximum is: 1.0000
The mean is: .3225
The variance is: .1944
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AFTER 1000 TRIALS
THE UNAVAILABILITY DISTRIBUTION DATA IS AS FOLLOWS
The minimum is: .00 00
The 1st percentile is: .0000
The 5th percentile is: .0000
The 25th percentile is: .0000
The 40th percentile is: .0000
The median is: .0000
The mean is: .2155
The 60th percentile is: .0000
The 75th percentile is: .4840
The 95th percentile is: .8701
The 99th percentile is: .954
The maximum is: .9790
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